The single spark that lights a dozen powder kegs

The deadline on Kosovo has past and the discussion now is on when Kosovo will declare independence and what will happen when they do. The question of when is becoming an increasingly confusing matter. While it has been suggested that January next year is when Kosovo will declare independence, the story has changed with the EU:

Kosovo will declare its independence in the first two months of 2008 and will be recognized by Britain, France, Italy and Germany within 48 hours, under a plan to be proposed by Slovenia after it assumes the presidency of the European Union in January, senior EU officials said Wednesday.

The officials described a carefully orchestrated declaration of independence, probably after Serbian elections in early February, followed by a welcome from the EU and diplomatic recognition by Europe's biggest nations.

More groups of countries will then recognize an independent Kosovo in a rolling series of announcements, led by the United States, the officials said. Washington would be followed by Switzerland, Iceland and Norway before another group made up of Turkey, Macedonia, Albania Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia joined in. The 56 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference would follow suit.

The point of making this declaration in February is due to the election of Serbia's president, slated for January 20th and February 3rd in the event of a runoff. However, it would seem Kosovo is not going along with the plan:

Kosovo's president Fatmir Sejdiu declared Wednesday that the province was a "few days away" from becoming independent.

Obviously it seems Kosovo wants independence sooner rather than later and never mind the consequences. Whether Kosovo will wait for December 19th when the UN is expected to discuss the issue or not remains to be seen. In any event, Kosovo will likely have to wait until forming a government. Tomorrow Thaci is expected to reveal who will be include in his coallition for the formation of a government. How long it would take to form a government is unknown, but it is likely some level of expediency will mean a government will be formed not long afterwards and be sworn in. After that it is entirely up to Kosovo when to declare independence and it is likely the President Sejdiu's estimate suggests that such a government will be formed and sworn in only a few days from now and immediately take necessary steps to declare independence. Should the EU reach a sufficient consensus they will be forced to recognize Kosovo much sooner than February and the impact could be immeasurable. Several conflicts are likely to open up soon after a declaration and recognition by other countries.

Northern Kosovo

Once Kosovo declares its independence the new nation will be a majority Albanian nation with a small Serb minority. A significant portion will be in the north, as well as a similar amount spread throughout the rest of Kosovo. In the event Kosovo declares its independence many Serbs in the south could head to Serbia or Northern Kosovo. Should they make the latter choice it's possible they will come into conflict with Albanians in the region. If violence erupts Serbia may decide to intervene and may even seek independence for the north. There have been some signs of Serbia showing greater interest in northern Kosovo:

Serbia opened a new government office in Mitrovica, Kosovo, on Dec. 10, the same day UN-mediated negotiations over Kosovo's status expired without a solution. The Serbian move to reinforce its claim on a city that hangs precariously between peace and conflict just as international diplomacy has stalled comes as thousands of protesters began gathering in Pristina to call for Kosovo's independence.

Should Kosovo Serbs move into Northern Kosovo and violence erupt, then a conflict with Serbia could be inevitable. While Serbia is not capable of taking on NATO in Kosovo, they may be able to succeed in retaining the small Serb region due to it proximity to Serbia and the fact less NATO troops are in the Serb region. While this will not be their end goal, it could be enough to prevent a nationalist outcry in the nation.

Republika Srpska

Not being able to retake all of Kosovo may cause enough problems for Serbia that they would need a second option to satisfy raging nationalist tensions. The autonomous Serb republic in Bosnia could be a viable alternative. Srpska is a majority Serb region and is currently facing difficulties with Bosnia's government implementing reforms for joining the EU. They've already made threats to declare independence and Kosovo's independence could encourage them to push for seceding from Bosnia. However, this is much trickier than with Kosovo. While Kosovo is right on Serbia's edge and Serb enclaves are easily concentrated in the north, Bosnia is a mix-matched nation with rough borders between Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia is actually divided into three regions with the third being Brcko district. The Brcko district, however, technically belongs to both but is administered by neither. Presently its population is divided almost evenly between Bosniaks and Serbs, with a significant Croat minority. However it also serves as the bridge between the other two entities. If Srpska loses Brcko district, it will lose access to its western half, though Bosnia will only lose access to a smaller region near Croatia. This means Brcko district is a likely region of conflict for Srpska as it will attempt in seceding from Bosnia to claim the district for itself, being essential to its unity.

Another serious area of conflict would the be the capital of Sarajevo. Resting right on the border of Srpska, Sarajevo is an easy target for Serbs seeking to force a resolution in their favor. With Serbian military aid, Srpska could encircle the capital city quickly forcing an agreement with the Bosnian federation.

Once an agreement is reached the loss for Bosnia will likely be two-fold, Srpska could claim Brcko district as its own and the region cut off from this loss, being dominantly Croat, could choose to merge with Croatia or this could be brokered in a deal after the conflict has finished. Bosnia would be left with only those parts of it west of Srpska. However, the benefits for Bosnia could be greater under such an agreement, since it could finally leave Bosnia stable and united enough to speed up their entry to the EU. On the other hand, while Serbia would be fully compensated for Kosovo with a Serb region nearly equal in population to Kosovo, it would be faced with a complete denial for EU entry. At the same time, EU backing for Kosovo's independence could doom that long beforehand.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

While technically separate entities their status and conflict will be ultimately inseparable from one another. Not only will their recognition come almost immediately after Kosovo's, maybe weeks at most, the conflict will be with Georgia and both will fight together and ultimately be absorbed by Russia. Recent events indicate Russia may already be preparing for just such a fight. These two will be Russia's first response to Kosovo's declaration of independence and recognition.

Transnistria

While overall a more difficult venture given that Transnistria has no connection to the sea and no land connection exists between Russia and the region, ultimately this is likely to constitute a second response by Russia, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia's secession. However it would be similarly thorny to Srpska since the only way for Russia to send additional troops to the region is by flying over Ukrainian or Moldovan territory. This likely means a conflict with Moldova itself. However, it is possible Russia has sufficient troops to prevent Moldova from responding with force. Also, Russia could make use of its naval and air forces to blockade Moldova as opposed to simple use of force. The Moldovan government will likely be much more malleable to Russian demands than Georgia.

Nagorno-Karabakh

In a previous post I discussed the matter of Nagorno-Karabakh more in depth. Who actually starts such a conflict is the real question. Azerbaijan, seeing Kosovo used as a precedent for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may decide to pre-empt any move to apply the precedent in Nagorno-Karabakh with force. A likely justification would be PKK "bases" they claim are inside Nagorno-Karabakh. Renewed attacks by the PKK inflamed by Kosovo's independence could make this even seem legitimate, especially if Turkey is already taking action against them in Northern Iraq. While being made to look like a show of solidarity with Turkey, the real aim will be instigating a conflict where Azerbaijan can justify retaking Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Seeing Armenia threatened by Azerbaijan, Russia may threaten to intervene, prompting U.S. deployment.

This conflict could be one of the most confrontational between the U.S. and Russia, with American troops lining Azerbaijan's border across from Russian troops. However, it is likely Russia will instead focus on putting its troops in Armenia and preventing Azerbaijan from moving into Armenia itself rather than just reclaiming Armenian-held territory.

Kurdistan

Much of this coming in January and moving into spring, an attack by Turkey in Northern Iraq could be inevitable. The PKK may use Kosovo's independence to ignite Kurdish nationalism, as well as failure to meet the deadline for the Kirkuk referendum. While it is unlikely Kurds will push for statehood, heightened nationalism in the region and increased PKK attacks might frighten Turkey enough to launch a push into Iraq. Should Azerbaijan have attacked Nagorno-Karabakh using the PKK as a justification and be defended by the United States, Turkey may be further enraged if told to back down. There is potential for Kosovo's independence and the resulting conflict to spark off a war in the Middle East.

Cyprus

Turkey has been having many problems with Greek Cyprus over this year and a renewed conflict in Northern Iraq alongside Kosovo's independence may give them the reasoning to push for Northern Cyprus. While recognized by Turkey, no other nation recognizes Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot government does not want division of Cyprus. However, this could be changed with Kosovo's independence. Turkey could begin pushing for the independence of Northern Cyprus, possibly even brokering a deal with Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for their recognition of Northern Cyprus and cooperation against the PKK. While the possibility may seem obscure, nationalists favoring invasion of Northern Iraq and support for Northern Cyprus may be willing to overlook a change in relations with Armenia.

Armenia would be more than happy to establish ties with Turkey, especially if it meant taking their support away from Azerbaijan and this would help uncomplicated Turkey's relations with Iran who would be supporting Turkey's incursion into Northern Iraq.

Western Sahara

While largely ignored in these discussions, the situation in Western Sahara is also beginning to escalate:

Polisario's national secretariat will put the proposal to prepare for war to a vote at a congress to be held on December 14-16 in the Polisario-controlled outpost of Tifariti, Polisario official Mohamed Beissat said in a Reuters interview on Monday.

If adopted, it would be the first time in 16 years that preparations for war had been part of Polisario strategy.

The timing of this action can not be easily ignored. It is unlikely a coincidence that the Polisario Front is choosing this time to discuss preparing for war and that is not the only thing upsetting Morocco:

Rabat said holding a Polisario congress in Tifariti would violate the U.N. ceasefire agreement, which it says made Tifariti part of a buffer zone between Algeria-backed Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan troops.

"All activities undertaken in this buffer zone are completely illegal..." the letter said.

Should the Polisario Front approve such preparations as well as holding this meeting, it is likely to enrage Morocco. If regions like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Srpska use Kosovo to justify independence and other countries recognize them, Morocco could consider the question of responding to the Polisario Front's war preparations before they're finished as a way of preventing a declaration of independence just like Azerbaijan could do with Nagorno-Karabakh. In this event it's also likely Morocco would come into direct conflict with Algeria, which backs the Polisario Front. This will also create issues between Morocco and the African Union, which recognizes Western Sahara as a nation. However, it is unlikely any conflict emerging from this situation would end up including any other African nations.

Somaliland

Even further under the radar is the issue of Somaliland. While technically part of Somalia, Somaliland has been one of the few regions to remain prosperous. They declared independence in 1994 due to constant civil war in the rest of Somalia and have since then been a unrecognized state. This year, Somaliland has appeared to be headed towards recognition by many states including Ethiopia and the United States. Somaliland is seen as a stable alternative to Somalia for the United States and Ethiopia, currently stuggling with Islamic militants in southern areas of Somalia. It would also serve to prevent Somali irredentism which seeks to claim parts of Ethiopia.

However, the web of Ethiopian involvement makes it difficult to address Somaliland's status. Ethiopia supports Somaliland, but also relies on Puntland for men, especially in the Somali transitional government in place since the expulsion of the Islamic Courts union. Somaliland and Puntland have been at a standoff over disputed territory in the north. Somaliland wants to gain the territory to restore itself to its previous status under the British. However, there are indications Ethiopia may be trying to move more support to Somaliland and away from Puntland as well as building up the transitional government in Mogadishu.

The potential for conflict is not due to Somalia reacting to secession by Somaliland, but Eritrea. Eritrea and Ethiopia have been edging closer towards a second war since a deadline for settling their border dispute passed with no movement by either side. Since the war between them ended Ethiopia and Eritrea have been waging a proxy war in Somalia with Eritrea backing the Islamic Courts Union. Recognition of Somaliland's independence may not directly cause a war between the two, however an ensuing proxy war could, combined with the tensions over the border, result in a renewed conflict between the two countries. However, it is unlikely either side will be able to defeat the other and it will end in another stalemate.

In Somalia, though, the result may be different. If Eritrea supports Puntland against Somaliland and Ethiopia withdraws support from Puntland a proxy battle between the two could be fought alongside Ethiopia and Eritrea's conflict. The likely end result is Somaliland succeeding in taking control of the disputed territory, perhaps with direct Ethiopian assistance. Aside from this, it is likely Somalia will remain a scene for proxy wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both failing to resolve their border issues through negotiations or military conflict.

Taiwan

One of the more obvious conflicts that could result from Kosovo's independence is between Taiwan and China. While Taiwan won't declare independence just because of Kosovo, Kosovo's independence could help the DPP gain an edge on the KMT in legislative and presidential elections. It would also be likely to increase support for a referendum on joining the U.N. as "Taiwan" rather than the Republic of China. China has already warned about this referendum and faced with a DPP president and a DPP legislature, especially if the legislature should gain a two-thirds majority itself or with Taiwan Solidarity Union, China is likely to feel independence is inevitable, especially with the Kosovo precedent and attack.

China's likely strategy would be to blockade the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, both are likely to be more inclined towards reunification so China could reach an agreement with them on reunification. Peacably gaining Kinmen and Matsu without attacking the islands might go a long way in defusing any nationalist sentiment in Taiwan. China could use force to gain the Taiwan-held Spratly Islands and move on Penghu islands. In order to do this gaining air and naval supremacy in the Taiwan Straits would be necessary, however, it's likely China will be more then capable of achieving this.

The United States has already come out in condemnation of the referendum and would likely see Taiwan's actions as provoking conflict so this strategy would push the U.S. even further from intervention than it would be already. Not only this, but if China should succeed in destroying or debilitating most of Taiwan's air force and navy, as well as seizing Penghu, many Taiwanese would become hopeless and enraged. Peaceful secession by Kinmen and Matsu would make things worse. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's ports could have even more dampening effects on Taiwanese attitudes. Faced with an economic depression, closed off from family members in mainland China and possibly Kinmen and Matsu, and seeing no chance of stopping China, let alone a chance of U.S. aid, Taiwanese citizens would be faced with an unwinnable situation. Taiwan's government could be faced with domestic unrest and no hope of winning. Seixure of Penghu would give China the ability to strike at the main island of Taiwan and provide a perfect launch ground for airborne or amphibious troops to be sent to Taiwan's main island.

It is likely the Taiwanese government would look to negotiations on a cease-fire or surrender, rather than face a Chinese onslaught.

Crimea

While not likely to become an immediate problem, in the long-term Crimea could become a similar situation where Russia recognizes territory in a former Soviet state as an independent nation only to absorb it. In fact, the very proposal of annexing Crimea is not new and many in Crimea favor the idea of rejoining Russia. To this effect Russia has launched a tremendous effort that could make annexing Crimea easy and viable by building a four and a half kilometer bridge from Russia to Crimea.

This is especially an issue given Russia's desire to keep its naval forces in the Crimean base. With Ukraine's government likely to be run again entirely by pro-Western parties Crimea may feel more distant from the Ukrainian government. With Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria all gaining independence and joining Russia, Russians in Crimea may feel left out and try to reunite with Russia, who would long to keep the region under their control. Losing Crimea would also nearly cut Ukraine off from the sea, with only a small portion of Ukraine's territorial seas between Crimea and Odessa remaining open to the Black Sea, a portion Russia could easily use its navy to block in the event of a conflict. It is unlikely Russia will move to get Crimea independence as quickly as it will for other regions, but it could happen before the end of next year after much of the conflicts elsewhere would be resolved.

Kosovo's independence is likely going to have strong implications for all of these regions and it's quite likely several will result in conflict. There are also several other regions which could be impacted, but they are most likely to be resolved peacefully. However, how violent the disputes over these regions becomes depends on the reactions of the nations involved, which can not be easily determined.

More dangerous than anything is the critical blow dealt to the United Nations Long aiming to help resolve global conflicts the U.N. would be facing itself with a complete inability to control even the most developed nations from defying their control and taking action absent of the body. While the U.N. may prove instrumental in resolving the conflict they will be exposed for a paper tiger, not capable of restraining ambitious foreign powers and only truly capable of mediating their discussions, making further more deadly conflicts inevitable.