Ukraine's East-West divide risks exploding

Following the election of Viktor Yanukovych as the President of Ukraine and his appointment of a new government coalition led by his Party of Regions fears arose that Ukraine would see a shift back towards Russia. The election and subsequent government appointment saw considerable controversy and a number of accusations were levied by the opposition. It is no surprise then that the realization of Ukraine's geopolitical shift would bring even greater resistance.

As the governing coalition sought to extend the lease for the Russian base at Sevastopol members of the opposition took action, sparking chaos in the parliament. Members of the opposition threw smoke bombs and eggs at Volodymyr Lytvyn, the Speaker of the parliament, and outside a protest raged. The chants of "death to traitors" and use of physical violence show the potential backlash from Ukraine's sway towards Russia.

In the end the ruling coalition was successful in passing the deal with Russia that included a cut in the price of natural gas imported from Russia. However, ultimately the cut only brought gas down from an inflated price to the market level, which had been Russia's intended target all along. Part of this new agreement requires Ukraine to buy more gas than it needs while also allowing Russia to bypass Ukraine's pipelines.

The latter possibility already has plans in motion with the South Stream pipeline project. This proposed pipeline would cross the Black Sea, bypassing Ukraine and NATO member Turkey to provide natural gas directly to customers in Europe. It would also, together with the Nord Stream project, increase Gazprom's hold on European energy by pushing towards Western Europe.

Russia has used the possibility of South Stream as leverage to push for an even bigger plan, a merger of Naftogaz, Ukraine's state-owned natural gas company, with Gazprom. Ukraine's leadership has not been eager to accept such an arrangement, however, this proposal would eliminate the perpetual flirtation with bankruptcy that has been a constant threat to the company and Ukraine. Yet Russia may not have any intention of actually pushing for a full-on merger, but simply be using the idea to put pressure on Ukraine's government and Naftogaz, which have been supportive of a gas consortium including the EU as a partner. Part of a consortium deal could be partial ownership of Naftogaz, possibly a controlling interest or half-and-half deal, in exchange for removing certain provisions of the recent natural gas deal, including those allowing them to bypass Ukraine altogether. Russia could also insure the European Union is locked out of the project. Ironically, despite the resistance to a merger in Ukraine the European Union has expressed openness to the idea, though steps to keep the EU out might change their perspective.

Any deal with Gazprom that essentially gives control of Ukraine's gas monopoly to Russia, whether through a merger or consortium, will inflame already boiling tensions between the government and the opposition. Already opposition leader and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko is moving for an impeachment of Yanukovych alleging his deals with the Russian government are state treason. She is also seeking to have the parliament dissolved in the hopes of toppling the pro-Russian coalition. Tymoshenko has intensified rhetoric against the current government by accusing it of turning Ukraine into a dictatorship and turning over its territories to Russia. All of this is being done in preparation for a major rally outside parliament on May 11 in order to force a new election.

How the government responds to the proposed gas merger and the planned protests could signal a critical development in Ukraine's future. While most supporters of the opposition hope for a recap of the Orange Revolution in 2004 there has been speculation of a more disastrous scenario: a Yugoslavia-type breakup where Ukraine ceases to be a country. At issue is Yanukovych's alleged disregard for Western Ukraine from appointing governors to ignoring pleas from intellectuals who are against the slide towards Russia. The fight in parliament over extending the Russian base lease gives a preview of the potential for violence. If Yanukovych accepts a gas merger or similar plan with Gazprom or the protests outside parliament turn violent sparking a government crackdown the nation could quickly descend into a civil war between the Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine, a microcosm of the greater geopolitical tug-of-war that risks pulling the country apart.

Subtle buildup to Second Karabakh War?

While the talk of war has been heating up over the past year a number of signs seem to indicate such a development may be near at hand. In Armenia Major General Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan has noted Azerbaijan's buildup of ammunition and threats of war as a sign that war is highly probable, but says he does not believe it would extend to Armenia itself given its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The strongest signs of war, however, are coming from Azerbaijan. Referring to a meeting there with President Aliyev a spokesman for the Defense Ministry praised the military's capabilities saying it would easily defeat Armenia in a new war, and displayed a desire for the military option to be used to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Aliyev was paraphrased as saying the reason for not resorting to force is the hope internationally-mediated negotiations could resolve the issue peacefully, but the spokesman says the talks have proved fruitless on this matter leaving no other option but the use of force. This could be the military putting increasing pressure on Aliyev for the use of military force or indicate a decision to use military force has already been made. With the former there is still cause to believe a war may be imminent as Aliyev could find himself bowing to pressure from the military.

International pressure, in addition to domestic pressure, may cause Azerbaijan to take action against Nagorno-Karabakh. While the U.S. has largely supported Azerbaijan's stance on Nagorno-Karabakh it has also been pushing for a reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. This effort at bettering ties has greatly strained Azerbaijan's relationship with the U.S. and Turkey, its two most important allies in the region. Despite the negotiations between Armenia and Turkey being called off it likely still leaves Azerbaijan feeling isolated and without stalwart allies, giving them all the more reason to act on their own.

One more potential sign of trouble in the region is a recent initiative by Nagorno-Karbakh to lobby foreign states for recognition. Done with the active encouragement of Armenia it creates another possible point of conflagration. While recognition is not likely to be forthcoming from many countries, should it succeed in persuading a single country it could be taken by Azerbaijan as a casus belli. This would still give Armenia room to accuse Azerbaijan of unprovoked invasion since it would be a third country responding to a direct request from Nagorno-Karabakh as opposed to recognition from Armenia or at Armenia's request. It also prepares the ground for recognition should Azerbaijan instead strike over dissatisfaction with the stalemate in talks.

Regardless of who sparks off a conflict these correlating events could indicate a war is soon to erupt in the region that will once again draw the attention and concern of the world to the Caucasus and inevitably, Russia.