A New Wave of Separatism

The declaration of independence of Kosovo and its subsequent recognition by the international community has set up a precedent for other separatist republics. This precedent has been further reinforced by the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While as of now Russia and Nicaragua are the only countries to recognize them this is not due to a lack of support as other countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union are likely to follow suit in time. However, this action has only increased the chances of further action later especially with the Serb action to have the declaration reviewed by the International Court of Justice.

Any decision they reach which does not label Kosovo a unique case and declare its secession illegal is likely to leave legal room for countries to recognize other separatist regions at their discretion. Two likely cases outside the Former Soviet Union could be Republika Srpska and Somaliland.

In Republika Srpska an election is being planned for October 5th which will determine who leads the autonomous region in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While a loss by the ruling party seems unlikely either way could result in its secession from Bosnia. Prime Minister of the region, Milorad Dodik, has himself said he has no attachment to Bosnia, but does have a strong attachment to Republika Srpska. Dodik has had to deal with growing pressure from the Muslim Bosnian government to consolidate the two autonomous regions comprising the country into one single unitary entity, a goal they share with EU. He has threatened to have a referendum on independence if there can be no progress on the dispute honoring his demand for maintaing the current autonomy or even expanding it. While he declared his desire for them to "part in peace" which might prove difficult given the Brcko district bisecting the two regions. Dodik could receive support from Serbia given his strong ties with President Tadic and pressure from nationalists in his own government and the opposition.

It's unlikely such a secession would receive world backing however, with the more likely candidate for such support being Somaliland, a separatist republic in Somalia. Having declared independence back in 1991 it has yet to receive any recognition but signs are growing that the situation may change. Ongoing civil war in Somalia has made the stable and democratic government in Somaliland look increasingly appeal to all interested parties and as it opted into the country of Somalia it has greater standing for independence than other secessionist groups.

Of particular interest are the actions of Ethiopia. Having gone into Somalia in 2006 to prevent the Islamic Courts Union from dominating the country the Ethiopian government is seeing itself in an increasingly untenable position. The Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, has hinted Ethiopian troops may pull out of the country though calling for African Union troops to take their place. Any pullout could also involve a two-state solution being pursued with Somalia by recognizing the Republic of Somaliland as independent, a move which would likely receive the support of western governments. Supposedly this scenario would involve Somaliland deploying troops to help fight against the Islamic Courts Union and expelling member of the Ogaden Liberation Front residing in Somaliland. It also is possible the situation represents a distancing between Ethiopia and Puntland which has been implicated in actions supporting pirates in the area.

This could also insure increased support for Somaliland among Western governments already pursuing closer relations with them. With Puntland possibly backing piracy against Western ships and southern Somalia wracked by violence Somaliland would likely appear to be the only pro-Western and democratic region of the country not under foreign control. As such it is of little surprise that security ties with the French seem to be improving with Somaliland officials saying French security operations in the region include actions launched from the unrecognized state. This is a policy to try and increase the chance of recognition from France as is a trip to meet with European leaders by Somaliland's president with trips to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom planned including an appeal for the European Union to treat Somaliland separate from Somalia with regards to foreign aid. A visit by the African Union envoy to Somalia could also signal possible action by them to recognize Somaliland. The U.S. is also looking at increasing aid to Somaliland and is increasing contacts with breakaway government which could help pave the way for recognition. Should the situation in Somalia deteriorate considerably a concerted action similar to the one in Kosovo could take place though possibly following the 2009 elections there.

Such actions independently would not hold much significance but together it represents a trend suggesting the first major separatist wave since the end of the Cold War, with Kosovo as the major starting point.

Middle Eastern War likely by year's end

Tensions are building every day in the Middle East. It has reached a point where another major conflict is likely and one could commence later this month or in October. Such a war would be certain to be unlike any other in recent history and its quite likely it would result in the use of nuclear weapons by Israel. The current situation is riddled with potential land mines.

Gaza and Israel

The true between Hamas and Israel has held steady despite expectations of its collapse, however the situation could be approaching a breaking point. The truce has remained in place largely due to every violation of the truce involving rocket attacks by Palestinian militant groups other than Hamas being responded to with merely a closure of the border. While some time these attacks injure, but there have not been deaths resulting from them. However, that is becoming increasingly less certain. One attack involved explosions along the border of Gaza near Israeli army patrols. No injuries resulted from the attack but the potential for a major escalation was clear. A single solider's death could have been enough to break the ceasefire.

Even without deaths there are reports the Israeli military and some Israeli officials intend to violate the ceasefire themselves. This demonstrates the continued resistance to Olmert's agreed ceasefire and fears of it being a concession that only allows Hamas to build up its military force even more.

Another potential flashpoint would actually involve Fatah either in the West Bank or Gaza. With Hamas calling on its members to resist attempts at arrest by Fatah with any forceful means needed. Such a situation could risk sparking an all-out uprising against Fatah in the West Bank. Such a situation could instigate a Fatah uprising against Hamas in Gaza. If it ends up involving Israelis in either area it could draw the IDF into Gaza. In addition the armed wing of Fatah suggested the opportunity for the ceasefire will end by the end of the month. This could mean the group attempts to launch an attack from Gaza to bring an end to the ceasefire. If organized by Fatah's political wing it could be intended as a way of eliminating Hamas as a threat.

The other chink in the truce's armor is the negotiation over Gilad Shalit. Israel has been pushing hard for his release and the negotiations are seen as part of the overall ceasefire. Negotiations have focused on securing his release in a prisoner exchange between the two sides. The negotiations, however, have faltered recently with Hamas suggesting the talks start from the beginning and this time with a greater amount of prisoners demanded for release in exchange for Shalit's release.

In addition to this Hamas has placed three conditions on Israel for renewing the negotiations which include:

1. Release of all Palestinian prisoners whose names appear on the list that had been given to Israel via Egyptian mediation
   
2. Implementation of all Israeli commitments in the framework of the ceasefire agreement, including the reopening of Gaza Strip crossings for the passage of goods
3. the opening of the Rafah crossing.

In addition Hamas has begun pressuring Egypt to release prisoners as well. Altogether such actions could dissuade Israel from continuing the negotiations and instead pushing for launching a military rescue operation, which would be certain to end the ceasefire.

As all these events require the government to take such action in response, however Olmert may yet resist such moves. However, here again the situation seems to favor renewed conflict as Olmert is set to resign from his post as Prime Minister. While he will likely remain until a replacement is chosen that may not be long in waiting as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has been chozen as leader of his Kadima party. While she is not the most hardline member who ran her position on the Gaza truce is that any violations should see a military response, meaning the ceasefire will most likely unravel. Another development which could see a harder line is if Livni made her firebrand opponent Shaul Mofaz Defense Minister. Such an appointment would greatly increase pressure on Livni to take military action in response to violations of the ceasefire. It also increases the likelihood of direct attack on Iran or a conflict with Hezbollah. Even if she does not manage to form a government it is likey the more hardline Likud could take power, though an election would likely delay any such event for over three months.

Hezbollah and Lebanon

Lebanon's flashpoints have been brewing for some time. Yet warnings are increasing that Hezbollah may take action against Israel over the death of Imad Mugniyeh as soon as the end of September either involving assassinations and kidnappings of Israeli officials, including military officers, or bombings of embassies and consulates.

Another conflagration could be military in nature with the shoot down of an Israeli aircraft flying over Lebanese airspace, in violation of the UN ceasefire, or the seizure of the Shebaa Farms. Either action would be seen in Lebanon as politically legitimate, especially the shoot down of an Israeli fighter, and as such allow them to accuse Israel of being the aggressor. It is likely a new, more hardline government would give them justification for greater attacks by responding with force themselves. However, the spread of Hezbollah's organization and increasing support and clout within Lebanon and the Lebanese military could lead to a war with Hezbollah being a war with Lebanon itself. As Hezbollah has greatly increased its own strength the combination with the Lebanese military would make a war far more deadly for Israel than the 2006 war.

In fact, reflecting the dangers of the current situation Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has warned of what a future conflict would bring:

Hizbullah Chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah warned Monday that if Israel "launches a war against Lebanon, Syria, Iran or Gaza, it will have thousands of scores to settle", adding that such a conflict would have "unclear implications for the Zionists."

This most likely means any war will result in a massive conflict involving all the above parties and a major push into Israel itself. Reports that Hezbollah has built its own naval force and assisting in Hamas in doing the same raises the stakes of war even higher. With its rocket capability, its anti-air, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles, in addition to a working naval force with warships and the assistance of Syria, Hamas, and Iran a new conflict would leave Israel's cities, seas, and air in terror from the onslaught launched against them.

Northern Iraq

The last major source of tension is in Northern Iraq. Currently a standoff between the Iraqi government under Maliki and the Kurds has reached the point where the government is trying to cut off exports from the Kurdish Regional Government and is warning Kurdish troops in Diyala province to withdraw in eight days or likely face a direct confrontation. Following his actions against the Shiite militias Maliki has become increasingly aggressive against other forces outside his authority. However, a battle with the Kurds may be more than he can chew.

This also runs into the renewal of authorization for Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq. With Turkey openly acknowledging their cooperation with Iran against the PKK it would be no surprise should Turkey take joint action against Northern Iraq with Iran. A civil war in Iraq with the Kurds could be taken as a perfect opportunity. Any conflict in the north involving Iran could end up causing a conflict with the United States, which is certain to spread.

With this assortment of potential conflicts there seems a strong chance of conflict erupting.

Ukraine's government falls

The coalition between President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and Yulia Tymoshenko's has been officially dissolved. This comes in the wake of accusations from Yushchenko that Tymoshenko was a betraying Ukraine to the Russians. Georgia's President, Mikheil Sakaashvili, even inserted his opinion saying he saw signs of meddling from Russia. The political crisis escalated when Tymoshenko joined with the Party of Regions to push through restrictions on Yushchenko's powers. Yushchenko went so far as to accuse the PM of trying to install a dictatorship and launching a coup. Tymoshenko herself belittled the situation:

"The government is going to work for a long time and is going to work successfully despite all these storms... Because this is a storm in a teacup."

A possibility in the crisis is the formation of a new coalition between Tymoshenko and various groups aligned with Russia and opposed to NATO membership, most notably the Party of Regions. Such a party would move Ukraine away from the West, but it may not end with this. Yushchenko is unlikely to abide a loss of his powers or formation of a government aligned more with Russia. Previous political crises have resulted in situation where security force have almost openly confronted each other and regions of Ukraine threatened secession. Such a situation could become even more likely in this event given the actions by Russia in Georgia and the issuing of Russian passports in Crimea.

This political crisis together with the Russia-Georgia war has led to a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Both have banned several of their officials from traveling to either countryand Russia criticized Ukraine for supplying Georgia with weapons accusing Ukraine of "unfriendly" behavior towards Russia. Even further a Russian Rear-Admiral has said Russia will never leave the Russian port in Sevastopol in spite of an agreement to leave by 2017. Such sentiments share a great deal of support through Russia and there is considerable historical basis for taking the whole of Crimea as it was once part of Russia under the Soviet Union, but granted to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev. Similar arguments have been used to justify the action in Georgia.

Given the tendency for political crises in Ukraine to fall into chaos it is hard to predict how the current situation will end. Massive protests seem to be a certainty and should they become violent requiring the use of force to contain, the situation could spiral. If protesters battle in the streets of Sevastopol and Ukrainian forces act, Russia might use the unstable situation to justify taking the whole city or a part. How far Russia goes would depend on the stability of the situation. All-out civil war in Ukraine would probably lead to far greater intervention by Russia and half of Ukraine joining Russia.

At the very least recent events suggest Ukraine will ultimately not integrate into NATO and possibly become a client state even if it can avoid dismemberment.

The proxy war for Bolivia

It was in Bolivia over 40 years ago where Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was executed after being captured by forces of the U.S.-backed dictatorship there. Che had the support of Cuba, the sole communist country in Latin America at the time and dedicated to exporting the revolution to the rest of the continent. Now the tables have turned and it is the U.S. backing an insurgency against a socialist leader backed by Venezuela. While Che's revolution was in the name of Marx, the revolution instituted by Evo Morales is in the name of 19th Century revolutionary Simon Bolivar, an advocate for the unification of South America.

Like President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela the Bolivian president came to power through the ballot box riding a wave of populism. Morales promised to use revenue from natural gas for social welfare and redistribute land to the indigenous inhabitants of Bolivia, which have both been enshrined in a new constitution, on which Morales has planned a referendum for December. These measures while popular with the majority indigenous population proved controversial in the eastern provinces of the country, rich in natural gas, especially among Bolivians with European ancestry who would see themselves lose considerable economic advantages. They also claim the constitution considerably increases Morales' power.

This schism has led to referendums on autonomy for the eastern provinces and escalating protests to the point of cutting off natural gas exports. Bolivian troops deployed in the provinces came under increasing threat of attack from the opposition governors demanding their withdrawal from the regions. Protests finally resulted in outright conflict between supporters of Morales and his opponents in the province of Pando which is believed to have resulted in 30 deaths including opposition and Morales supporters. Ultimately Morales resorted to launching a state of emergency in Pando and sent troops to take the airport on the outskirts of provincial capital and proceeded to retake the city from the opposition. He also ordered for the provincial governor to be arrest accusing him of committing a massacre.

Morales had initially shown a desire to negotiate on the details of the constitution though he has reiterated his intention to hold the referendum. Talks which have been held with the opposition have shown some progress, though results remain in doubt. Of particular danger is an opposition warning that any more deaths among members of the opposition would result in the cancellation of talks. With the Bolivian military patrolling the capital of Pando and opposition members warning they may resist any moves to formally enter the city the chances for renewed conflict remain. Should such a situation result in the death of opposition members and a breaking of talks, the potential for more violent resistance increases and it is likely Morales will follow through on his threat to extend martial law to the other eastern provinces.

How events unfold from there could depend on the actions of the military and opposition. Should the situation erupt into a full-on civil war the potential for a coup or assassination against Morales greatly increases. Hugo Chavez has threatened in such an event that he would support military operations to restore the government. Chavez also condemned the military for what he believed was a lack of action possibly suggesting the military itself was against Morales. It would be possible for the military to take advantage of a period of civil unrest or civil war to seize power from Morales. Such an event would likely be no more successful than the attempt against Chavez with its chances made considerably worse with the support of Venezuelan armed forces. However, there would be little denying the likely backing of the U.S. government for a Bolivian junta and opposition movements.

Indeed, such support for the opposition governors has already been alleged by Morales, leading to the expulsion of America's ambassador to the country. It is that event which shows the extent to which the U.S. has been shut out of Latin America. In support of Bolivia's action Venezuela followed up by expelling the American ambbassador to his country, also accusing the U.S. of supporting a coup attempt against him. Honduras, which recently joined the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas begun by Chavez, also gave a snub to the U.S. delaying the reception of the American mabbassador. Nicragua's President Daniel Ortega head of the Sandinistas who was also president in the 80's and opposed by a U.S.-backed insurgency at the time also made a show of solidarity by rejecting a meeting with President George W. Bush.

The diplomatic retaliation has increased a crisis with both Bolivia and Venezuela. Before his departure the U.S. ambassador warned of "serious consequences" for Bolivia and accused Morales of underestimating retaliation from Washington. On Venezuela it already seems clear what consequences are in store for it. Quickly after Venezuela's ambassador to the U.S. was expelled the Treasury Department accused two senior Venezuelan intelligence officials of backing the FARC, a leftist terror group in Colombia. One official suggested further economic measures and even designation of Venezuela as a terror sponsor could follow. The accusations against Chavez and his government have their roots in a crisis earlier in the year when Colombia launched a raid into Ecuadorian territory to attack a FARC encampment. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador was another member of Chavez's Bolivarian alliance and both leaders cut ties with Colombia with Venezuela deploying its military to the Colombian border warning any incursion into Venezuela would result in war. Nicaragua also cut diplomatic relations with Colombia following the action. While the situation was later resolved it was likely the first sign of the clashing interests of the United States and its allies with the Bolivarian nations led by Venezuela.

While the backing of Venezuela's Bolivarian allies is to be expected the real sign of the decline of U.S. influence in the region has been the reaction of large nations such as Brazil to the crisis in Bolivia and in March, with Brazil backing the Bolivarian side in both cases. Indeed most of South America has sided with the Bolivarian alliance and it is not just regional support where the U.S. is seeing its interests challenged. Russia has long been an ally of Venezuela and has recently moved long-range bombers to the country for military exercises to be followed by a joint naval exercise with Venezuela. Also while the Bolivarian alliance is divided on its ties with Washington, some more being conciliatory than others, and China, with countries like Nicarague and Honduras still maintaining formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, they all have been supportive of Russia with Nicaragua being the second country to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia following Russia itself.

Brazil also has deepened its Russian ties joining Russia and India in the Su PAK FA fifth generation fighter project. The move shores up the Russian project providing much needed financial backing and also extends Russia's influence in the region. In this light while the internal unrest in Bolivia can be seen as a move by the U.S. to challenge the growing support of Chavez and increasing resistance of South America to U.S. dominance it also could be placed in a global context as a push against Russian penetration into a traditional sphere of influence for the United States.