Brewing Conflict in the Horn of Africa

Somalia's transitional government, set up after Ethiopia's invasion of the country almost exactly one year ago has recently announced it is not in control of 80% of the country. More disturbingly the government is saying the Islamic Courts Union is regrouping and planning a large-scale offensive against the transitional government and the Ethiopian military. They also say the government has no power to stop them. Somali Islamic militants have begun to come out of hiding after months of relative peace and are bulking up with more weapons and foreign fighters.

However, while it's true the transitional government does not have control of 80% of the country, that 80% is mostly out of control of the Islamic Courts Union as well. Northern Somalia, around half the country, is controlled by two other warring factions, Somaliland and Puntland. Somaliland is an unrecognized state comprising most of what was British Somaliland, with its own military, government, and unofficial embassies in several countries. Puntland has not declared independence, but instead declared itself an autonomous region with its own military and government, though still part of Somalia.

Somaliland wants to take all territory once occupying British Somaliland, which has brought them into conflict with Puntland on several occasions. The main dispute is on the regions of Sanaag and Sool. Sanaag was previously administered by Puntland but has since declared itself as the autonomous state of Maakhir. The region is still claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland.

Sool has been switching between Puntland and Somaliland for several years, though lately Somaliland has gained the upper hand. Somaliland's strength in Sool and their seizure of Las Anod, Sool's capital, has alarmed Puntland, which threatened to launch a counter-attack to retake Las Anod. Somaliland's military since last month have moved their troops nearly 35 kilometers away from Puntland's capital of Garowe. Puntland's situation has also been hurt by defections of their military officers in Sool.

What complicates matters in the region is Somaliland's unrecognized status. As Kosovo's independence approaches the question of whether other unrecognized states should receive recognition will receive renewed debate. According to several sources Ethiopia is considering recognition of Somaliland as a way of dampening Somali irredentism and there is apparently a dispute between the United States Defense Department and and State Department on whether the U.S. should recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation.

However, the Defense Department's motivations may not be related to stability in Somalia as they claim, but instead about infrastructure for AFRICOM, a new U.S. military command like Pacific Command. In particular reports say the Pentagon is interested in the port of Berbera, but because of Somaliland's status it is currently not viable for AFRICOM. So the Pentagon and Defense Department have been pushing for recognition of Somaliland and Kosovo may provide the perfect opportunity to push their agenda. Once Somaliland gains its independence the U.S. can set up a base in the new nation to expand its operations in Africa, increasingly coming under the influence of China and the European Union.

The problem is, it is unlikely Puntland will take such recognition laying down. Indeed, Somaliland being recognized by the U.S. and Ethiopia after invading Sool and expelling Puntland's forces could be seen by Puntland as rewarding aggression. While Puntland has been strongly tied with Ethiopia, such recognition could lead to their estrangement of ties. This is where the conflict could broaden. Should Puntland disengage from Ethiopia they may look for a new ally in the region and the obvious choice would be Eritrea.

Eritrea and Ethiopia have been at a standoff ever since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia. An unsettled border dispute between the nations previously resulted in a major war between the two countries. Since the war ended in a stalemate the two states have engaged in a constant cold war with Eritrea backing the ONLF in Ethiopia and the two sides waging proxy wars in Somalia. In fact, it is believed the ONLF's war in Ogaden is partly the cause of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia. The ONLF is believed to have coordinated actions with the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia and both groups have been supported by Eritrea. Ethiopia's backing of the transitional government is seen as part of this proxy conflict with Eritrea.

In the event Somaliland does get recognized by Ethiopia and Puntland forges ties with Eritrea, a conflict between the two Somali regions could expand to include a conflict between the Islamic Courts Union and transitional government, as well as Ethiopian troops in Somalia. If Puntland manages to gain ground against Somaliland and Ethiopia intervenes directly, Eritrea may take advantage of the opening to make a thrust into Ethiopia itself.

Eritrea's justification would be the unresolved border dispute. The border was effectively decided by the international community in favor of Eritrea, but Ethiopia has refused to acknowledge the ruling. With 125,000 troops on the border facing 100,000 Ethiopian troops, Eritrea stands a decent chance of pushing through if some of those Ethiopians troops should be diverted to Somalia. Considering a U.N. force in the area is set to leave in the following month, when Kosovo is widely expected to gain its independence, which would likely be followed up by Somaliland's independence, Eritrea seems to have a perfect opening coming up in the following months. A renewed attack by the Islamic Courts Union next year alongside a conflict between Puntland and Somaliland could distract Ethiopia enough to give Eritrea a chance to try and resolve the border issue by force. The end result would be a wider and more deadly conflict than the previous war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.