A New York Times story published on December 23rd has suggested U.S. support for Sunni Awakening groups might be increasing the chances of civil war in Iraq. The Awakening groups have grown to possibly 80,000 troops and may soon reach 100,000 troops overall. Iraq's government is concerned this large force may end up being used against it. However, there is another possibility that the Sunni Awakening groups could end with a new united Iraqi government and army. Turkey could provide the perfect catalyst.
Turkey has been launching even more attacks on Northern Iraq. The continued bombardment of Northern Iraq, which has just begun increasing could be a sign that Turkey's building up in preparation for a full-scale invasion. A recent attack in Istanbul blamed on the PKK may provide even stronger incentive for Turkey to invade Iraqi Kurdistan. If Turkey actually does invade the Kurds in the north are likely to fight back. A major war breaking out could also draw Iran into Iraq.
In this event several groups such as the Awakening militias and Moqtada al-Sadr's forces could rush to fight alongside the Kurds. After this it's likely Iraqis will rally around one of the major leaders in among them and forge a new government, toppling the Maliki government backed by the U.S.
Al-Sadr appears to be grooming himself for just this possibility getting deep into Islamic studies, eyeing the possibility of becoming an Ayatollah. Becoming such a religious leader would allow him to challenge his rival al-Sistani and his Badr Brigade. Al-Sadr has one strength in his Iraqi and Arab heritage, compared to Sistani's Iranian birth. By establishing himself as legitimate religious authority al-Sadr would be able to build his movement even larger and become a true national leader.
To this end it's believe his recent cease-fire is aimed at increasing the strength of his Mahdi Army. The aim is to provide an Iraqi militia modeled after Hezbollah, with significant religious, political, and military power. Sadr's aim may be to have an effective state within a state in Iraq. He is also using this time to weed out those responsible for sectarian killings in his militia. This will help to end the strife between al-Sadr and the Sunni population.
Al-Sadr has been reaching out to this very community in an attempt to form an alliance against the United States. The Awakening movements may provide the perfect chance for al-Sadr to forge an Iraqi national resistance against the U.S. occupation and Maliki government. If recent events are any indication it's possible the Kurds could also join up with the resistance.
Kurdish leaders have increasingly been in disagreement with the Maliki government over a variety of issues. Part of the problem is Kurdish oil deals signed with foreign countries, which Iraq's government rejects and has declared them void. In addition they've asked for a specific portion of the oil revenue in the country. There is also the contentious issue of Kirkuk and its referendum on joining the Kurdish region. Not only that but Iraq's government wants the Kurdish region to reduce its large army which is believed to be as large as 180,000 troops down to only about 25,000 troops which they claim is the limit given in previous agreements.
These issues all run the risk of ending the crucial support of Maliki from the Kurds, which would bring down the ruling government. While it's possible other factions will not agree with the demands of the Kurds either they may be willing to forge a coalition with them in order to remove the Maliki government.
U.S. support of Turkey's strikes in Northern Iraq is also threatening ties between the U.S. and the Kurds. A Kurdish leader over a week ago refused to meet with Condoleeza Rice. If Turkey launches an invasion of Northern Iraq it will most likely not be blocked by the United States, which has the likely possibility of alienating the Kurds completely who would look for new allies and may find them in Sadr and the Awakening movements. Sadr supporting the Kurds against Turkey and possibly Iran would also legitimize him before the Sunnis as well, making it more likely they would join them along with the Kurds. An alliance of the Kurdish Regional Government, the Awakening movement, and Al-Sadr could lead to the formation of a unity government with representation from Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites with a large capable of army around 350,000 troops strong and one completely opposed to foreign interference and occupation, unfortunately for the U.S.
Friday, December 28, 2007
The Coming Wars of Independence
Kosovo's President condemned a Serbian resolution calling for cutting ties with countries that recognize Kosovo among other retaliatory measures. He referred to the resolution as a form of aggression and stated Serbia's policy has led to nothing but bloodshed.
Ironically it may be the case that Kosovo Albanians may end up causing bloodshed. The most likely area of conflict will be in Northern Kosovo. According to a member of the Albanian National Army his militia will send its troops into Northern Kosovo to defend Albanians as soon as Kosovo declares independence. They would also be deployed in the northern part of Mitrovica a city in Northern Kosovo. Apparently their troops have been spending the past few months on mobilization and logistics.
Should these troops move up north they are likely to come into conflict with Serbs in the north, some who are effectively Serbian police in the region. Serbs in the region are also strongly connected to Serbia with some even hanging pictures of the Serbian Radical party leader Vojislav Seselj who is on trial for war crimes. A very light presence of NATO forces exists in the north, around 500 German troops and 200 U.S. troops, a force hardly suitable for preventing a conflict between Albanian militias and Serbs.
According to one Serb in Northern Kosovo, Serbia has worked out a plan with Russia to send in Russian military advisers and weapons shipments to allow Serbia to retake the north. He says these advisers would easily be able to cross the border with Kosovo. In the south of Kosovo, however, several Serbs are planning to move up north to Serbia as soon as independence or have already left.
A mass movement of Serbs up into Serbia would be a disastrous outcome for Kosovo's government and Albanian militias seeking to protect Albanians in Northern Kosovo may clash with Serbs trying to protect Serbs from Albanian attacks. An attack would be all the justification Serbia needs to send its troops into Kosovo and spark a new war in the Balkans.
Of course, this will not end at Kosovo. There are dozens of frozen conflicts waiting for the Kosovo precedent to stake their claim to independence. In the Balkans there are several Albanian communities wanting to leave their countries and join a Greater Albania. On the other side there are also Serb communities wishing to break off and join Serbia, most notably Srpska in Bosnia. A push for independence by Srpska would mean an automatic war with Bosnia.
To provide the most notable example of how Srpska's independence means an instant war one has too look at how the country is divided:
Srpska is the red region and the light green region is Brcko District, which is shared jointly by Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia. Effectively, Srpska is cut in half by Brcko district an ethnically mixed region with slightly more Bosniaks than Serbs and a minority of Croats. More importantly is that Srpska's de-facto capital, Banja Luka would be cut off from Serbia and it has no sea access. This makes a war effectively required in order for Srpska to secede as part of its territory is also part of the Federation of Bosnia and is a crucial connecting point between Srpska's capital and the rest of the region.
Other than the Balkans some unrecocgnized states in the Soviet Union are likely to declare their independence. One notable case is South Ossetia which is saying in 2008 they expect to be united with North Ossetia in Russia. This would be seen as declaration of war by Georgia who would undoubtedly rush to invade the unrecognized state as well as Abkhazia and may draw Russia into the conflict.
Kosovo's precedent could be used by Northern Cyrpus as well. A senior Turkish Cypriot official claims 2008 is the last window of opportunity for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict and that the EU is prepared to go forward with a plan for recognizing Northern Cyprus's independence, which Cyprus is blocking.
In Africa the precedent of Kosovo is possible for Western Sahara and Somaliland. Western Sahara's Polisario Front has warned they'll resume war with Morocco if no progress is made in talks on its status. This would likely be done after Polisario's Congress next June or July. Somaliland may also be recognized next year as well which could mean a war with Somalia as Somaliland plans to extend itself to the former border of British Somaliland.
With other possible independence conflicts arising in Taiwan, Madhesh, and Kurdistan which is aiming for a Kirkuk referendum the year 2008 could be a year of wars.
Ironically it may be the case that Kosovo Albanians may end up causing bloodshed. The most likely area of conflict will be in Northern Kosovo. According to a member of the Albanian National Army his militia will send its troops into Northern Kosovo to defend Albanians as soon as Kosovo declares independence. They would also be deployed in the northern part of Mitrovica a city in Northern Kosovo. Apparently their troops have been spending the past few months on mobilization and logistics.
Should these troops move up north they are likely to come into conflict with Serbs in the north, some who are effectively Serbian police in the region. Serbs in the region are also strongly connected to Serbia with some even hanging pictures of the Serbian Radical party leader Vojislav Seselj who is on trial for war crimes. A very light presence of NATO forces exists in the north, around 500 German troops and 200 U.S. troops, a force hardly suitable for preventing a conflict between Albanian militias and Serbs.
According to one Serb in Northern Kosovo, Serbia has worked out a plan with Russia to send in Russian military advisers and weapons shipments to allow Serbia to retake the north. He says these advisers would easily be able to cross the border with Kosovo. In the south of Kosovo, however, several Serbs are planning to move up north to Serbia as soon as independence or have already left.
A mass movement of Serbs up into Serbia would be a disastrous outcome for Kosovo's government and Albanian militias seeking to protect Albanians in Northern Kosovo may clash with Serbs trying to protect Serbs from Albanian attacks. An attack would be all the justification Serbia needs to send its troops into Kosovo and spark a new war in the Balkans.
Of course, this will not end at Kosovo. There are dozens of frozen conflicts waiting for the Kosovo precedent to stake their claim to independence. In the Balkans there are several Albanian communities wanting to leave their countries and join a Greater Albania. On the other side there are also Serb communities wishing to break off and join Serbia, most notably Srpska in Bosnia. A push for independence by Srpska would mean an automatic war with Bosnia.
To provide the most notable example of how Srpska's independence means an instant war one has too look at how the country is divided:
Srpska is the red region and the light green region is Brcko District, which is shared jointly by Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia. Effectively, Srpska is cut in half by Brcko district an ethnically mixed region with slightly more Bosniaks than Serbs and a minority of Croats. More importantly is that Srpska's de-facto capital, Banja Luka would be cut off from Serbia and it has no sea access. This makes a war effectively required in order for Srpska to secede as part of its territory is also part of the Federation of Bosnia and is a crucial connecting point between Srpska's capital and the rest of the region.Other than the Balkans some unrecocgnized states in the Soviet Union are likely to declare their independence. One notable case is South Ossetia which is saying in 2008 they expect to be united with North Ossetia in Russia. This would be seen as declaration of war by Georgia who would undoubtedly rush to invade the unrecognized state as well as Abkhazia and may draw Russia into the conflict.
Kosovo's precedent could be used by Northern Cyrpus as well. A senior Turkish Cypriot official claims 2008 is the last window of opportunity for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict and that the EU is prepared to go forward with a plan for recognizing Northern Cyprus's independence, which Cyprus is blocking.
In Africa the precedent of Kosovo is possible for Western Sahara and Somaliland. Western Sahara's Polisario Front has warned they'll resume war with Morocco if no progress is made in talks on its status. This would likely be done after Polisario's Congress next June or July. Somaliland may also be recognized next year as well which could mean a war with Somalia as Somaliland plans to extend itself to the former border of British Somaliland.
With other possible independence conflicts arising in Taiwan, Madhesh, and Kurdistan which is aiming for a Kirkuk referendum the year 2008 could be a year of wars.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
2008, a year of conflict
BBC News reporter Nick Thorpe wrote an article on the developing conflict in the Balkans. In it he suggested, "2008 could be the year the clouds of war finally disappear." I can't help but admire his irrational optimism.
His biggest mistake, like with all reports in Western Europe and the United States is the presumptuous belief that Serbia can be easily pacified and isn't going to fight what it knows to be a losing battle. Of course, Serbia doesn't have to defeat NATO to win the battle. Not being able to understand this is why there's a rush to recognize Kosovo and little worry about the consequences.
One of the most foolish and possibly dangerous presumptions is that Serbia will give up Kosovo for EU membership. While President Boris Tadic is pro-European and would continue on the European path Vojislav Kostunica is a nationalist. Tadic's tacit approval of trading Kosovo for EU membership is believed to be why he scheduled a presidential election for January 20th. The EU's schedule for signing the SAA, a step towards entry talks, on January 28th is believed to be aimed at propping up Tadic before an expected second round of votes in the presidential election.
However, ambitiously propping up Tadic may due far more harm then good to the pro-European faction in Serbia. Kostunica has threatened to form a new coalition with the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party which would command a majority of 128 seats, only two seats less than the current three-party coalition. If Kosovo declares its independence any time before February 3rd it could help the Serbian Radical Party's Tomislav Nikolic take the presidency where most polls show him and Tadic in a dead heat during the second round. A win for Nikolic is especially likely if Tadic appears willing to trade Kosovo for EU membership.
This would create a situation where the government is under the complete control of nationalists. Tadic's only chance would be to call a general election, however this might only serve to delay and could work in favor of the nationalists standing to gain off a declaration of independence by Kosovo. In interest of avoiding such a scenario Kostunica may refrain from taking sides until the presidential election is over and the new president is sworn in about two weeks later. In this case Kosovo may be able to gain two weeks without having to worry about reprisals from Serbia.
Tadic's conflict with Kostunica though, may have already been resolved after a resolution was backed by Tadic's party. The resolution calls for no agreement to be signed without recognizing Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, implying that any agreement with Serbia must consider Kosovo as a part of Serbia. It also calls for stopping movement towards joining NATO. In particular Tadic suggested he would send in the Serbian army if Kosovo Serbs come under attack, though only with international support.
His willingness to do this is, however, in question and it's blamed largely on election politics. It's seemingly a shallow and transparent attempt at improving his poll numbers, but it could work all the same, presuming Kosovo keeps up its end in this bargain and does not declare independence until after February 3rd.
In this area Kosovo has already made its first big step towards independence:
Thorpe is also dismissive of Srpska and a move towards independence by them. This in itself seems to be little more than wishful thinking. Srpska's president has actually stated he would call a referendum on independence is Kosovo was recognized. Controversial police reforms are being delayed until mid-February, right after the Serbian elections. Should Nikolic win the presidency and his party forge a nationalist government Dodik may decide to call a referendum on independence or, if blocked in this move, declare independence outright. Such an event will mean nothing short of war as Srpska is cut in two by the Brcko district belonging to both the Serb entity and the Bosnian Federation. Nikolic and Kostunica would rush to support Bosnian Serbs, reigniting conflict in the Balkans.
One potential outcome which could inflame Serb irredentist interests is a push by the newly independent Kosovo to join with Albania. A member of Kosovo's government has suggested this as an inevitable outcome of independence. Current Prime Minister Agim Ceku has also stated this as a possibility, particularly if Serbia tries to force secession of Northern Kosovo. What exists in Kosovo now is a partition in fact and in the event of independence Serbia could push the north towards secession, especially if there is violence against Serbs. Irredentism from Kosovo would further push Serb irredentism and encourage Srpska to secede from Bosnia and join Serbia. It also could push Serbia into conflict with Albania.
While it's unlikely Serbia would ever be paid off by EU membership and this has actually served more to enrage Serbs then pacify them the same can not be said for other Balkan states. Macedonia and Montenegro, despite having reason to worry about Albanian irredentism, both having ethnic Albanian communities, appear set for recognizing Kosovo. Macedonia will, however, benefit from an invitation for NATO membership in April 2008. Albania will also be given NATO membership and Croatia, which could be faced with problems of Serb irredentism incited by Kosovo's independence and has an ethnic interest in preserving Bosnia. Croatia could also see its EU talks sped up towards reaching a 2010 accession date. Montenegro, likewise could be put on the fast track for EU and NATO membership, with EU accession as soon as 2012, according to member of the European Parliament.
This would stand to make Serbia's position worse, but also open room for far greater conflict. A merger of Kosovo with Albania would likely take place after NATO membership and with all four as NATO members Serbia would be almost completely surrounded by NATO members, making almost any conflict in the Balkans a conflict with all of NATO. Serbia's only option would then be to join the CSTO thus making any war in the Balkans a war between the U.S. and Russia.
However, while the optimists will ignorantly seek to allay concerns about the Balkans seeing renewed conflict they tend to ignore the ramifications outside of Europe. Most prominently is the development in Russia:
Fallout from Kosovo could go further into Taiwan which is also heading towards a likely war due to a referendum on joining the U.N. with the name Taiwan which both China and the U.S. see as provocation, despite the fact Taiwan will never make it into the U.N. Not only could Kosovo's independence and recognition help the pro-independence DPP win in the legislative and presidential elections another event may make this more likely. It all depends on a court verdict on Friday. If KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou is found guilty and sentenced to 10 years or more or convicted on breach-of-trust he'll be unable to run for president. This will effectively guarantee a victory for Frank Hsieh of the DPP and could carry on to the KMT's performance in the legislative elections. Faced with the prospect of a DPP-controlled government, especially one with a two-thirds majority needed for changes to the constitution, and a successful referendum China may decide to launch an attack on Taiwan.
Suffice to say the clouds of war will probably not disappear, but instead darken and spread.
His biggest mistake, like with all reports in Western Europe and the United States is the presumptuous belief that Serbia can be easily pacified and isn't going to fight what it knows to be a losing battle. Of course, Serbia doesn't have to defeat NATO to win the battle. Not being able to understand this is why there's a rush to recognize Kosovo and little worry about the consequences.
One of the most foolish and possibly dangerous presumptions is that Serbia will give up Kosovo for EU membership. While President Boris Tadic is pro-European and would continue on the European path Vojislav Kostunica is a nationalist. Tadic's tacit approval of trading Kosovo for EU membership is believed to be why he scheduled a presidential election for January 20th. The EU's schedule for signing the SAA, a step towards entry talks, on January 28th is believed to be aimed at propping up Tadic before an expected second round of votes in the presidential election.
However, ambitiously propping up Tadic may due far more harm then good to the pro-European faction in Serbia. Kostunica has threatened to form a new coalition with the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party which would command a majority of 128 seats, only two seats less than the current three-party coalition. If Kosovo declares its independence any time before February 3rd it could help the Serbian Radical Party's Tomislav Nikolic take the presidency where most polls show him and Tadic in a dead heat during the second round. A win for Nikolic is especially likely if Tadic appears willing to trade Kosovo for EU membership.
This would create a situation where the government is under the complete control of nationalists. Tadic's only chance would be to call a general election, however this might only serve to delay and could work in favor of the nationalists standing to gain off a declaration of independence by Kosovo. In interest of avoiding such a scenario Kostunica may refrain from taking sides until the presidential election is over and the new president is sworn in about two weeks later. In this case Kosovo may be able to gain two weeks without having to worry about reprisals from Serbia.
Tadic's conflict with Kostunica though, may have already been resolved after a resolution was backed by Tadic's party. The resolution calls for no agreement to be signed without recognizing Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, implying that any agreement with Serbia must consider Kosovo as a part of Serbia. It also calls for stopping movement towards joining NATO. In particular Tadic suggested he would send in the Serbian army if Kosovo Serbs come under attack, though only with international support.
His willingness to do this is, however, in question and it's blamed largely on election politics. It's seemingly a shallow and transparent attempt at improving his poll numbers, but it could work all the same, presuming Kosovo keeps up its end in this bargain and does not declare independence until after February 3rd.
In this area Kosovo has already made its first big step towards independence:
Kosovo's two main political parties have agreed to form a coalition government which will lead the breakaway province towards independence from Serbia early next year, party sources said on Wednesday.While both the President and Prime Minister have pledged to work with the EU and US, they've also declared independence is "weeks away" just last week. Regardless of when Kosovo declares its independence the EU and US all plan to recognize it. So if Tadic follows up an independence declaration from Kosovo by signing the SAA, it could kill his support in presidential elections, giving Nikolic the presidency. He would likely assume office around February 17th. Kostunica then would be free to abandon the current governing coalition and join with the Radical Party.
Thorpe is also dismissive of Srpska and a move towards independence by them. This in itself seems to be little more than wishful thinking. Srpska's president has actually stated he would call a referendum on independence is Kosovo was recognized. Controversial police reforms are being delayed until mid-February, right after the Serbian elections. Should Nikolic win the presidency and his party forge a nationalist government Dodik may decide to call a referendum on independence or, if blocked in this move, declare independence outright. Such an event will mean nothing short of war as Srpska is cut in two by the Brcko district belonging to both the Serb entity and the Bosnian Federation. Nikolic and Kostunica would rush to support Bosnian Serbs, reigniting conflict in the Balkans.
One potential outcome which could inflame Serb irredentist interests is a push by the newly independent Kosovo to join with Albania. A member of Kosovo's government has suggested this as an inevitable outcome of independence. Current Prime Minister Agim Ceku has also stated this as a possibility, particularly if Serbia tries to force secession of Northern Kosovo. What exists in Kosovo now is a partition in fact and in the event of independence Serbia could push the north towards secession, especially if there is violence against Serbs. Irredentism from Kosovo would further push Serb irredentism and encourage Srpska to secede from Bosnia and join Serbia. It also could push Serbia into conflict with Albania.
While it's unlikely Serbia would ever be paid off by EU membership and this has actually served more to enrage Serbs then pacify them the same can not be said for other Balkan states. Macedonia and Montenegro, despite having reason to worry about Albanian irredentism, both having ethnic Albanian communities, appear set for recognizing Kosovo. Macedonia will, however, benefit from an invitation for NATO membership in April 2008. Albania will also be given NATO membership and Croatia, which could be faced with problems of Serb irredentism incited by Kosovo's independence and has an ethnic interest in preserving Bosnia. Croatia could also see its EU talks sped up towards reaching a 2010 accession date. Montenegro, likewise could be put on the fast track for EU and NATO membership, with EU accession as soon as 2012, according to member of the European Parliament.
This would stand to make Serbia's position worse, but also open room for far greater conflict. A merger of Kosovo with Albania would likely take place after NATO membership and with all four as NATO members Serbia would be almost completely surrounded by NATO members, making almost any conflict in the Balkans a conflict with all of NATO. Serbia's only option would then be to join the CSTO thus making any war in the Balkans a war between the U.S. and Russia.
However, while the optimists will ignorantly seek to allay concerns about the Balkans seeing renewed conflict they tend to ignore the ramifications outside of Europe. Most prominently is the development in Russia:
This follows a statement by the leader of the lower house saying such recognition would be looked at starting January. The timing can not be easily ignored and this is obviously a response to Kosovo's inevitable declaration of independence. It's end result is effectively expected, Russia will recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. While Transistria's independence may be uneventful given President Voronin's trepid approach to Russia, Georgia has said recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence would effectively be a declaration of war, something all sides have been preparing for since 1991 and especially since the Rose Revolution. What happens depends largely on Georgian elections scheduled for January 5th. Polls show a conflicting story with Saakashvili first in most and in some by an overwhelming majority among decided voters. He has also played things in his favor by putting forward a referendum on whether Georgia should join NATO. If Saakashvili can maintain his place in office it would be a serious blow to Russia and make a war in the region almost inevitable." - In case of the unilateral recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Russia will be entitled to change its approach to the so-called unrecognized republics in the post-soviet regions - South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie," the chairman of the Council of the Federation (upper chamber of the Russian parliament), Sergei Mironov, said on Tuesday.
" - If countries start recognizing Kosovo randomly, this will be the first violent change of borders in Europe after World War Two, and the consequences will be unforeseeable,” Mironov warned at a press conference in Moscow.
According to the political leader, this will mark the beginning of a domino principle and then it will be possible to raise the issue of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which broke away form Georgia.
" - In case of such a recognition of Kosovo, Russia will be able to say that it is free in its approach, including towards the so-called unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Pridnestrovie,” Mironov said, using the official short-form name of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublica (PMR).
Fallout from Kosovo could go further into Taiwan which is also heading towards a likely war due to a referendum on joining the U.N. with the name Taiwan which both China and the U.S. see as provocation, despite the fact Taiwan will never make it into the U.N. Not only could Kosovo's independence and recognition help the pro-independence DPP win in the legislative and presidential elections another event may make this more likely. It all depends on a court verdict on Friday. If KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou is found guilty and sentenced to 10 years or more or convicted on breach-of-trust he'll be unable to run for president. This will effectively guarantee a victory for Frank Hsieh of the DPP and could carry on to the KMT's performance in the legislative elections. Faced with the prospect of a DPP-controlled government, especially one with a two-thirds majority needed for changes to the constitution, and a successful referendum China may decide to launch an attack on Taiwan.
Suffice to say the clouds of war will probably not disappear, but instead darken and spread.
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Turkey Ups the Ante in Iraq
Turkey has revealed that they recently launched two major attacks into Northern Iraq. One was an airstrike on Sunday and another was a small-scale incursion on Tuesday. The incursion involved about 300 troops. This is more than in a previous incursion earlier this month involving about 100 special forces and six helicopters.
It would seem Turkey's government is escalating its offensive actions in Northern Iraq more each time. Previously reports of incursions were scattered, often involving limited incursions and limited strikes lacking any coordinated action. Now the attacks seem to be getting more coordinated and strategic. This is possibly due to U.S. intelligence being funnelled to Turkey's military. Apparently this attack was actually approved by the U.S.:
Turkey's incursions have stepped up in intensity and it is unlikely this is because the targets required more force. The Turkish government is probably either testing the waters to see how far the U.S. will tolerate Turkish action, or simply gradually building up force until they believe they have no choice but to launch a full-scale invasion. Now that they know this action is tolerated by the U.S. and understand the reaction created it is likely they will try to step up the next attack and make it larger. This could continue until they feel a large-scale attack would be accepted or becomes viable. Presently it is the winter which may prevent any major attack for the time being.
Should such an invasion take place Iraq will not be the only one impacted. A representative of the PKK recently said if Turkey invades Northern Iraq they will attack Azerbaijan. It is likely referring to supposed PKK camps in Nagorno-Karabakh which Azerbaijan has said could be attacked in the coming weeks. It would be a perfect excuse to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh from declaring independence after Kosovo.
It would seem Turkey's government is escalating its offensive actions in Northern Iraq more each time. Previously reports of incursions were scattered, often involving limited incursions and limited strikes lacking any coordinated action. Now the attacks seem to be getting more coordinated and strategic. This is possibly due to U.S. intelligence being funnelled to Turkey's military. Apparently this attack was actually approved by the U.S.:
The authoritative US daily quoted a military official as saying the US was "essentially handing (the Turks) their targets."The Iraqi government, on the other hand, claimed the Turkish government did not inform them of the attack or consult them. This certainly offended the Iraqi government which has tended to tolerate Turkey's incursions in the past. All the same they took a relatively conciliatory tone in spite of the attack:
Further to the report, the unnamed official although denying that the US had given official approval of Turkish actions in Iraq explained that "(the Turkish military ) said, 'We want to do something.' We said, 'Okay, it's your decision'."
However, Turkey has not received the same kind of measured criticism from the Kurds in Iraq:"We believe any unilateral actions to destabilise the situation will harm Iraq's interests and Turkey's interests at the same time," he said.
"But at the same time we fully understand and appreciate the legitimate security concern Turkey has over the PKK terrorist activities."
Massoud Barzani, leader of the autonomous Kurdish region in the north, condemned the assaults as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty that had undermined months of diplomacy. “These attacks hinder the political efforts exerted to find a peaceful solution based on mutual respect,” he said in a statement.The United States' apparent tacit approval of Turkey's incursion has also put a serious wedge in U.S. relations with the Kurds:
However, the Kurdish government said that its president, Masoud Barzani, had decided not to travel to Baghdad to meet Ms Rice, because of his anger over the US’s role in the Turkish military action.
Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurdish regional government, told Reuters the Kurdish president had decided not to go “because of the US position regarding the Turkish attacks and bombings”. He added: “The US supervises [Iraq’s] airspace so it is not possible that a violation of this airspace occurs without the knowledge or approval of the Americans.”
Differences between the U.S. and Kurds on Turkey's attacks as well as the Maliki's government restraint in condemning the attacks is sure to hurt the political situation in Iraq. Without Kurdish support Maliki's government would fall and if the Kurds see the U.S. as tolerating Turkey's actions they may fall behind many other political groups in Iraq seeking a U.S. withdrawal. Presently this is not likely to happen as the Turkish government is taking things carefully, however, this may not last much longer.
Turkey's incursions have stepped up in intensity and it is unlikely this is because the targets required more force. The Turkish government is probably either testing the waters to see how far the U.S. will tolerate Turkish action, or simply gradually building up force until they believe they have no choice but to launch a full-scale invasion. Now that they know this action is tolerated by the U.S. and understand the reaction created it is likely they will try to step up the next attack and make it larger. This could continue until they feel a large-scale attack would be accepted or becomes viable. Presently it is the winter which may prevent any major attack for the time being.
Should such an invasion take place Iraq will not be the only one impacted. A representative of the PKK recently said if Turkey invades Northern Iraq they will attack Azerbaijan. It is likely referring to supposed PKK camps in Nagorno-Karabakh which Azerbaijan has said could be attacked in the coming weeks. It would be a perfect excuse to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh from declaring independence after Kosovo.
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
Madhesh May Secede from Nepal
Though little attention is being paid to this crucial flashpoint a disturbing event has emerged with Madhesh. While the Unified Madheshi Front has set out a plan and list of demands for their move towards autonomy as well as preparing for several peaceful agitations they have also made it clear what will happen if the demands aren't met:
Things are certainly not helped by the inevitable declaration of independence by Kosovo. With many regions seceding and getting recognition Madheshi leaders may feel like they too will be recognized if the declare independence. If they do, Nepal might view it as aggression by India and seek China's help, which could spark a conflict between the two nations already experiencing tension over a border dispute. However, this is unlikely unless Madhesh tries to merge with India.
When this possible secession would take place is a bigger question. The Madheshi Front has stated their plan for agitations and given dates of five day-long agitations as part of their movement for autonomy:
Even if Madhesh follows through on secession and Nepal goes to war it may not incite a conflict beyond their borders, though it could be used by the King to try and remove the government once again. The most likely result is simply a major conflict in Madhesh and instability in other parts, though not significant. Perhaps the greatest danger posed by Madhesh is its potential to inflame the nationalist sentiment in Nepal, maybe resurrecting historical claims to parts of India which would result in a broader war if ever acted on.
“We are tired of the discrimination, and we would like to govern ourselves now. But if the government does not respect our demands, we will be forced to divide the Terai region from Nepal.”Nepal's government has already been wary over the potential for Madhesh to secede and considers Madhesh's calls for autonomy an attempt at disintegrating Nepal. However, due to their apparent neglect in outlining autonomy for Madhesh the region may move towards secession. After such a move war would not be far behind and Nepali leaders would undoubtedly blame India as many already have.
Things are certainly not helped by the inevitable declaration of independence by Kosovo. With many regions seceding and getting recognition Madheshi leaders may feel like they too will be recognized if the declare independence. If they do, Nepal might view it as aggression by India and seek China's help, which could spark a conflict between the two nations already experiencing tension over a border dispute. However, this is unlikely unless Madhesh tries to merge with India.
When this possible secession would take place is a bigger question. The Madheshi Front has stated their plan for agitations and given dates of five day-long agitations as part of their movement for autonomy:
JMF, however, said that the protest to be organised in Biratnagar, Birgunj, Rupandehi, Janakpur and Nepalgunj would be peaceful. Yadav also warned if the government tried to disrupt or resist the protest, it would not be in the interest of the government as well as of the country. JMF is organising agitation on December 29, January 5, 9, 12 and 14.Any moves towards secession are unlikely until after January 14th unless further violence instigates such a move. Like many other secessionist movements being brought to the surface right when Kosovo is approaching its independence, this seems to be aimed towards early next year. Whether Madhesh's push for secession would follow immediately after January 14th or take place beyond that depends on the government's reaction. If they grant autonomy to Madhesh it will likely prevent any further escalation for the time being, but it seems unlikely that the government aims for such an end and calls for secession may only serve to inflame their opposition.
�If the government fails to address the problem of the Madhesi, ethnic community, janajatis and marginalised groups the country may face disintegration," Yadav warned further.
Even if Madhesh follows through on secession and Nepal goes to war it may not incite a conflict beyond their borders, though it could be used by the King to try and remove the government once again. The most likely result is simply a major conflict in Madhesh and instability in other parts, though not significant. Perhaps the greatest danger posed by Madhesh is its potential to inflame the nationalist sentiment in Nepal, maybe resurrecting historical claims to parts of India which would result in a broader war if ever acted on.
Saturday, December 15, 2007
The Second Sino-Indian War
Chinese intrusions on the Bhutanese border have led to small-scale standoff between China and India. India recently sent 6,000 troops to the disputed region in Sikkim near where intrusions have been taking place. China's incursions into Bhutan and aggressive behavior near the border with India have also been raising alarms, leading to a high-level meeting between India's External Affairs Minister and top defense officials. India's position in the eastern region has been inadequate, leaving the region open to instability.
Of particular worry to India is Chinese movement towards the Siliguri corridor, which is a vital point connecting India's northeast with the rest of the country. China has been increasingly aggressive near Sikkim, which was considered an independent state by China until 2003, also near the corridor and part of a long-standing border dispute between the two countries. Should China push through and take the small Siliguri corridor, only about 25 miles wide, it would leave India's northeast cut off by land. The region hosts several insurgent groups opposed to India's government.
India's domestic situation is also in question. While current run by the Congress Party, which wants to maintain ties with China, the leading opposition BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, believes the government is being too soft and ignoring the Chinese threat. Most notably indications are that the BJP could see a return to power in government with the recent announcement that their candidate for Prime Minister will be LK Advani. Advani is seen as the man who brought the BJP to power before and he may be able to do it again. While elections are currently set 2009 it's believed there could be snap polls soon now that Congress's ally, the Left Front is looking to abandon them and form a third force in the political sphere.
Should elections be held in 2008 it would become a battle between the three groups and if the Left is able to rally significant support by uniting their efforts, they could bring down the Congress enough to usher the BJP to power. This would not only mean a deterioration in relations with China, but could mean expanded conflict in other spheres. Nepal is the most likely flashpoint for the two countries.
While Nepal has many potential flashpoints stewing under the surface, the one bubbling up most right now is the conflict in Madhesh or Terai. Recently several groups pushing Madesh to be recognized as an autonomous region have united their efforts and are planning to launch a "peaceful" agitation against the government of Nepal beginning December 30th. Leaders have called from the arms groups to join this peaceful movement and lay down their arms. This is all taking place alongside an unstable situation in the Terai region resulting in a security crackdown in the area.
The situation has devolved even further with several members of the government resigning in protest, calling for Madhesh to be given autonomous status and planning on forming a united Madhesi political party. While all claims are coming that this is aimed at "peaceful agitation" the result may completely different, especially if the current government moves to halt the movement for autonomy.
Madhesh's push for autonomy is, however, serving to unite the Nepali government together after a deal was reached on setting up a republic and holding elections, now scheduled for April next year. Maoist leader Prachanda and several other Left parties have been joining with Nepali Congress to oppose the moves by Madhesi members of government, attempting to keep them from causing any instability in Terai region. Many nationalist members of the government in all parties are uniting together to oppose the moves in Terai and are even accusing India and the King of Nepal of instigating the instability in the region and attempting to "disintegrate" Nepal.
Nationalists are, according to Prakash Koraila, uniting against India and siding with China. They see China as supporting their territorial integrity, while India is seeking to tear their country apart. Koraila stated that he believe China would not allow India to disintegrate China. A Hindu nationalist government in India would oppose establishing a republican government and support a Madhesh movement that wants to make Hindi a national language. Such a government would further stoke tensions in Nepal and increase frustrations with India, as well as creating greater tension with China.
Awaking the nationalists, however, may not be an entirely good thing as some may favor a push to reject the Sugauli Treaty and restore Nepal to its previous borders establishing a Greater Nepal. Any attempt at taking territory from India and merging it with Nepal is likely to incite India and China rushing into Nepal to prevent this may even bring out the British, who have long-standing ties with Nepali Ghurkas and would object to any conflict in the country starting the first major conflict between the British and Chinese since the Opium Wars.
Of particular worry to India is Chinese movement towards the Siliguri corridor, which is a vital point connecting India's northeast with the rest of the country. China has been increasingly aggressive near Sikkim, which was considered an independent state by China until 2003, also near the corridor and part of a long-standing border dispute between the two countries. Should China push through and take the small Siliguri corridor, only about 25 miles wide, it would leave India's northeast cut off by land. The region hosts several insurgent groups opposed to India's government.
India's domestic situation is also in question. While current run by the Congress Party, which wants to maintain ties with China, the leading opposition BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, believes the government is being too soft and ignoring the Chinese threat. Most notably indications are that the BJP could see a return to power in government with the recent announcement that their candidate for Prime Minister will be LK Advani. Advani is seen as the man who brought the BJP to power before and he may be able to do it again. While elections are currently set 2009 it's believed there could be snap polls soon now that Congress's ally, the Left Front is looking to abandon them and form a third force in the political sphere.
Should elections be held in 2008 it would become a battle between the three groups and if the Left is able to rally significant support by uniting their efforts, they could bring down the Congress enough to usher the BJP to power. This would not only mean a deterioration in relations with China, but could mean expanded conflict in other spheres. Nepal is the most likely flashpoint for the two countries.
While Nepal has many potential flashpoints stewing under the surface, the one bubbling up most right now is the conflict in Madhesh or Terai. Recently several groups pushing Madesh to be recognized as an autonomous region have united their efforts and are planning to launch a "peaceful" agitation against the government of Nepal beginning December 30th. Leaders have called from the arms groups to join this peaceful movement and lay down their arms. This is all taking place alongside an unstable situation in the Terai region resulting in a security crackdown in the area.
The situation has devolved even further with several members of the government resigning in protest, calling for Madhesh to be given autonomous status and planning on forming a united Madhesi political party. While all claims are coming that this is aimed at "peaceful agitation" the result may completely different, especially if the current government moves to halt the movement for autonomy.
Madhesh's push for autonomy is, however, serving to unite the Nepali government together after a deal was reached on setting up a republic and holding elections, now scheduled for April next year. Maoist leader Prachanda and several other Left parties have been joining with Nepali Congress to oppose the moves by Madhesi members of government, attempting to keep them from causing any instability in Terai region. Many nationalist members of the government in all parties are uniting together to oppose the moves in Terai and are even accusing India and the King of Nepal of instigating the instability in the region and attempting to "disintegrate" Nepal.
Nationalists are, according to Prakash Koraila, uniting against India and siding with China. They see China as supporting their territorial integrity, while India is seeking to tear their country apart. Koraila stated that he believe China would not allow India to disintegrate China. A Hindu nationalist government in India would oppose establishing a republican government and support a Madhesh movement that wants to make Hindi a national language. Such a government would further stoke tensions in Nepal and increase frustrations with India, as well as creating greater tension with China.
Awaking the nationalists, however, may not be an entirely good thing as some may favor a push to reject the Sugauli Treaty and restore Nepal to its previous borders establishing a Greater Nepal. Any attempt at taking territory from India and merging it with Nepal is likely to incite India and China rushing into Nepal to prevent this may even bring out the British, who have long-standing ties with Nepali Ghurkas and would object to any conflict in the country starting the first major conflict between the British and Chinese since the Opium Wars.
Brewing Conflict in the Horn of Africa
Somalia's transitional government, set up after Ethiopia's invasion of the country almost exactly one year ago has recently announced it is not in control of 80% of the country. More disturbingly the government is saying the Islamic Courts Union is regrouping and planning a large-scale offensive against the transitional government and the Ethiopian military. They also say the government has no power to stop them. Somali Islamic militants have begun to come out of hiding after months of relative peace and are bulking up with more weapons and foreign fighters.
However, while it's true the transitional government does not have control of 80% of the country, that 80% is mostly out of control of the Islamic Courts Union as well. Northern Somalia, around half the country, is controlled by two other warring factions, Somaliland and Puntland. Somaliland is an unrecognized state comprising most of what was British Somaliland, with its own military, government, and unofficial embassies in several countries. Puntland has not declared independence, but instead declared itself an autonomous region with its own military and government, though still part of Somalia.
Somaliland wants to take all territory once occupying British Somaliland, which has brought them into conflict with Puntland on several occasions. The main dispute is on the regions of Sanaag and Sool. Sanaag was previously administered by Puntland but has since declared itself as the autonomous state of Maakhir. The region is still claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland.
Sool has been switching between Puntland and Somaliland for several years, though lately Somaliland has gained the upper hand. Somaliland's strength in Sool and their seizure of Las Anod, Sool's capital, has alarmed Puntland, which threatened to launch a counter-attack to retake Las Anod. Somaliland's military since last month have moved their troops nearly 35 kilometers away from Puntland's capital of Garowe. Puntland's situation has also been hurt by defections of their military officers in Sool.
What complicates matters in the region is Somaliland's unrecognized status. As Kosovo's independence approaches the question of whether other unrecognized states should receive recognition will receive renewed debate. According to several sources Ethiopia is considering recognition of Somaliland as a way of dampening Somali irredentism and there is apparently a dispute between the United States Defense Department and and State Department on whether the U.S. should recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation.
However, the Defense Department's motivations may not be related to stability in Somalia as they claim, but instead about infrastructure for AFRICOM, a new U.S. military command like Pacific Command. In particular reports say the Pentagon is interested in the port of Berbera, but because of Somaliland's status it is currently not viable for AFRICOM. So the Pentagon and Defense Department have been pushing for recognition of Somaliland and Kosovo may provide the perfect opportunity to push their agenda. Once Somaliland gains its independence the U.S. can set up a base in the new nation to expand its operations in Africa, increasingly coming under the influence of China and the European Union.
The problem is, it is unlikely Puntland will take such recognition laying down. Indeed, Somaliland being recognized by the U.S. and Ethiopia after invading Sool and expelling Puntland's forces could be seen by Puntland as rewarding aggression. While Puntland has been strongly tied with Ethiopia, such recognition could lead to their estrangement of ties. This is where the conflict could broaden. Should Puntland disengage from Ethiopia they may look for a new ally in the region and the obvious choice would be Eritrea.
Eritrea and Ethiopia have been at a standoff ever since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia. An unsettled border dispute between the nations previously resulted in a major war between the two countries. Since the war ended in a stalemate the two states have engaged in a constant cold war with Eritrea backing the ONLF in Ethiopia and the two sides waging proxy wars in Somalia. In fact, it is believed the ONLF's war in Ogaden is partly the cause of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia. The ONLF is believed to have coordinated actions with the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia and both groups have been supported by Eritrea. Ethiopia's backing of the transitional government is seen as part of this proxy conflict with Eritrea.
In the event Somaliland does get recognized by Ethiopia and Puntland forges ties with Eritrea, a conflict between the two Somali regions could expand to include a conflict between the Islamic Courts Union and transitional government, as well as Ethiopian troops in Somalia. If Puntland manages to gain ground against Somaliland and Ethiopia intervenes directly, Eritrea may take advantage of the opening to make a thrust into Ethiopia itself.
Eritrea's justification would be the unresolved border dispute. The border was effectively decided by the international community in favor of Eritrea, but Ethiopia has refused to acknowledge the ruling. With 125,000 troops on the border facing 100,000 Ethiopian troops, Eritrea stands a decent chance of pushing through if some of those Ethiopians troops should be diverted to Somalia. Considering a U.N. force in the area is set to leave in the following month, when Kosovo is widely expected to gain its independence, which would likely be followed up by Somaliland's independence, Eritrea seems to have a perfect opening coming up in the following months. A renewed attack by the Islamic Courts Union next year alongside a conflict between Puntland and Somaliland could distract Ethiopia enough to give Eritrea a chance to try and resolve the border issue by force. The end result would be a wider and more deadly conflict than the previous war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
However, while it's true the transitional government does not have control of 80% of the country, that 80% is mostly out of control of the Islamic Courts Union as well. Northern Somalia, around half the country, is controlled by two other warring factions, Somaliland and Puntland. Somaliland is an unrecognized state comprising most of what was British Somaliland, with its own military, government, and unofficial embassies in several countries. Puntland has not declared independence, but instead declared itself an autonomous region with its own military and government, though still part of Somalia.
Somaliland wants to take all territory once occupying British Somaliland, which has brought them into conflict with Puntland on several occasions. The main dispute is on the regions of Sanaag and Sool. Sanaag was previously administered by Puntland but has since declared itself as the autonomous state of Maakhir. The region is still claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland.
Sool has been switching between Puntland and Somaliland for several years, though lately Somaliland has gained the upper hand. Somaliland's strength in Sool and their seizure of Las Anod, Sool's capital, has alarmed Puntland, which threatened to launch a counter-attack to retake Las Anod. Somaliland's military since last month have moved their troops nearly 35 kilometers away from Puntland's capital of Garowe. Puntland's situation has also been hurt by defections of their military officers in Sool.
What complicates matters in the region is Somaliland's unrecognized status. As Kosovo's independence approaches the question of whether other unrecognized states should receive recognition will receive renewed debate. According to several sources Ethiopia is considering recognition of Somaliland as a way of dampening Somali irredentism and there is apparently a dispute between the United States Defense Department and and State Department on whether the U.S. should recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation.
However, the Defense Department's motivations may not be related to stability in Somalia as they claim, but instead about infrastructure for AFRICOM, a new U.S. military command like Pacific Command. In particular reports say the Pentagon is interested in the port of Berbera, but because of Somaliland's status it is currently not viable for AFRICOM. So the Pentagon and Defense Department have been pushing for recognition of Somaliland and Kosovo may provide the perfect opportunity to push their agenda. Once Somaliland gains its independence the U.S. can set up a base in the new nation to expand its operations in Africa, increasingly coming under the influence of China and the European Union.
The problem is, it is unlikely Puntland will take such recognition laying down. Indeed, Somaliland being recognized by the U.S. and Ethiopia after invading Sool and expelling Puntland's forces could be seen by Puntland as rewarding aggression. While Puntland has been strongly tied with Ethiopia, such recognition could lead to their estrangement of ties. This is where the conflict could broaden. Should Puntland disengage from Ethiopia they may look for a new ally in the region and the obvious choice would be Eritrea.
Eritrea and Ethiopia have been at a standoff ever since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia. An unsettled border dispute between the nations previously resulted in a major war between the two countries. Since the war ended in a stalemate the two states have engaged in a constant cold war with Eritrea backing the ONLF in Ethiopia and the two sides waging proxy wars in Somalia. In fact, it is believed the ONLF's war in Ogaden is partly the cause of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia. The ONLF is believed to have coordinated actions with the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia and both groups have been supported by Eritrea. Ethiopia's backing of the transitional government is seen as part of this proxy conflict with Eritrea.
In the event Somaliland does get recognized by Ethiopia and Puntland forges ties with Eritrea, a conflict between the two Somali regions could expand to include a conflict between the Islamic Courts Union and transitional government, as well as Ethiopian troops in Somalia. If Puntland manages to gain ground against Somaliland and Ethiopia intervenes directly, Eritrea may take advantage of the opening to make a thrust into Ethiopia itself.
Eritrea's justification would be the unresolved border dispute. The border was effectively decided by the international community in favor of Eritrea, but Ethiopia has refused to acknowledge the ruling. With 125,000 troops on the border facing 100,000 Ethiopian troops, Eritrea stands a decent chance of pushing through if some of those Ethiopians troops should be diverted to Somalia. Considering a U.N. force in the area is set to leave in the following month, when Kosovo is widely expected to gain its independence, which would likely be followed up by Somaliland's independence, Eritrea seems to have a perfect opening coming up in the following months. A renewed attack by the Islamic Courts Union next year alongside a conflict between Puntland and Somaliland could distract Ethiopia enough to give Eritrea a chance to try and resolve the border issue by force. The end result would be a wider and more deadly conflict than the previous war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Rebuilding the Russian Empire
President Putin is in Belarus to discuss the idea of forming a united state with the country. Belorussian officials said the talks will touch on a constitution for the formation of the new state, despite denials from the Kremlin. This may be just one of many ways for Putin to retain power over Russia, who can not run for a third consecutive term. It is also the most favorable for Putin as he would rule over an even larger territory.
Talks have been stalled for many years, but recently Pavel Borodin state secretary of the Union of Russia and Belarus said that a draft constitutional act had been completed and would be ready for approval at the next Supreme State Council meeting. The meeting consists of the Presidents, Prime Ministers, and head of the chambers of Parliament in both countries.
Reports are saying when the two merge Putin will become its President and Lukashenko of Belarus will become the Speaker of its Parliament. A merger of Russia and Belarus would be a major change in the current geopolitical field not only because it would increase the population and territory ruled by Putin, but because it would expand the reach of Russia's military. Adding on the additional manpower of Belarus would also increase the size and strength of Russia's military. Putting it in further context is Russia's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Russia would be able to deploy its newly expanded military in Belarus on the border of Poland and Lithuania. In fact, the new merger would leave the Baltic states almost completely closed off and surrounded by Russia's military. Only a small border with Poland would remain out of Russian control.
For Belarus a merge would also provide additional benefits. One would be Belarus able to meet in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Previously Belarus was denied membership because they were not near Central Asia, however merged with Russia, a member of the grouping, Belarus would have complete justification for taking part in the discussion. Not only this, but Belarus would no longer have to be concerned about being cut off from Russian energy since it would be part of the new nation.
However, this merger would only be the first part of an expansion of Russia's power. The suspension of the CFE was completed yesterday and Russia immediately capitalized on it to expand its presence:
In the midst of this Russia has also escalated a dispute with the British:
Talks have been stalled for many years, but recently Pavel Borodin state secretary of the Union of Russia and Belarus said that a draft constitutional act had been completed and would be ready for approval at the next Supreme State Council meeting. The meeting consists of the Presidents, Prime Ministers, and head of the chambers of Parliament in both countries.
Reports are saying when the two merge Putin will become its President and Lukashenko of Belarus will become the Speaker of its Parliament. A merger of Russia and Belarus would be a major change in the current geopolitical field not only because it would increase the population and territory ruled by Putin, but because it would expand the reach of Russia's military. Adding on the additional manpower of Belarus would also increase the size and strength of Russia's military. Putting it in further context is Russia's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Russia would be able to deploy its newly expanded military in Belarus on the border of Poland and Lithuania. In fact, the new merger would leave the Baltic states almost completely closed off and surrounded by Russia's military. Only a small border with Poland would remain out of Russian control.
For Belarus a merge would also provide additional benefits. One would be Belarus able to meet in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Previously Belarus was denied membership because they were not near Central Asia, however merged with Russia, a member of the grouping, Belarus would have complete justification for taking part in the discussion. Not only this, but Belarus would no longer have to be concerned about being cut off from Russian energy since it would be part of the new nation.
However, this merger would only be the first part of an expansion of Russia's power. The suspension of the CFE was completed yesterday and Russia immediately capitalized on it to expand its presence:
Russian planes on board the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier have conducted 11 practice flights in the North Sea, a Navy spokesman said on Tuesday.A Russian naval group, comprising an aircraft carrier, two large anti-submarine ships and a number of auxiliary vessels, left last Wednesday on a tour to the Mediterranean as part of Russia's plans to resume its continual presence in different regions of the world's seas.
The timing of all of this can not be viewed as mere coincidence. With Kosovo's independence now a matter of when not if, Russia will want to have its military able to go anywhere in preparation for any scenario. Conflict isn't likely, however, deployment of the Russian navy in the Adriatic Sea during a conflict with Serbia is possible and airspace violations or threatening airspace violations. Deployment in the Mediterranean would also allow Russia to make its presence known in the Middle East during a potential conflict there or even position its navy near Morocco, which may come to blows with Russian ally Algeria over Western Sahara. Whatever Russia's reasons there's no denying that there is a rebuilding of a Russian empire. Belarus will be just one development of this, with the violent seizure of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria as other addition to Russia's strength. Down the line Crimea and other parts of Ukraine as well as parts of Kazakhstan could become prey to Russian expansion.
In the midst of this Russia has also escalated a dispute with the British:
Russia ordered the British government's cultural arm on Wednesday to halt work at its regional offices, in the latest round of a bitter dispute over the murder of Kremlin critic Alexander Litvinenko.Russia's spat with Britain comes from Russia's sheltering of the suspected murderer of Alexander Litvinenko, who was said to have been assassinated by Russia's government. Russia's intensification at this point when Kosovo is likely to be granted independence is probably also not a coincidence. Russia is stepping up the rhetoric and aggression due to the coming conflict over Kosovo and other unrecognized states. However, if this is just the beginning Russia may be heading to the point of no return in its relations with the West.Relations between Russia and Britain hit their lowest level since the Cold War this year after Moscow refused to extradite a former KGB bodyguard who Britain suspects of poisoning Litvinenko in 2006 with radioactive polonium.
Russia said the British Council, which promotes British culture abroad, had breached international rules on consular activities by failing to properly register 15 regional offices.
Britain said Russia's move was illegal and the British Council had nothing to do with the row over Litvinenko's murder, which sparked a tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats in July.
The single spark that lights a dozen powder kegs
The deadline on Kosovo has past and the discussion now is on when Kosovo will declare independence and what will happen when they do. The question of when is becoming an increasingly confusing matter. While it has been suggested that January next year is when Kosovo will declare independence, the story has changed with the EU:
Northern Kosovo
Once Kosovo declares its independence the new nation will be a majority Albanian nation with a small Serb minority. A significant portion will be in the north, as well as a similar amount spread throughout the rest of Kosovo. In the event Kosovo declares its independence many Serbs in the south could head to Serbia or Northern Kosovo. Should they make the latter choice it's possible they will come into conflict with Albanians in the region. If violence erupts Serbia may decide to intervene and may even seek independence for the north. There have been some signs of Serbia showing greater interest in northern Kosovo:
Republika Srpska
Not being able to retake all of Kosovo may cause enough problems for Serbia that they would need a second option to satisfy raging nationalist tensions. The autonomous Serb republic in Bosnia could be a viable alternative. Srpska is a majority Serb region and is currently facing difficulties with Bosnia's government implementing reforms for joining the EU. They've already made threats to declare independence and Kosovo's independence could encourage them to push for seceding from Bosnia. However, this is much trickier than with Kosovo. While Kosovo is right on Serbia's edge and Serb enclaves are easily concentrated in the north, Bosnia is a mix-matched nation with rough borders between Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia is actually divided into three regions with the third being Brcko district. The Brcko district, however, technically belongs to both but is administered by neither. Presently its population is divided almost evenly between Bosniaks and Serbs, with a significant Croat minority. However it also serves as the bridge between the other two entities. If Srpska loses Brcko district, it will lose access to its western half, though Bosnia will only lose access to a smaller region near Croatia. This means Brcko district is a likely region of conflict for Srpska as it will attempt in seceding from Bosnia to claim the district for itself, being essential to its unity.
Another serious area of conflict would the be the capital of Sarajevo. Resting right on the border of Srpska, Sarajevo is an easy target for Serbs seeking to force a resolution in their favor. With Serbian military aid, Srpska could encircle the capital city quickly forcing an agreement with the Bosnian federation.
Once an agreement is reached the loss for Bosnia will likely be two-fold, Srpska could claim Brcko district as its own and the region cut off from this loss, being dominantly Croat, could choose to merge with Croatia or this could be brokered in a deal after the conflict has finished. Bosnia would be left with only those parts of it west of Srpska. However, the benefits for Bosnia could be greater under such an agreement, since it could finally leave Bosnia stable and united enough to speed up their entry to the EU. On the other hand, while Serbia would be fully compensated for Kosovo with a Serb region nearly equal in population to Kosovo, it would be faced with a complete denial for EU entry. At the same time, EU backing for Kosovo's independence could doom that long beforehand.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
While technically separate entities their status and conflict will be ultimately inseparable from one another. Not only will their recognition come almost immediately after Kosovo's, maybe weeks at most, the conflict will be with Georgia and both will fight together and ultimately be absorbed by Russia. Recent events indicate Russia may already be preparing for just such a fight. These two will be Russia's first response to Kosovo's declaration of independence and recognition.
Transnistria
While overall a more difficult venture given that Transnistria has no connection to the sea and no land connection exists between Russia and the region, ultimately this is likely to constitute a second response by Russia, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia's secession. However it would be similarly thorny to Srpska since the only way for Russia to send additional troops to the region is by flying over Ukrainian or Moldovan territory. This likely means a conflict with Moldova itself. However, it is possible Russia has sufficient troops to prevent Moldova from responding with force. Also, Russia could make use of its naval and air forces to blockade Moldova as opposed to simple use of force. The Moldovan government will likely be much more malleable to Russian demands than Georgia.
Nagorno-Karabakh
In a previous post I discussed the matter of Nagorno-Karabakh more in depth. Who actually starts such a conflict is the real question. Azerbaijan, seeing Kosovo used as a precedent for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may decide to pre-empt any move to apply the precedent in Nagorno-Karabakh with force. A likely justification would be PKK "bases" they claim are inside Nagorno-Karabakh. Renewed attacks by the PKK inflamed by Kosovo's independence could make this even seem legitimate, especially if Turkey is already taking action against them in Northern Iraq. While being made to look like a show of solidarity with Turkey, the real aim will be instigating a conflict where Azerbaijan can justify retaking Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Seeing Armenia threatened by Azerbaijan, Russia may threaten to intervene, prompting U.S. deployment.
This conflict could be one of the most confrontational between the U.S. and Russia, with American troops lining Azerbaijan's border across from Russian troops. However, it is likely Russia will instead focus on putting its troops in Armenia and preventing Azerbaijan from moving into Armenia itself rather than just reclaiming Armenian-held territory.
Kurdistan
Much of this coming in January and moving into spring, an attack by Turkey in Northern Iraq could be inevitable. The PKK may use Kosovo's independence to ignite Kurdish nationalism, as well as failure to meet the deadline for the Kirkuk referendum. While it is unlikely Kurds will push for statehood, heightened nationalism in the region and increased PKK attacks might frighten Turkey enough to launch a push into Iraq. Should Azerbaijan have attacked Nagorno-Karabakh using the PKK as a justification and be defended by the United States, Turkey may be further enraged if told to back down. There is potential for Kosovo's independence and the resulting conflict to spark off a war in the Middle East.
Cyprus
Turkey has been having many problems with Greek Cyprus over this year and a renewed conflict in Northern Iraq alongside Kosovo's independence may give them the reasoning to push for Northern Cyprus. While recognized by Turkey, no other nation recognizes Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot government does not want division of Cyprus. However, this could be changed with Kosovo's independence. Turkey could begin pushing for the independence of Northern Cyprus, possibly even brokering a deal with Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for their recognition of Northern Cyprus and cooperation against the PKK. While the possibility may seem obscure, nationalists favoring invasion of Northern Iraq and support for Northern Cyprus may be willing to overlook a change in relations with Armenia.
Armenia would be more than happy to establish ties with Turkey, especially if it meant taking their support away from Azerbaijan and this would help uncomplicated Turkey's relations with Iran who would be supporting Turkey's incursion into Northern Iraq.
Western Sahara
While largely ignored in these discussions, the situation in Western Sahara is also beginning to escalate:
Somaliland
Even further under the radar is the issue of Somaliland. While technically part of Somalia, Somaliland has been one of the few regions to remain prosperous. They declared independence in 1994 due to constant civil war in the rest of Somalia and have since then been a unrecognized state. This year, Somaliland has appeared to be headed towards recognition by many states including Ethiopia and the United States. Somaliland is seen as a stable alternative to Somalia for the United States and Ethiopia, currently stuggling with Islamic militants in southern areas of Somalia. It would also serve to prevent Somali irredentism which seeks to claim parts of Ethiopia.
However, the web of Ethiopian involvement makes it difficult to address Somaliland's status. Ethiopia supports Somaliland, but also relies on Puntland for men, especially in the Somali transitional government in place since the expulsion of the Islamic Courts union. Somaliland and Puntland have been at a standoff over disputed territory in the north. Somaliland wants to gain the territory to restore itself to its previous status under the British. However, there are indications Ethiopia may be trying to move more support to Somaliland and away from Puntland as well as building up the transitional government in Mogadishu.
The potential for conflict is not due to Somalia reacting to secession by Somaliland, but Eritrea. Eritrea and Ethiopia have been edging closer towards a second war since a deadline for settling their border dispute passed with no movement by either side. Since the war between them ended Ethiopia and Eritrea have been waging a proxy war in Somalia with Eritrea backing the Islamic Courts Union. Recognition of Somaliland's independence may not directly cause a war between the two, however an ensuing proxy war could, combined with the tensions over the border, result in a renewed conflict between the two countries. However, it is unlikely either side will be able to defeat the other and it will end in another stalemate.
In Somalia, though, the result may be different. If Eritrea supports Puntland against Somaliland and Ethiopia withdraws support from Puntland a proxy battle between the two could be fought alongside Ethiopia and Eritrea's conflict. The likely end result is Somaliland succeeding in taking control of the disputed territory, perhaps with direct Ethiopian assistance. Aside from this, it is likely Somalia will remain a scene for proxy wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both failing to resolve their border issues through negotiations or military conflict.
Taiwan
One of the more obvious conflicts that could result from Kosovo's independence is between Taiwan and China. While Taiwan won't declare independence just because of Kosovo, Kosovo's independence could help the DPP gain an edge on the KMT in legislative and presidential elections. It would also be likely to increase support for a referendum on joining the U.N. as "Taiwan" rather than the Republic of China. China has already warned about this referendum and faced with a DPP president and a DPP legislature, especially if the legislature should gain a two-thirds majority itself or with Taiwan Solidarity Union, China is likely to feel independence is inevitable, especially with the Kosovo precedent and attack.
China's likely strategy would be to blockade the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, both are likely to be more inclined towards reunification so China could reach an agreement with them on reunification. Peacably gaining Kinmen and Matsu without attacking the islands might go a long way in defusing any nationalist sentiment in Taiwan. China could use force to gain the Taiwan-held Spratly Islands and move on Penghu islands. In order to do this gaining air and naval supremacy in the Taiwan Straits would be necessary, however, it's likely China will be more then capable of achieving this.
The United States has already come out in condemnation of the referendum and would likely see Taiwan's actions as provoking conflict so this strategy would push the U.S. even further from intervention than it would be already. Not only this, but if China should succeed in destroying or debilitating most of Taiwan's air force and navy, as well as seizing Penghu, many Taiwanese would become hopeless and enraged. Peaceful secession by Kinmen and Matsu would make things worse. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's ports could have even more dampening effects on Taiwanese attitudes. Faced with an economic depression, closed off from family members in mainland China and possibly Kinmen and Matsu, and seeing no chance of stopping China, let alone a chance of U.S. aid, Taiwanese citizens would be faced with an unwinnable situation. Taiwan's government could be faced with domestic unrest and no hope of winning. Seixure of Penghu would give China the ability to strike at the main island of Taiwan and provide a perfect launch ground for airborne or amphibious troops to be sent to Taiwan's main island.
It is likely the Taiwanese government would look to negotiations on a cease-fire or surrender, rather than face a Chinese onslaught.
Crimea
While not likely to become an immediate problem, in the long-term Crimea could become a similar situation where Russia recognizes territory in a former Soviet state as an independent nation only to absorb it. In fact, the very proposal of annexing Crimea is not new and many in Crimea favor the idea of rejoining Russia. To this effect Russia has launched a tremendous effort that could make annexing Crimea easy and viable by building a four and a half kilometer bridge from Russia to Crimea.
This is especially an issue given Russia's desire to keep its naval forces in the Crimean base. With Ukraine's government likely to be run again entirely by pro-Western parties Crimea may feel more distant from the Ukrainian government. With Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria all gaining independence and joining Russia, Russians in Crimea may feel left out and try to reunite with Russia, who would long to keep the region under their control. Losing Crimea would also nearly cut Ukraine off from the sea, with only a small portion of Ukraine's territorial seas between Crimea and Odessa remaining open to the Black Sea, a portion Russia could easily use its navy to block in the event of a conflict. It is unlikely Russia will move to get Crimea independence as quickly as it will for other regions, but it could happen before the end of next year after much of the conflicts elsewhere would be resolved.
Kosovo's independence is likely going to have strong implications for all of these regions and it's quite likely several will result in conflict. There are also several other regions which could be impacted, but they are most likely to be resolved peacefully. However, how violent the disputes over these regions becomes depends on the reactions of the nations involved, which can not be easily determined.
More dangerous than anything is the critical blow dealt to the United Nations Long aiming to help resolve global conflicts the U.N. would be facing itself with a complete inability to control even the most developed nations from defying their control and taking action absent of the body. While the U.N. may prove instrumental in resolving the conflict they will be exposed for a paper tiger, not capable of restraining ambitious foreign powers and only truly capable of mediating their discussions, making further more deadly conflicts inevitable.
Kosovo will declare its independence in the first two months of 2008 and will be recognized by Britain, France, Italy and Germany within 48 hours, under a plan to be proposed by Slovenia after it assumes the presidency of the European Union in January, senior EU officials said Wednesday.The point of making this declaration in February is due to the election of Serbia's president, slated for January 20th and February 3rd in the event of a runoff. However, it would seem Kosovo is not going along with the plan:The officials described a carefully orchestrated declaration of independence, probably after Serbian elections in early February, followed by a welcome from the EU and diplomatic recognition by Europe's biggest nations.
More groups of countries will then recognize an independent Kosovo in a rolling series of announcements, led by the United States, the officials said. Washington would be followed by Switzerland, Iceland and Norway before another group made up of Turkey, Macedonia, Albania Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia joined in. The 56 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference would follow suit.
Kosovo's president Fatmir Sejdiu declared Wednesday that the province was a "few days away" from becoming independent.Obviously it seems Kosovo wants independence sooner rather than later and never mind the consequences. Whether Kosovo will wait for December 19th when the UN is expected to discuss the issue or not remains to be seen. In any event, Kosovo will likely have to wait until forming a government. Tomorrow Thaci is expected to reveal who will be include in his coallition for the formation of a government. How long it would take to form a government is unknown, but it is likely some level of expediency will mean a government will be formed not long afterwards and be sworn in. After that it is entirely up to Kosovo when to declare independence and it is likely the President Sejdiu's estimate suggests that such a government will be formed and sworn in only a few days from now and immediately take necessary steps to declare independence. Should the EU reach a sufficient consensus they will be forced to recognize Kosovo much sooner than February and the impact could be immeasurable. Several conflicts are likely to open up soon after a declaration and recognition by other countries.
Northern Kosovo
Once Kosovo declares its independence the new nation will be a majority Albanian nation with a small Serb minority. A significant portion will be in the north, as well as a similar amount spread throughout the rest of Kosovo. In the event Kosovo declares its independence many Serbs in the south could head to Serbia or Northern Kosovo. Should they make the latter choice it's possible they will come into conflict with Albanians in the region. If violence erupts Serbia may decide to intervene and may even seek independence for the north. There have been some signs of Serbia showing greater interest in northern Kosovo:
Serbia opened a new government office in Mitrovica, Kosovo, on Dec. 10, the same day UN-mediated negotiations over Kosovo's status expired without a solution. The Serbian move to reinforce its claim on a city that hangs precariously between peace and conflict just as international diplomacy has stalled comes as thousands of protesters began gathering in Pristina to call for Kosovo's independence.Should Kosovo Serbs move into Northern Kosovo and violence erupt, then a conflict with Serbia could be inevitable. While Serbia is not capable of taking on NATO in Kosovo, they may be able to succeed in retaining the small Serb region due to it proximity to Serbia and the fact less NATO troops are in the Serb region. While this will not be their end goal, it could be enough to prevent a nationalist outcry in the nation.
Republika Srpska
Not being able to retake all of Kosovo may cause enough problems for Serbia that they would need a second option to satisfy raging nationalist tensions. The autonomous Serb republic in Bosnia could be a viable alternative. Srpska is a majority Serb region and is currently facing difficulties with Bosnia's government implementing reforms for joining the EU. They've already made threats to declare independence and Kosovo's independence could encourage them to push for seceding from Bosnia. However, this is much trickier than with Kosovo. While Kosovo is right on Serbia's edge and Serb enclaves are easily concentrated in the north, Bosnia is a mix-matched nation with rough borders between Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia is actually divided into three regions with the third being Brcko district. The Brcko district, however, technically belongs to both but is administered by neither. Presently its population is divided almost evenly between Bosniaks and Serbs, with a significant Croat minority. However it also serves as the bridge between the other two entities. If Srpska loses Brcko district, it will lose access to its western half, though Bosnia will only lose access to a smaller region near Croatia. This means Brcko district is a likely region of conflict for Srpska as it will attempt in seceding from Bosnia to claim the district for itself, being essential to its unity.
Another serious area of conflict would the be the capital of Sarajevo. Resting right on the border of Srpska, Sarajevo is an easy target for Serbs seeking to force a resolution in their favor. With Serbian military aid, Srpska could encircle the capital city quickly forcing an agreement with the Bosnian federation.
Once an agreement is reached the loss for Bosnia will likely be two-fold, Srpska could claim Brcko district as its own and the region cut off from this loss, being dominantly Croat, could choose to merge with Croatia or this could be brokered in a deal after the conflict has finished. Bosnia would be left with only those parts of it west of Srpska. However, the benefits for Bosnia could be greater under such an agreement, since it could finally leave Bosnia stable and united enough to speed up their entry to the EU. On the other hand, while Serbia would be fully compensated for Kosovo with a Serb region nearly equal in population to Kosovo, it would be faced with a complete denial for EU entry. At the same time, EU backing for Kosovo's independence could doom that long beforehand.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
While technically separate entities their status and conflict will be ultimately inseparable from one another. Not only will their recognition come almost immediately after Kosovo's, maybe weeks at most, the conflict will be with Georgia and both will fight together and ultimately be absorbed by Russia. Recent events indicate Russia may already be preparing for just such a fight. These two will be Russia's first response to Kosovo's declaration of independence and recognition.
Transnistria
While overall a more difficult venture given that Transnistria has no connection to the sea and no land connection exists between Russia and the region, ultimately this is likely to constitute a second response by Russia, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia's secession. However it would be similarly thorny to Srpska since the only way for Russia to send additional troops to the region is by flying over Ukrainian or Moldovan territory. This likely means a conflict with Moldova itself. However, it is possible Russia has sufficient troops to prevent Moldova from responding with force. Also, Russia could make use of its naval and air forces to blockade Moldova as opposed to simple use of force. The Moldovan government will likely be much more malleable to Russian demands than Georgia.
Nagorno-Karabakh
In a previous post I discussed the matter of Nagorno-Karabakh more in depth. Who actually starts such a conflict is the real question. Azerbaijan, seeing Kosovo used as a precedent for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may decide to pre-empt any move to apply the precedent in Nagorno-Karabakh with force. A likely justification would be PKK "bases" they claim are inside Nagorno-Karabakh. Renewed attacks by the PKK inflamed by Kosovo's independence could make this even seem legitimate, especially if Turkey is already taking action against them in Northern Iraq. While being made to look like a show of solidarity with Turkey, the real aim will be instigating a conflict where Azerbaijan can justify retaking Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Seeing Armenia threatened by Azerbaijan, Russia may threaten to intervene, prompting U.S. deployment.
This conflict could be one of the most confrontational between the U.S. and Russia, with American troops lining Azerbaijan's border across from Russian troops. However, it is likely Russia will instead focus on putting its troops in Armenia and preventing Azerbaijan from moving into Armenia itself rather than just reclaiming Armenian-held territory.
Kurdistan
Much of this coming in January and moving into spring, an attack by Turkey in Northern Iraq could be inevitable. The PKK may use Kosovo's independence to ignite Kurdish nationalism, as well as failure to meet the deadline for the Kirkuk referendum. While it is unlikely Kurds will push for statehood, heightened nationalism in the region and increased PKK attacks might frighten Turkey enough to launch a push into Iraq. Should Azerbaijan have attacked Nagorno-Karabakh using the PKK as a justification and be defended by the United States, Turkey may be further enraged if told to back down. There is potential for Kosovo's independence and the resulting conflict to spark off a war in the Middle East.
Cyprus
Turkey has been having many problems with Greek Cyprus over this year and a renewed conflict in Northern Iraq alongside Kosovo's independence may give them the reasoning to push for Northern Cyprus. While recognized by Turkey, no other nation recognizes Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot government does not want division of Cyprus. However, this could be changed with Kosovo's independence. Turkey could begin pushing for the independence of Northern Cyprus, possibly even brokering a deal with Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for their recognition of Northern Cyprus and cooperation against the PKK. While the possibility may seem obscure, nationalists favoring invasion of Northern Iraq and support for Northern Cyprus may be willing to overlook a change in relations with Armenia.
Armenia would be more than happy to establish ties with Turkey, especially if it meant taking their support away from Azerbaijan and this would help uncomplicated Turkey's relations with Iran who would be supporting Turkey's incursion into Northern Iraq.
Western Sahara
While largely ignored in these discussions, the situation in Western Sahara is also beginning to escalate:
The timing of this action can not be easily ignored. It is unlikely a coincidence that the Polisario Front is choosing this time to discuss preparing for war and that is not the only thing upsetting Morocco:Polisario's national secretariat will put the proposal to prepare for war to a vote at a congress to be held on December 14-16 in the Polisario-controlled outpost of Tifariti, Polisario official Mohamed Beissat said in a Reuters interview on Monday.
If adopted, it would be the first time in 16 years that preparations for war had been part of Polisario strategy.
Should the Polisario Front approve such preparations as well as holding this meeting, it is likely to enrage Morocco. If regions like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Srpska use Kosovo to justify independence and other countries recognize them, Morocco could consider the question of responding to the Polisario Front's war preparations before they're finished as a way of preventing a declaration of independence just like Azerbaijan could do with Nagorno-Karabakh. In this event it's also likely Morocco would come into direct conflict with Algeria, which backs the Polisario Front. This will also create issues between Morocco and the African Union, which recognizes Western Sahara as a nation. However, it is unlikely any conflict emerging from this situation would end up including any other African nations.Rabat said holding a Polisario congress in Tifariti would violate the U.N. ceasefire agreement, which it says made Tifariti part of a buffer zone between Algeria-backed Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan troops.
"All activities undertaken in this buffer zone are completely illegal..." the letter said.
Somaliland
Even further under the radar is the issue of Somaliland. While technically part of Somalia, Somaliland has been one of the few regions to remain prosperous. They declared independence in 1994 due to constant civil war in the rest of Somalia and have since then been a unrecognized state. This year, Somaliland has appeared to be headed towards recognition by many states including Ethiopia and the United States. Somaliland is seen as a stable alternative to Somalia for the United States and Ethiopia, currently stuggling with Islamic militants in southern areas of Somalia. It would also serve to prevent Somali irredentism which seeks to claim parts of Ethiopia.
However, the web of Ethiopian involvement makes it difficult to address Somaliland's status. Ethiopia supports Somaliland, but also relies on Puntland for men, especially in the Somali transitional government in place since the expulsion of the Islamic Courts union. Somaliland and Puntland have been at a standoff over disputed territory in the north. Somaliland wants to gain the territory to restore itself to its previous status under the British. However, there are indications Ethiopia may be trying to move more support to Somaliland and away from Puntland as well as building up the transitional government in Mogadishu.
The potential for conflict is not due to Somalia reacting to secession by Somaliland, but Eritrea. Eritrea and Ethiopia have been edging closer towards a second war since a deadline for settling their border dispute passed with no movement by either side. Since the war between them ended Ethiopia and Eritrea have been waging a proxy war in Somalia with Eritrea backing the Islamic Courts Union. Recognition of Somaliland's independence may not directly cause a war between the two, however an ensuing proxy war could, combined with the tensions over the border, result in a renewed conflict between the two countries. However, it is unlikely either side will be able to defeat the other and it will end in another stalemate.
In Somalia, though, the result may be different. If Eritrea supports Puntland against Somaliland and Ethiopia withdraws support from Puntland a proxy battle between the two could be fought alongside Ethiopia and Eritrea's conflict. The likely end result is Somaliland succeeding in taking control of the disputed territory, perhaps with direct Ethiopian assistance. Aside from this, it is likely Somalia will remain a scene for proxy wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both failing to resolve their border issues through negotiations or military conflict.
Taiwan
One of the more obvious conflicts that could result from Kosovo's independence is between Taiwan and China. While Taiwan won't declare independence just because of Kosovo, Kosovo's independence could help the DPP gain an edge on the KMT in legislative and presidential elections. It would also be likely to increase support for a referendum on joining the U.N. as "Taiwan" rather than the Republic of China. China has already warned about this referendum and faced with a DPP president and a DPP legislature, especially if the legislature should gain a two-thirds majority itself or with Taiwan Solidarity Union, China is likely to feel independence is inevitable, especially with the Kosovo precedent and attack.
China's likely strategy would be to blockade the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, both are likely to be more inclined towards reunification so China could reach an agreement with them on reunification. Peacably gaining Kinmen and Matsu without attacking the islands might go a long way in defusing any nationalist sentiment in Taiwan. China could use force to gain the Taiwan-held Spratly Islands and move on Penghu islands. In order to do this gaining air and naval supremacy in the Taiwan Straits would be necessary, however, it's likely China will be more then capable of achieving this.
The United States has already come out in condemnation of the referendum and would likely see Taiwan's actions as provoking conflict so this strategy would push the U.S. even further from intervention than it would be already. Not only this, but if China should succeed in destroying or debilitating most of Taiwan's air force and navy, as well as seizing Penghu, many Taiwanese would become hopeless and enraged. Peaceful secession by Kinmen and Matsu would make things worse. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's ports could have even more dampening effects on Taiwanese attitudes. Faced with an economic depression, closed off from family members in mainland China and possibly Kinmen and Matsu, and seeing no chance of stopping China, let alone a chance of U.S. aid, Taiwanese citizens would be faced with an unwinnable situation. Taiwan's government could be faced with domestic unrest and no hope of winning. Seixure of Penghu would give China the ability to strike at the main island of Taiwan and provide a perfect launch ground for airborne or amphibious troops to be sent to Taiwan's main island.
It is likely the Taiwanese government would look to negotiations on a cease-fire or surrender, rather than face a Chinese onslaught.
Crimea
While not likely to become an immediate problem, in the long-term Crimea could become a similar situation where Russia recognizes territory in a former Soviet state as an independent nation only to absorb it. In fact, the very proposal of annexing Crimea is not new and many in Crimea favor the idea of rejoining Russia. To this effect Russia has launched a tremendous effort that could make annexing Crimea easy and viable by building a four and a half kilometer bridge from Russia to Crimea.
This is especially an issue given Russia's desire to keep its naval forces in the Crimean base. With Ukraine's government likely to be run again entirely by pro-Western parties Crimea may feel more distant from the Ukrainian government. With Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria all gaining independence and joining Russia, Russians in Crimea may feel left out and try to reunite with Russia, who would long to keep the region under their control. Losing Crimea would also nearly cut Ukraine off from the sea, with only a small portion of Ukraine's territorial seas between Crimea and Odessa remaining open to the Black Sea, a portion Russia could easily use its navy to block in the event of a conflict. It is unlikely Russia will move to get Crimea independence as quickly as it will for other regions, but it could happen before the end of next year after much of the conflicts elsewhere would be resolved.
Kosovo's independence is likely going to have strong implications for all of these regions and it's quite likely several will result in conflict. There are also several other regions which could be impacted, but they are most likely to be resolved peacefully. However, how violent the disputes over these regions becomes depends on the reactions of the nations involved, which can not be easily determined.
More dangerous than anything is the critical blow dealt to the United Nations Long aiming to help resolve global conflicts the U.N. would be facing itself with a complete inability to control even the most developed nations from defying their control and taking action absent of the body. While the U.N. may prove instrumental in resolving the conflict they will be exposed for a paper tiger, not capable of restraining ambitious foreign powers and only truly capable of mediating their discussions, making further more deadly conflicts inevitable.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Now we wait . . . . .
The predicted outcome of talks with Kosovo has arrived:
Russia has been issuing the usual veiled threats on this issue:
In another interesting develop recent accusations that the PKK is in Nagorno-Karabakh have lead to Azerbaijan threatening to attack the alleged PKK presence:
Put in context of the brewing Middle Eastern conflict, an attack by Azerbaijan may happen at the same time as an attack on Northern Iraq by Turkey. It is possible Turkey will cooperate with the U.S. and Azerbaijan, but should Iran back Turkey in Northern Iraq it could become a more complicated situation. Azerbaijan's relationship with Turkey comes primarily out of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, but their relations with Iran are more dynamic and not simply a strategic alliance. One possibility is if Azerbaijan is backed by the U.S., but Turkey is told not to react or get involved. This could become a problem for Turkey and would drastically increase the possibility of an attack as popular outcry would be even greater than before. If Turkey invades without the U.S. acquiescence and gets support from Iran it could be the death knell to U.S.-Turkish relations.
There is also potential for problems in Taiwan, which is having a presidential election next year in March.Recent polls show the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou with 37% support and pro-independence Frank Hsieh. Alongside this is a referendum on entering the U.N. under the name of Taiwan, which, if passed, would be the second of the five noes promised by Chen Shui-Ban to be broken after he scrapped the Unification Council last year.
Should pro-unification Ma win the election the results of the referendum may be overlooked by China given the KMT's friendly relations with China's government and ambition for peace talks. However, if the referendum passes, as it likely will regardless, and Frank Hsieh of the DPP wins, China may see Taiwan moving on an unavoidable path towards independence and take some form of military action against Taiwan. Under such circumstances it is likely the U.S. would not stop China, seeing the referendum as a needless provocation and also not wanting to come to blows with the Chinese. A win for Ma, though, is likely at the moment.
Independence for Kosovo, could, on the other hand, change things. The poll, while showing Ma with a 15% lead, also shows 41% of those polled have not made their decision. If Kosovo declares independence and is recognized by, among others, the United States, nationalist sentiments in Taiwan will be brought to the forefront and could give Hsieh the edge in the election. If that happens, China is likely to respond with force soon after, to avoid further moves towards independence.
For now, however, we can only watch and wait to know what happens next.
Only one question remains on Kosovo's independence, "When?" There appears to be some dispute on this. While many have called for independence before the end of the year some suggested it could come in early January next year. In this matter the EU has shown a growing unity:Kosovo's leaders said Monday they would embark on immediate talks on independence from Serbia and EU nations backed their cause as a UN deadline ended for a negotiated settlement.
"From today, Kosovo is starting intense consultations with its international partners with the aim of coordinating steps for declaring independence, and the official demands for recognising independence," said Skender Hyseni of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team.
The European Union is less divided but is unlikely to reach unity any time soon on how to react to Kosovo's plans to declare independence from Serbia, officials in Brussels conceded after a meeting of foreign ministers Monday.
'We are trying to organize a strong, cohesive, unified position (on Kosovo) within the EU. We still have more steps to make during the next weeks,' said Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the EU until December 31.
Indeed it seems there is only one country left that objects to a declaration outside of the U.N.:
Several ministers acknowledged that the biggest obstacle to a united EU position was posed by Cyprus, an island split in half by Greece and Turkey.
Cyprus officials insisted Monday that they would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo's leaders and that talks between the sides should continue.
While Cyprus is particularly strong on this issue it may be related to the Turkish Cypriots in the north. Should they be reassured on that issue, they may come around to independence. If that happens and a consensus on independence is reached, it will have a strong impact on other nations like Montenegro and Croatia, aspiring EU members.
Russia has been issuing the usual veiled threats on this issue:
Serbia's main backer in the international arena, Russia, is already making threatening statements on the issue. Foreign minister Sergei Labrov said a unilateral declaration of independence would be illegal and would "naturally have consequences".Of course, it has recently come out that Russia may be considering recognition of at least Abkhazia and South Ossetia in January, perhaps followed by Transnistria.
"I am positive that such steps will trigger a chain reaction in the Balkans and other regions. Everyone who has such plans must be fully aware of their responsibility," the Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.
In another interesting develop recent accusations that the PKK is in Nagorno-Karabakh have lead to Azerbaijan threatening to attack the alleged PKK presence:
Azerbaijan is prepared to hold anti-terror operations against the placement of armed divisions of the Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) in Nagorno-Karabakh, Araz Azimov, the Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister and Azerbaijani President’s special representative for Nagorno-Karabakh, said in talks with journalists on 10 December.Of course, Azerbaijan could simply use an alleged presence to justify retaking Nagorno-Karabakh, fearing or following its recognition by Armenia and Russia.
Put in context of the brewing Middle Eastern conflict, an attack by Azerbaijan may happen at the same time as an attack on Northern Iraq by Turkey. It is possible Turkey will cooperate with the U.S. and Azerbaijan, but should Iran back Turkey in Northern Iraq it could become a more complicated situation. Azerbaijan's relationship with Turkey comes primarily out of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, but their relations with Iran are more dynamic and not simply a strategic alliance. One possibility is if Azerbaijan is backed by the U.S., but Turkey is told not to react or get involved. This could become a problem for Turkey and would drastically increase the possibility of an attack as popular outcry would be even greater than before. If Turkey invades without the U.S. acquiescence and gets support from Iran it could be the death knell to U.S.-Turkish relations.
There is also potential for problems in Taiwan, which is having a presidential election next year in March.Recent polls show the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou with 37% support and pro-independence Frank Hsieh. Alongside this is a referendum on entering the U.N. under the name of Taiwan, which, if passed, would be the second of the five noes promised by Chen Shui-Ban to be broken after he scrapped the Unification Council last year.
Should pro-unification Ma win the election the results of the referendum may be overlooked by China given the KMT's friendly relations with China's government and ambition for peace talks. However, if the referendum passes, as it likely will regardless, and Frank Hsieh of the DPP wins, China may see Taiwan moving on an unavoidable path towards independence and take some form of military action against Taiwan. Under such circumstances it is likely the U.S. would not stop China, seeing the referendum as a needless provocation and also not wanting to come to blows with the Chinese. A win for Ma, though, is likely at the moment.
Independence for Kosovo, could, on the other hand, change things. The poll, while showing Ma with a 15% lead, also shows 41% of those polled have not made their decision. If Kosovo declares independence and is recognized by, among others, the United States, nationalist sentiments in Taiwan will be brought to the forefront and could give Hsieh the edge in the election. If that happens, China is likely to respond with force soon after, to avoid further moves towards independence.
For now, however, we can only watch and wait to know what happens next.
Wednesday, December 5, 2007
On the edge of a Storm
Next week, likely December 11th or December 12th, Kosovo will probably declare its independence unilaterally. They are expected to be quickly recognized by the U.S., Britain, several other European countries, and several Muslim countries. Once this is done the can of worms will be opened and conflicts may emerge across Europe.
In Kosovo NATO is already preparing for the event that there is violence in the province after independence:
However, it doesn't end in the Balkans. Another potential threat looms with Russia and the Caucasus. A former speaker of the State Duma in Russia has said that as soon as January the Duma could be considering recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Kosovo declares its independence and is recognized unilaterally then it is possible this date may be moved up faster. Georgia has responded by saying that if such a recognition were made that it would be tantamount to a declaration of war.
This goes along with recent statements by Georgia's president stating of South Ossetia, "The [secessionist] regime in Tskhinvali is like a loose tooth ready for removal and I am sure – if the January 5 [presidential elections] are held normally – this is a matter of, if not weeks, then at the very most, months." His comments line up perfectly with South Ossetia and Abkhazia's expected recognition by Russia's State Duma. The implication seems to be that the issue will be resolved and likely by force.
Signs of this emerging struggle are already being shown. A journalist from Geneva recently suggested that Georgia's arms buildup is geared towards retaking South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. Georgia's weaponry and funding for this arms buildup comes almost exclusively from the United States. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, feeling threatened by Georgia and likely suspecting their independence will come soon, are coming together and promising to fight against Georgia together should one of them be attacked. Georgia has also accused Russia of building up its own forces in the region in preparation for a war. A buildup to war is evident with these actions.
Interestingly enough the likely date of Kosovo's independence lines up almost perfectly with Russia's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty which will takes effect on December 12th. This means Russia could build up as many of its forces as it wants without any obligations to the West. The potential for this to be used against Georgia and other countries is clear.
Another potential flashpoint with Russia is in Moldova, where Transnistria expects to be recognized alongside South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A Russian member of parliaments has said Russia will recognize Transnistria and that several other countries will follow suit like Cuba, Venezuela, and Belarus. If this happens a potential conflict in Eastern Europe will erupt and with Russia suspending the CFE, there will be no limitations or obligations for their use of force in the region.
Nagorno-Karabakh may end up being recognized by Russia as well, which will ultimately result in a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia which could draw in Russia, the U.S., and Turkey. However, should Turkey be pre-occupied with the Kurds they may stay out of the situation. A conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, would most likely get Russia involved since they troops based in Armenia.
It will not end there, either. Independence for Kosovo and the following independence of these regions will incite independence movements around the world. In Northern Iraq the Kurds have been pushing for a referendum on Kirkuk and this is likely only to magnify their wishes and possibly incite them towards independence. Particularly the PKK may be pushed towards harder actions against Turkey as it has long aimed for a Kurdish nation. With this happening at the same time as Turkey's authorization for war in Northern Iraq, it could incite a Middle Eastern conflict.
Taiwan is in an election season and the independence of so many other unrecognized states outside the U.N. could translate into strong votes in favor of a U.N. referendum and the DPP during the presidential election. The combined effect of both votes is likely to start a war with China over Taiwanese independence, one that may leave out the United States.
Fallout from Kosovo's independence will be widespread and impact everywhere. In the U.S. a widespread war overseas could favor Rudy Giuliani who has staked his election on a strong stance on national security. A debate would rage throughout the U.S. on how to respond to this situation and what it means for the U.N., which has failed to deal with the problems. Calls for non-interventionism would fall on deaf ears while whoever is the toughest and roughest on foreign policy will be considered a strong contender for President. This likely means Giuliani winning the Presidency.
In Europe Belgium's current crisis could result in a complete dissolution of the country and Scotland may make immediate moves towards their own independence as well as the Basque country in Spain.
With conflicts raging all over the world the U.N. would be coming face to face with its own impotence in the face of massive world powers. While it will likely be the medium through which these conflicts are resolved, it will have proven itself incompetent at stopping the ambitions of other nations leading to serious questions about reforming the institution. Iraq had already shown a weakness in the U.N., but Kosovo's independence and the resulting wave of conflict, will prove their impotence.
After that all the U.N. can do is serve as a negotiating table for large powers to cut out their swaths of territory and create some form of stable peace. However, the damage to international peace will have already been made and nations will be on war-footing waiting for the next shot to start an even larger war.
In Kosovo NATO is already preparing for the event that there is violence in the province after independence:
NATO's chief said Tuesday that his forces are prepared to respond to violence in coming weeks as the breakaway territory of Serbia prepares to assert its independence.While Serbia has said they will not use their military against Kosovo in response to independence they have left open the possibility of using force:Gen. John Craddock said that plans include the possibility of quickly boosting the 16,000 NATO troops currently in Kosovo.
"I think that there will be those who want to create mischief and that will be manifested as strife, potentially violence in Kosovo,"
"Different scenarios were considered, and a reaction is possible in the event of any attempts to violating security, or on the grounds of a political decision made by the Serbian government or the head of state," the sources at the MoD told the agency.Essentially this means Serbia may react with military force if the Serb populations in Kosovo seem to be threatened. This same justification was given during the Yugoslav wars by Slobodan Milosevic. Protecting Serbs will not only apply in Kosovo, but Bosnia as well. Serbia's Prime minister recently said, "preserving Kosovo and Republika Srpska are now the most important goals of our [Serbian] state and national policy." Bosnia has recently been carrying out reforms to try and enter the EU, some of these reforms would involve integrating the police forces and changing the parliamentary voting system. Bosnia's Serbs see both reforms as attempts at destroying the Serb entity in Bosnia and have threatened themselves to declare independence. The Prime Minister of Republika Srpska has even said, "most people would want this to happen, to see the RS in some form outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and suggesting such a move could be unavoidable after Kosovo's independence.
"Force deployment and unequivocal messages have already preventively made it clear to everyone that Serbia is ready to act in a serious manner should the need arise," the unnamed source explained.
The Serbian Army (VS) last week sent out recruitment orders for more than 700 soldiers under contract, for different posts in the Vranje, Leskovac and Bujanovac garrisons, in the south of the country.
Thursday, the cabinet decided that all ministries should make action plans for helping the Serb and other non-Albanian population in Kosovo, should there be a unilateral proclamation of independence, Labor Minister Rasim Ljajić told reporters after the session.
However, it doesn't end in the Balkans. Another potential threat looms with Russia and the Caucasus. A former speaker of the State Duma in Russia has said that as soon as January the Duma could be considering recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Kosovo declares its independence and is recognized unilaterally then it is possible this date may be moved up faster. Georgia has responded by saying that if such a recognition were made that it would be tantamount to a declaration of war.
This goes along with recent statements by Georgia's president stating of South Ossetia, "The [secessionist] regime in Tskhinvali is like a loose tooth ready for removal and I am sure – if the January 5 [presidential elections] are held normally – this is a matter of, if not weeks, then at the very most, months." His comments line up perfectly with South Ossetia and Abkhazia's expected recognition by Russia's State Duma. The implication seems to be that the issue will be resolved and likely by force.
Signs of this emerging struggle are already being shown. A journalist from Geneva recently suggested that Georgia's arms buildup is geared towards retaking South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. Georgia's weaponry and funding for this arms buildup comes almost exclusively from the United States. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, feeling threatened by Georgia and likely suspecting their independence will come soon, are coming together and promising to fight against Georgia together should one of them be attacked. Georgia has also accused Russia of building up its own forces in the region in preparation for a war. A buildup to war is evident with these actions.
Interestingly enough the likely date of Kosovo's independence lines up almost perfectly with Russia's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty which will takes effect on December 12th. This means Russia could build up as many of its forces as it wants without any obligations to the West. The potential for this to be used against Georgia and other countries is clear.
Another potential flashpoint with Russia is in Moldova, where Transnistria expects to be recognized alongside South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A Russian member of parliaments has said Russia will recognize Transnistria and that several other countries will follow suit like Cuba, Venezuela, and Belarus. If this happens a potential conflict in Eastern Europe will erupt and with Russia suspending the CFE, there will be no limitations or obligations for their use of force in the region.
Nagorno-Karabakh may end up being recognized by Russia as well, which will ultimately result in a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia which could draw in Russia, the U.S., and Turkey. However, should Turkey be pre-occupied with the Kurds they may stay out of the situation. A conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, would most likely get Russia involved since they troops based in Armenia.
It will not end there, either. Independence for Kosovo and the following independence of these regions will incite independence movements around the world. In Northern Iraq the Kurds have been pushing for a referendum on Kirkuk and this is likely only to magnify their wishes and possibly incite them towards independence. Particularly the PKK may be pushed towards harder actions against Turkey as it has long aimed for a Kurdish nation. With this happening at the same time as Turkey's authorization for war in Northern Iraq, it could incite a Middle Eastern conflict.
Taiwan is in an election season and the independence of so many other unrecognized states outside the U.N. could translate into strong votes in favor of a U.N. referendum and the DPP during the presidential election. The combined effect of both votes is likely to start a war with China over Taiwanese independence, one that may leave out the United States.
Fallout from Kosovo's independence will be widespread and impact everywhere. In the U.S. a widespread war overseas could favor Rudy Giuliani who has staked his election on a strong stance on national security. A debate would rage throughout the U.S. on how to respond to this situation and what it means for the U.N., which has failed to deal with the problems. Calls for non-interventionism would fall on deaf ears while whoever is the toughest and roughest on foreign policy will be considered a strong contender for President. This likely means Giuliani winning the Presidency.
In Europe Belgium's current crisis could result in a complete dissolution of the country and Scotland may make immediate moves towards their own independence as well as the Basque country in Spain.
With conflicts raging all over the world the U.N. would be coming face to face with its own impotence in the face of massive world powers. While it will likely be the medium through which these conflicts are resolved, it will have proven itself incompetent at stopping the ambitions of other nations leading to serious questions about reforming the institution. Iraq had already shown a weakness in the U.N., but Kosovo's independence and the resulting wave of conflict, will prove their impotence.
After that all the U.N. can do is serve as a negotiating table for large powers to cut out their swaths of territory and create some form of stable peace. However, the damage to international peace will have already been made and nations will be on war-footing waiting for the next shot to start an even larger war.
Friday, November 30, 2007
Turkish Cabinet authorizes an attack
Almost as if to blend into what's going on with Kosovo Turkey's cabinet has given the military authorization to go into Northern Iraq:
Speaking on Turkish television, Mr Erdogan said "Turkish armed forces are now authorised for a cross-border operation."
His cabinet had approved the decision in a meeting on November 28, he said.
Turkey has amassed some 100,000 troops on its border with Iraq since October 17 when Turkish MPs voted by 507 votes to 19 in favour of military action.
Combined with Turkey dropping leaflets calling PKK members to surrender, this seems to indicate an attack is soon to be launched, though exactly when is uncertain. Adding to the mix is this report in the AP:
"The PKK fighters have evacuated their posts in Iraq's Qandil mountain chain, and gone to Turkish Kurdistan," Ocalan said, adding that the PKK fighters were largely replaced by fighters from the anti-Iran Free Life Iranian Kurdish Party.While there is some question to the truth of this, it's unlikely Turkey differentiates between the two anyway and this has the potential to bring Iran into the mix, which would cause even greater problems. If that happens then the reverberations will be fought across the region.
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
Turkey: Surrender or Else
It seems Turkey is finally going to back up their threats to invade:
It's also uncertain whether Iran will join Turkey in its attack. However, for now, it seems clear Turkey is ultimately set on invading Northern Iraq one way or the other. The only question there is when.
In recent weeks, the Turkish military has moved more soldiers and artillery units to the border with Iraq in preparation for a possible cross-border offensive against the Kurdistan Workers Party's (PKK) bases.While Turkey's diplomatic action cooled the U.S. and the media's fears, it seems Turkey instead sees it as a green light to invade. This will likely take place after the Annapolis conference, though exactly how it will be carried is still unknown. Another big question mark is whether the Kurdish Regional Government will allow Turkey to invade the area in any manner, though it's unlikely they would tolerate a massive military incursion.
At the same time, army helicopters have dropped thousands of leaflets on mountainous paths used by the rebels to infiltrate Turkey, a government official said.
"Make your decision and leave the organization. Go to the nearest military unit or police station. You will be welcomed with love,'' said one leaflet found by a villager on a path near the border town of Cukurca.
It's also uncertain whether Iran will join Turkey in its attack. However, for now, it seems clear Turkey is ultimately set on invading Northern Iraq one way or the other. The only question there is when.
Thursday, November 1, 2007
The Confrontational Hotbed Known as Nepal
Nepal is expected to push a final vote today in their interim parliament on whether to abolish the monarchy and have a proportional voting system. This is key to meeting demands from the Nepalese Maoists who withdrew from the government in September, resulting in the suspension of elections to the Constituent Assembly, which is intended to form a new government.
This struggle is just one of many ongoing conflicts in Nepal, which is of incredible importance to the two big powers in the region, India and China. Dangers with this particular move are tenfold. Not only have the Maoists threatened to instigate a "people's revolt" to overturn the government should their demands not be met, if they are met the military may use force to keep Nepal's King Gyanendra in power. Nepal declaring itself a secular republic has also raised the threat of a Hindu revolt to restore Hinduism as the state religion.
In the parliament chances of it being passed have been seriously questioned as, even with support of the other Communist parties in Nepal there would have to be a defection from the Nepali Congress party to secure passage because the vote needs a two-thirds majority. However, given the Nepali Congress being composed of two recently reunified parties, it's possible those members once part of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) party could defect and vote for the Maoist proposals. The former leader of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) party Sher Bahadur Deuba was twice deposed by the Nepalese king, which may make him and his faction more willing to vote for the Maoists proposal.
However, this could cause serious problems for Nepal as some in India have raised the possibility of sending in their military to stabilize the situation. These remarks by an ex-Indian army officer and the BJP have brought on harsh remarks from the Communist parties in Nepal. The Chief of the Maoists international affairs has warned this puts Nepal's nationalism "under threat". While India has come out and said there are no plans to go into Nepal, this could change should instability grow.
It is not just Nepal's change to a secular republic that has the potential for conflict as there are far grander complications in the country. One of the other conflicts that could emerge is in Madhesh, where people believe they are discriminated and have called for everything from autonomy to outright independence. Recently a Madheshi minister called for the uniting of all Madheshi groups into a single front so as to better achieve their goals. Should such a unified movement be formed and make any serious push towards autonomy or independence it could lead to a conflict with the Nepalese government.
There is still yet another brewing potential conflict in Nepal, but it's not a conflict that could happen in Nepal, but ultimately may come from Nepal. This is the issue of Bhutanese refugees currently in Nepal. The refugees in Nepal wish to return to their homeland of Bhutan in time to participate in elections in the country. Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal are mainly people who participated in a massive pro-democracy protest in their home country in 1990. Since then, though, they've been living in Nepal with Bhutan refusing to accept their return.
While the United States and other countries have offered up resettlement as a possibility for the refugees, some of the refugee leaders have allegedly made death threats anyone seeking to resettle, desiring only to be returned to Bhutan. These leaders have reffered to those favoring resettlement as "agents of America" and it's believe several refugee leaders favoring resettlement were killed as part of this campaign. Refugee leaders behind this campaign reveal a troubling factor in this situation. Most of the leaders pushing against resettlement are members of the Bhutanese Maoist party, heavily influence and supported by the Nepali Maoists. Bhutanese Maoists have made frequent efforts at crossing through Nepal and India to reach Bhutan and some may have made it back and are part of a small-scale insurgency there.
With the Bhutanese refugee issue there arises the potential for a major conflict emerging out of Nepal and manifesting in Bhutan. Should these groups be allowed to return to Bhutan it's possible they'll engage in a major insurgency against the Bhutanese government like the Nepali Maoists did before. Bhutan has been a long-time ally of India and is effectively a protectorate of India. A massive Maoist uprising in Bhutan could bring about Indian intervention in the country. If Bhutan fails to accept the refugees, they could decide to try and push out of Nepal and into Bhutan, ultimately bringing them into conflict with the Nepalese army and possibly India's army.
All of these factors in Nepal are worrisome as India, the United Kingdom, and Singapore all have have Gurkha soldiers serving in their armies, who are recruited from Nepal. Should massive instability disrupt the situation in Nepal it could lead to intervention, not only by India, but also the British. India's possible intervention is made even more possible by accusations the Nepalese Maoists are facilitating Islamist and Naxalite violence in India itself as well as helping Pakistan infiltrate Islamic terrorists into India.
There is also potential for Chinese intervention in the region. Nepal has traditionally served as an escape route for Tibetan refugees trying to escape Chinese rule or simply wishing to see the Dalai Lama in India. Nepal's Maoists have recently reported what they believe to be a plot by the Dalai Lama to launch a secessionist campaign aimed at distracting China while India and the U.S. intervene in Nepal. Though, alleged ties between the Maoists and China are discussed frequently the Maoist attacks against the Dalai Lama may be an attempt at currying favor with the Chinese government.
This is coming at a time when China has reportedly made an intrusion over Bhutan's border, which has aroused concern with India's government. This also coincides with China calling for India to remove bunkers it says are on their side of the line of Control in Sikkim. The Indian province of Sikkim is part of a border dispute with China and is also between Nepal and Bhutan. India on the other hand claims China frequently crosses the line of control and has raised concerns about an increasing Chinese military presence near India.
Any serious conflagration in Nepal or from the return of refugees in Nepal could set China and India on a collision course that could even leave the British in the crossfire. However, given China's importance with regards to North Korea and trade, the possibility of American intervention in any possibly conflict may be low, with the U.S. forced to stand by as its allies come to blows with the rising power of China.
The potential blow back from such a conflict could turn out to be immeasurable.
This struggle is just one of many ongoing conflicts in Nepal, which is of incredible importance to the two big powers in the region, India and China. Dangers with this particular move are tenfold. Not only have the Maoists threatened to instigate a "people's revolt" to overturn the government should their demands not be met, if they are met the military may use force to keep Nepal's King Gyanendra in power. Nepal declaring itself a secular republic has also raised the threat of a Hindu revolt to restore Hinduism as the state religion.
In the parliament chances of it being passed have been seriously questioned as, even with support of the other Communist parties in Nepal there would have to be a defection from the Nepali Congress party to secure passage because the vote needs a two-thirds majority. However, given the Nepali Congress being composed of two recently reunified parties, it's possible those members once part of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) party could defect and vote for the Maoist proposals. The former leader of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) party Sher Bahadur Deuba was twice deposed by the Nepalese king, which may make him and his faction more willing to vote for the Maoists proposal.
However, this could cause serious problems for Nepal as some in India have raised the possibility of sending in their military to stabilize the situation. These remarks by an ex-Indian army officer and the BJP have brought on harsh remarks from the Communist parties in Nepal. The Chief of the Maoists international affairs has warned this puts Nepal's nationalism "under threat". While India has come out and said there are no plans to go into Nepal, this could change should instability grow.
It is not just Nepal's change to a secular republic that has the potential for conflict as there are far grander complications in the country. One of the other conflicts that could emerge is in Madhesh, where people believe they are discriminated and have called for everything from autonomy to outright independence. Recently a Madheshi minister called for the uniting of all Madheshi groups into a single front so as to better achieve their goals. Should such a unified movement be formed and make any serious push towards autonomy or independence it could lead to a conflict with the Nepalese government.
There is still yet another brewing potential conflict in Nepal, but it's not a conflict that could happen in Nepal, but ultimately may come from Nepal. This is the issue of Bhutanese refugees currently in Nepal. The refugees in Nepal wish to return to their homeland of Bhutan in time to participate in elections in the country. Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal are mainly people who participated in a massive pro-democracy protest in their home country in 1990. Since then, though, they've been living in Nepal with Bhutan refusing to accept their return.
While the United States and other countries have offered up resettlement as a possibility for the refugees, some of the refugee leaders have allegedly made death threats anyone seeking to resettle, desiring only to be returned to Bhutan. These leaders have reffered to those favoring resettlement as "agents of America" and it's believe several refugee leaders favoring resettlement were killed as part of this campaign. Refugee leaders behind this campaign reveal a troubling factor in this situation. Most of the leaders pushing against resettlement are members of the Bhutanese Maoist party, heavily influence and supported by the Nepali Maoists. Bhutanese Maoists have made frequent efforts at crossing through Nepal and India to reach Bhutan and some may have made it back and are part of a small-scale insurgency there.
With the Bhutanese refugee issue there arises the potential for a major conflict emerging out of Nepal and manifesting in Bhutan. Should these groups be allowed to return to Bhutan it's possible they'll engage in a major insurgency against the Bhutanese government like the Nepali Maoists did before. Bhutan has been a long-time ally of India and is effectively a protectorate of India. A massive Maoist uprising in Bhutan could bring about Indian intervention in the country. If Bhutan fails to accept the refugees, they could decide to try and push out of Nepal and into Bhutan, ultimately bringing them into conflict with the Nepalese army and possibly India's army.
All of these factors in Nepal are worrisome as India, the United Kingdom, and Singapore all have have Gurkha soldiers serving in their armies, who are recruited from Nepal. Should massive instability disrupt the situation in Nepal it could lead to intervention, not only by India, but also the British. India's possible intervention is made even more possible by accusations the Nepalese Maoists are facilitating Islamist and Naxalite violence in India itself as well as helping Pakistan infiltrate Islamic terrorists into India.
There is also potential for Chinese intervention in the region. Nepal has traditionally served as an escape route for Tibetan refugees trying to escape Chinese rule or simply wishing to see the Dalai Lama in India. Nepal's Maoists have recently reported what they believe to be a plot by the Dalai Lama to launch a secessionist campaign aimed at distracting China while India and the U.S. intervene in Nepal. Though, alleged ties between the Maoists and China are discussed frequently the Maoist attacks against the Dalai Lama may be an attempt at currying favor with the Chinese government.
This is coming at a time when China has reportedly made an intrusion over Bhutan's border, which has aroused concern with India's government. This also coincides with China calling for India to remove bunkers it says are on their side of the line of Control in Sikkim. The Indian province of Sikkim is part of a border dispute with China and is also between Nepal and Bhutan. India on the other hand claims China frequently crosses the line of control and has raised concerns about an increasing Chinese military presence near India.
Any serious conflagration in Nepal or from the return of refugees in Nepal could set China and India on a collision course that could even leave the British in the crossfire. However, given China's importance with regards to North Korea and trade, the possibility of American intervention in any possibly conflict may be low, with the U.S. forced to stand by as its allies come to blows with the rising power of China.
The potential blow back from such a conflict could turn out to be immeasurable.
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