The Battle Over Africa

As the power of the United States wanes and the power of the European Union, China, and Russia rise so too will the level of competition between the various powers. Like all geopolitical competition it is be both overt and covert, governmental and corporate, and will rarely, if ever, involve the direct engagement of the powers in question. At the same time the constant proxy warfare will inflame nationalist sentiments and regional conflicts. These are the cases where direct involvement by one or more of the world powers becomes likely. As the powers increase their presence in a region they also will increase their vulnerability to domestic conflicts which ultimately lead to more intervention.

In Africa exists a fertile ground for large-scale proxy wars between the great powers and other forms of intervention. The Cold War saw battles against colonialism and civil wars becoming battles between the various powers including the European powers wishing to retain their territories in Africa. In the current era similar conflicts are potential staging grounds for proxy wars between outside powers.

Zimbabwe

Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe, has been a long-time ally of the Chinese government dating back to the days of the Rhodesian Bush Wars. At the same time he has become an enemy of Europe and the United States supposedly for his authoritarian methods. In Zimbabwe the U.S. and Europe favor opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Despite criticism of the 2008 election Tsvangirai's party was able to win control of the lower house, though failing to secure the less powerful upper house. The presidential election results were delayed and pushed back but ultimately Tsvangirai was declared to have won but not by a sufficient margin to avoid a second round. In the intervening period Zimbabwean war veterans and loyalists of Mugabe began attacking members of the MDC and frequent threats were made. In the end Tsvangirai withdrew because of the violence against his supporters giving Mugabe victory in the presidential election.

Since that time a series of negotiations have been conducted to resolve the dispute and have a power-sharing arrangement. However, resistance from the military, which is believed to have pressured Mugabe against resigning following the first election and instead unleashing the wave of violence prior to the second round, has held up decisions on key government positions. The situation has deteriorated considerably in the country including an outbreak of cholera and domestic unrest by renegade members of the military.

This situation has also given rise to broader problems with European and pro-Western African officials actively calling for Mugabe to resign or be deposed by military force if necessary. The most notable controversies have arisen over the stance of Botswana's government which has not only suggested closing the borders of Zimbabwe to bring down Mugabe but has even talked about giving shelter to the MDC so it can form a "democratic resistance movement" to the Zimbabwean government should power-sharing talks fail, most likely meaning an armed resistance to Mugabe. Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana have deteriorated to such a level that Botswana has announced it is closing its embassy with the nation.

Botswana is a major ally of the United States with the U.S. training most of Botswana's military officers and the dominant party in the country is said to receive money from the United States. As such Botswana is most likely acting at the behest of the United States government in its statements about Mugabe. The most likely motivation is to prevent the growth of Chinese influence in Africa as Zimbabwe is a stalwart ally of China. However, Zimbabwe is not without its regional allies with Namibia in particular attacking the statements of Botswana's government. Destabilization of the situation in Zimbabwe and interference from Botswana could invite Namibian intervention as a result. Such a conflict would also involve some form of assistance from various regional powers like South Africa and the Congo in the latter case possibly entangling with its own conflicts.

Sudan

While the situation in Sudan has not reached the level it did earlier in the year when rebels from Darfur attacked Khartoum and put Sudan and Chad on a potential path to war there are potential issues in Southern Sudan. The Justice and Equality Movement of Darfur has been reportedly moving forces into South Kordofan and the Sudanese army has responded by sending its military forces into the region. However the region is also disputed with Southern Sudan and scheduled to vote on joining Southern Sudan the same time Southern Sudan is set to vote on independence. The ruling party in the south, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, is claiming the deployment violates the peace agreement. A similar deployment in Abyei earlier in the year nearly resulted in the reigniting of the country's civil war.

Sudan is presently opposed by the U.S. and Europe because of the situation in Darfur, which many in the U.S. government consider genocide, while China has embraced the country. China gets a significant amount of oil from Sudan and one major source China is looking to exploit is in Sudan's south. In conjunction with China's economic and military relationship with Sudan it has a significant presence in the country which would be threatened by a renewed civil war. Most risky is the chance that Southern Sudan and Darfuri rebels will come together against the government in Khartoum posing a real threat to the state. Any threat to China's oil projects in the country and Chinese citizen there could invite Chinese military intervention to prop up the government and fight rebel forces. While relations have improved a major conflict in Sudan could rekindle tensions with Chad, which receives significant backing from France and the EU risking a proxy war between the Europeans and the Chinese through Chad and Sudan.

Somalia

No country best exemplifies the frequent proxy wars and geopolitical dynamics of Africa as much as Somalia. Switching from the Soviets to the U.S. on several occasion the government collapsed completely in 1991 and afterwards devolving into warlordism with several secessionist states forming in the area. In 2006 a powerful force emerged lead by the Islamic Courts Union with significant ties to the global jihadist network including al-Qaeda. Allegedly the ICU was backed by Eritrea with Ethiopia supporting its opponents, a part of the cold war between Ethiopia and Eritrea since their war over the border region of Badme. Ultimately Ethiopia, backed by the United States, launched an offensive into Somalia pushing back the ICU.

Since then, however, the situation has deteriorated. Al-Shebab, the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union, became more radicalized and most leaders of the ICU had been swept aside following the Ethiopian intervention. Shebab has begun regaining lost territory in Somalia with its forces beginning to encircle Mogadishu and having already gained control of major ports in the Southern part of Somalia like Kismayo. They also have won support from the local populations to some extent by drastically reducing the crime rate in areas they've claimed. At the same time the Ethiopian government has announced plans to pull out of the country at the end of the year which could be followed by withdrawal of the African Union force. With the Western-backed transitional government in dire straits a withdrawal of foreign forces would allow the quick victory of al-Shebab over remaining resistance in Southern Somalia.

At this point focus would shift to north and the autonomous state in Puntland along with the pirates in the region. If Islamic force can manage to secure victory against Puntland then their next target will be the secessionist state of Somaliland. In such a scenario the West is likely to recognize Somaliland as an independent state and rush to its aid. This conflict could then become another proxy battle between Eritrea and Ethiopia. At the same time with Ethiopia less engaged in the country they could seek to resolve their conflict with Eritrea by force. Such an operation would likely receive Western support as Eritrea has also made threats to neighbor Djibouti including a brief border conflict. Any scenario where Ethiopia and Eritrea go to war will likely also include a conflict in Djibouti which is likely to bring in France and the United States. In such a scenario Eritrea could leak to foreign powers like Iran or Russia for support, thus casting the conflict as a greater proxy war between outside powers.

Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has seen itself embroiled in the deadliest war in Africa since the Second World War with eight nations overalled fighting in the Second Congo War. Since that war concluded another conflict has brewed in the Kivu region as renegade general Laurent Nkunda fights against the Congolese government. Fighting intensified in 2008 with Nkunda making significant gains in the area and threatening to overthrow the government. While he agreed to peace talks initially they have been cast in doubt with threats of ending the talks if other rebel groups are brought on.

Despite apparently declaring together with African neighbors not to support Nkunda there is evidence the U.S. has covertly backed Nkunda against the Congolese governments and very clear evidence of him receiving support from Rwandan forces with members of Rwanda's military fighting alongside Nkunda according to reports and Nkunda's army even reportedly being on the payroll of the Rwandan government. On the Congo's side are various reports of Angolan soldiers fighting against Nkunda's forces alongside the Congolese military and Zimbabwean soldiers performing recon missions for the Congolese central government.

While the regional alliances are clear enough the outside ones are more complicated. While Nkunda could be receiving support from the U.S. and Rwanda, a U.S.-backed regime in the region, the European Union has talked about intervening in the conflict on the side of the Congolese government. The UN mission there, consisting of many European peacekeepers, have been attacked directly by Nkunda. At the same time Nkunda has shown considerable opposition to Chinese involvement in the country like a $9 billion Chinese plan to invest in Congolese infrastructure in exchange for considerable control of the nation's mineral resources. The terms of the agreement with the central government are clearly favorable to China which had led to accusations of colonialism.

Whether it is concern about the EU gaining too much influence in the country or China the U.S. may be backing Nkunda as a way of applying pressure on the central government to prevent such influence from becoming too great or may even desire to remove the current government in favor of one more pliable to the U.S. However, the only likely chance of direct military intervention is on the side of the Europeans and regional nations. On the regional side a conflict in the Congo could easily intersect with one in Zimbabwe representing a wider African war involving a proxy conflict simultaneously between the U.S. and the EU, the EU and China, and the U.S. and China.

Growing competition between the rising powers and the U.S. as well as between the rising powers themselves will manifest itself more and more as global conditions deteriorate and it is likely Africa will be just one major battleground for the inevitable proxy wars.

Economic crisis causing geopolitical shifts

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and further falls of such institutions as AIG and Washington Mutual the world financial markets have seen increasing signs of trouble. With potentially more large failures and bankruptcies to come the fear in the market has led to freeze in credit. While the economic ramifications of this are being explored throughout the media it's impact on diplomacy and security is set to the side. Though some economists would prefer optimism the nature of the financial crisis suggests the world is headed for an economic depression of unprecedented scale. Such economic woes have been decades apart and always led to a massive shift in global politics. The Long Depression signaled the rise of continental European economies against the British economy and spurred the Scramble for Africa. The Great Depression helped propel Adolph Hitler to power in Germany. So too will such an economic depression in the modern age lead to political upheavals around the world.

In Europe the most notable casualty has been Iceland. While not heavily involved in the American financial system Iceland heavily relies on foreign debt. The freezing of credit markets and declining value of the Icelandic currency has put Iceland's major banks in dire straits with all three being taken over by the government. It is estimated this crisis on its own will leave Iceland in an economic depression. Iceland's financial system is not only dependent on foreign debt, it is heavily invested outside of Iceland primarily in Europe, most notably in the UK.

It is the relationship with the UK which is most at issue. Many British citizens have cash deposited in Icelandic banks and the situations of those banks put their deposits at risk. Originally the deposits were freezed with British depositors unable to access their accounts. This led to a threat from the UK to take legal action against Iceland in order to secure the deposits. Instead the UK seized British accounts using anti-terrorism legislation. Iceland's reaction was furious and he denounced the British seizure as an "unfriendly act" and claimed it was the reason Iceland's largest bank, Kaupthing, had to be nationalized. Even domestic security was a concern as the Prime Minister of Iceland was escorted by security guards for the first time. The Prime Minister has also said he would support legal action against the UK by Kaupthing.

The crisis in relations between the two countries has already been compared to the Cod Wars, a fishing dispute that led to several naval confrontations, but it is Iceland's means to rescue its economy which signals the greatest impact of the crisis. Iceland's Prime Minister expressed disappointment with its "friends" when they denied the country the support it asked for, with Iceland seeking a loan from Russia. The fact the United States and Europe failed to support Iceland during a period of financial need while Russia immediately responded to the approach will likely dampen Iceland's ties with NATO and dim further its chances of joining the European Union. It could also be the beginning of an unexpected partnership between the two countries certain to upset the balance between Russia and the West.

Iceland also poses a strong risk of financial contagion possibly on the level of Thailand in 1997. This would likely be felt first in the UK and Nordic countries, but is likely to then spread into the general European economy. It has already sparked united action by the eurozone nations and it is likely the situation will serve to further desires for greater European integration and the formation of a European superstate which is likely to become a major economic and military power, though one which may see itself in opposition to the United States.

The global financial crisis is also likely to worsen conditions for nations already suffering under their economic conditions. Pakistan has been hit hard by corruption, insurgency, and high oil and food prices. It now faces a situation where it will need billions of dollars in order to avoid national bankruptcy. Already Taliban forces recieve more money than Pakistani soldiers, if Pakistan's government is unable to adequately fund its military the chance of defections increases and the weakened financial state of Pakistan's government, and by extension its military, will also prove a fertile recruiting ground for the Taliban and leave it even more exposed to attacks by Taliban forces. The potential for the complete collapse of Pakistan increases greatly should it be plunged into bankruptcy. Financial strains on the global system may make it harder for Pakistan to get needed support.

While Israel is for the moment unharmed by the global financial crisis it is still taking measures to shore up its banking system. Israel's stock market has also taken a very serious hit in light of the worsening global outlook. This increases the likelihood of a government being formed soon in Israel, one which will likely be tougher than Olmert's government. It also will likely divert Israeli money from other areas and potentially rules out requested assistance to Gaza. Former British Prime Minister and International Mideast envoy Tony Blair has said around $30 million are needed a month to keep Gaza's banks from collapsing and insure financing for the salaries of thousands of civil servants. Should that situation arise it is likely to further destabilize the region and inflame opponents of Israel at a time when Gazan militants are threatening a response to Arab-Jewish violence in Israel. It also is at a time when Hamas is accusing Israel of preparing an invasion with military exercises and Israel has been making further incursions into Lebanese air space and even briefly sending troops across the border. An economically unstable situation in Gaza in tandem with other developments could increase the chances of a war erupting in the region.

As the economic situation deteriorates further even greater shifts should be expected. Such crises have traditionally been the breeding ground for nationalism which in turn has led to expansionism and increased competition between major powers. This competition for dwindling world resources and dominance over important markets usually has only one result: war.

A New Wave of Separatism

The declaration of independence of Kosovo and its subsequent recognition by the international community has set up a precedent for other separatist republics. This precedent has been further reinforced by the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While as of now Russia and Nicaragua are the only countries to recognize them this is not due to a lack of support as other countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union are likely to follow suit in time. However, this action has only increased the chances of further action later especially with the Serb action to have the declaration reviewed by the International Court of Justice.

Any decision they reach which does not label Kosovo a unique case and declare its secession illegal is likely to leave legal room for countries to recognize other separatist regions at their discretion. Two likely cases outside the Former Soviet Union could be Republika Srpska and Somaliland.

In Republika Srpska an election is being planned for October 5th which will determine who leads the autonomous region in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While a loss by the ruling party seems unlikely either way could result in its secession from Bosnia. Prime Minister of the region, Milorad Dodik, has himself said he has no attachment to Bosnia, but does have a strong attachment to Republika Srpska. Dodik has had to deal with growing pressure from the Muslim Bosnian government to consolidate the two autonomous regions comprising the country into one single unitary entity, a goal they share with EU. He has threatened to have a referendum on independence if there can be no progress on the dispute honoring his demand for maintaing the current autonomy or even expanding it. While he declared his desire for them to "part in peace" which might prove difficult given the Brcko district bisecting the two regions. Dodik could receive support from Serbia given his strong ties with President Tadic and pressure from nationalists in his own government and the opposition.

It's unlikely such a secession would receive world backing however, with the more likely candidate for such support being Somaliland, a separatist republic in Somalia. Having declared independence back in 1991 it has yet to receive any recognition but signs are growing that the situation may change. Ongoing civil war in Somalia has made the stable and democratic government in Somaliland look increasingly appeal to all interested parties and as it opted into the country of Somalia it has greater standing for independence than other secessionist groups.

Of particular interest are the actions of Ethiopia. Having gone into Somalia in 2006 to prevent the Islamic Courts Union from dominating the country the Ethiopian government is seeing itself in an increasingly untenable position. The Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, has hinted Ethiopian troops may pull out of the country though calling for African Union troops to take their place. Any pullout could also involve a two-state solution being pursued with Somalia by recognizing the Republic of Somaliland as independent, a move which would likely receive the support of western governments. Supposedly this scenario would involve Somaliland deploying troops to help fight against the Islamic Courts Union and expelling member of the Ogaden Liberation Front residing in Somaliland. It also is possible the situation represents a distancing between Ethiopia and Puntland which has been implicated in actions supporting pirates in the area.

This could also insure increased support for Somaliland among Western governments already pursuing closer relations with them. With Puntland possibly backing piracy against Western ships and southern Somalia wracked by violence Somaliland would likely appear to be the only pro-Western and democratic region of the country not under foreign control. As such it is of little surprise that security ties with the French seem to be improving with Somaliland officials saying French security operations in the region include actions launched from the unrecognized state. This is a policy to try and increase the chance of recognition from France as is a trip to meet with European leaders by Somaliland's president with trips to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom planned including an appeal for the European Union to treat Somaliland separate from Somalia with regards to foreign aid. A visit by the African Union envoy to Somalia could also signal possible action by them to recognize Somaliland. The U.S. is also looking at increasing aid to Somaliland and is increasing contacts with breakaway government which could help pave the way for recognition. Should the situation in Somalia deteriorate considerably a concerted action similar to the one in Kosovo could take place though possibly following the 2009 elections there.

Such actions independently would not hold much significance but together it represents a trend suggesting the first major separatist wave since the end of the Cold War, with Kosovo as the major starting point.

Middle Eastern War likely by year's end

Tensions are building every day in the Middle East. It has reached a point where another major conflict is likely and one could commence later this month or in October. Such a war would be certain to be unlike any other in recent history and its quite likely it would result in the use of nuclear weapons by Israel. The current situation is riddled with potential land mines.

Gaza and Israel

The true between Hamas and Israel has held steady despite expectations of its collapse, however the situation could be approaching a breaking point. The truce has remained in place largely due to every violation of the truce involving rocket attacks by Palestinian militant groups other than Hamas being responded to with merely a closure of the border. While some time these attacks injure, but there have not been deaths resulting from them. However, that is becoming increasingly less certain. One attack involved explosions along the border of Gaza near Israeli army patrols. No injuries resulted from the attack but the potential for a major escalation was clear. A single solider's death could have been enough to break the ceasefire.

Even without deaths there are reports the Israeli military and some Israeli officials intend to violate the ceasefire themselves. This demonstrates the continued resistance to Olmert's agreed ceasefire and fears of it being a concession that only allows Hamas to build up its military force even more.

Another potential flashpoint would actually involve Fatah either in the West Bank or Gaza. With Hamas calling on its members to resist attempts at arrest by Fatah with any forceful means needed. Such a situation could risk sparking an all-out uprising against Fatah in the West Bank. Such a situation could instigate a Fatah uprising against Hamas in Gaza. If it ends up involving Israelis in either area it could draw the IDF into Gaza. In addition the armed wing of Fatah suggested the opportunity for the ceasefire will end by the end of the month. This could mean the group attempts to launch an attack from Gaza to bring an end to the ceasefire. If organized by Fatah's political wing it could be intended as a way of eliminating Hamas as a threat.

The other chink in the truce's armor is the negotiation over Gilad Shalit. Israel has been pushing hard for his release and the negotiations are seen as part of the overall ceasefire. Negotiations have focused on securing his release in a prisoner exchange between the two sides. The negotiations, however, have faltered recently with Hamas suggesting the talks start from the beginning and this time with a greater amount of prisoners demanded for release in exchange for Shalit's release.

In addition to this Hamas has placed three conditions on Israel for renewing the negotiations which include:

1. Release of all Palestinian prisoners whose names appear on the list that had been given to Israel via Egyptian mediation
   
2. Implementation of all Israeli commitments in the framework of the ceasefire agreement, including the reopening of Gaza Strip crossings for the passage of goods
3. the opening of the Rafah crossing.

In addition Hamas has begun pressuring Egypt to release prisoners as well. Altogether such actions could dissuade Israel from continuing the negotiations and instead pushing for launching a military rescue operation, which would be certain to end the ceasefire.

As all these events require the government to take such action in response, however Olmert may yet resist such moves. However, here again the situation seems to favor renewed conflict as Olmert is set to resign from his post as Prime Minister. While he will likely remain until a replacement is chosen that may not be long in waiting as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has been chozen as leader of his Kadima party. While she is not the most hardline member who ran her position on the Gaza truce is that any violations should see a military response, meaning the ceasefire will most likely unravel. Another development which could see a harder line is if Livni made her firebrand opponent Shaul Mofaz Defense Minister. Such an appointment would greatly increase pressure on Livni to take military action in response to violations of the ceasefire. It also increases the likelihood of direct attack on Iran or a conflict with Hezbollah. Even if she does not manage to form a government it is likey the more hardline Likud could take power, though an election would likely delay any such event for over three months.

Hezbollah and Lebanon

Lebanon's flashpoints have been brewing for some time. Yet warnings are increasing that Hezbollah may take action against Israel over the death of Imad Mugniyeh as soon as the end of September either involving assassinations and kidnappings of Israeli officials, including military officers, or bombings of embassies and consulates.

Another conflagration could be military in nature with the shoot down of an Israeli aircraft flying over Lebanese airspace, in violation of the UN ceasefire, or the seizure of the Shebaa Farms. Either action would be seen in Lebanon as politically legitimate, especially the shoot down of an Israeli fighter, and as such allow them to accuse Israel of being the aggressor. It is likely a new, more hardline government would give them justification for greater attacks by responding with force themselves. However, the spread of Hezbollah's organization and increasing support and clout within Lebanon and the Lebanese military could lead to a war with Hezbollah being a war with Lebanon itself. As Hezbollah has greatly increased its own strength the combination with the Lebanese military would make a war far more deadly for Israel than the 2006 war.

In fact, reflecting the dangers of the current situation Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has warned of what a future conflict would bring:

Hizbullah Chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah warned Monday that if Israel "launches a war against Lebanon, Syria, Iran or Gaza, it will have thousands of scores to settle", adding that such a conflict would have "unclear implications for the Zionists."

This most likely means any war will result in a massive conflict involving all the above parties and a major push into Israel itself. Reports that Hezbollah has built its own naval force and assisting in Hamas in doing the same raises the stakes of war even higher. With its rocket capability, its anti-air, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles, in addition to a working naval force with warships and the assistance of Syria, Hamas, and Iran a new conflict would leave Israel's cities, seas, and air in terror from the onslaught launched against them.

Northern Iraq

The last major source of tension is in Northern Iraq. Currently a standoff between the Iraqi government under Maliki and the Kurds has reached the point where the government is trying to cut off exports from the Kurdish Regional Government and is warning Kurdish troops in Diyala province to withdraw in eight days or likely face a direct confrontation. Following his actions against the Shiite militias Maliki has become increasingly aggressive against other forces outside his authority. However, a battle with the Kurds may be more than he can chew.

This also runs into the renewal of authorization for Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq. With Turkey openly acknowledging their cooperation with Iran against the PKK it would be no surprise should Turkey take joint action against Northern Iraq with Iran. A civil war in Iraq with the Kurds could be taken as a perfect opportunity. Any conflict in the north involving Iran could end up causing a conflict with the United States, which is certain to spread.

With this assortment of potential conflicts there seems a strong chance of conflict erupting.

Ukraine's government falls

The coalition between President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and Yulia Tymoshenko's has been officially dissolved. This comes in the wake of accusations from Yushchenko that Tymoshenko was a betraying Ukraine to the Russians. Georgia's President, Mikheil Sakaashvili, even inserted his opinion saying he saw signs of meddling from Russia. The political crisis escalated when Tymoshenko joined with the Party of Regions to push through restrictions on Yushchenko's powers. Yushchenko went so far as to accuse the PM of trying to install a dictatorship and launching a coup. Tymoshenko herself belittled the situation:

"The government is going to work for a long time and is going to work successfully despite all these storms... Because this is a storm in a teacup."

A possibility in the crisis is the formation of a new coalition between Tymoshenko and various groups aligned with Russia and opposed to NATO membership, most notably the Party of Regions. Such a party would move Ukraine away from the West, but it may not end with this. Yushchenko is unlikely to abide a loss of his powers or formation of a government aligned more with Russia. Previous political crises have resulted in situation where security force have almost openly confronted each other and regions of Ukraine threatened secession. Such a situation could become even more likely in this event given the actions by Russia in Georgia and the issuing of Russian passports in Crimea.

This political crisis together with the Russia-Georgia war has led to a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Both have banned several of their officials from traveling to either countryand Russia criticized Ukraine for supplying Georgia with weapons accusing Ukraine of "unfriendly" behavior towards Russia. Even further a Russian Rear-Admiral has said Russia will never leave the Russian port in Sevastopol in spite of an agreement to leave by 2017. Such sentiments share a great deal of support through Russia and there is considerable historical basis for taking the whole of Crimea as it was once part of Russia under the Soviet Union, but granted to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev. Similar arguments have been used to justify the action in Georgia.

Given the tendency for political crises in Ukraine to fall into chaos it is hard to predict how the current situation will end. Massive protests seem to be a certainty and should they become violent requiring the use of force to contain, the situation could spiral. If protesters battle in the streets of Sevastopol and Ukrainian forces act, Russia might use the unstable situation to justify taking the whole city or a part. How far Russia goes would depend on the stability of the situation. All-out civil war in Ukraine would probably lead to far greater intervention by Russia and half of Ukraine joining Russia.

At the very least recent events suggest Ukraine will ultimately not integrate into NATO and possibly become a client state even if it can avoid dismemberment.

The proxy war for Bolivia

It was in Bolivia over 40 years ago where Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was executed after being captured by forces of the U.S.-backed dictatorship there. Che had the support of Cuba, the sole communist country in Latin America at the time and dedicated to exporting the revolution to the rest of the continent. Now the tables have turned and it is the U.S. backing an insurgency against a socialist leader backed by Venezuela. While Che's revolution was in the name of Marx, the revolution instituted by Evo Morales is in the name of 19th Century revolutionary Simon Bolivar, an advocate for the unification of South America.

Like President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela the Bolivian president came to power through the ballot box riding a wave of populism. Morales promised to use revenue from natural gas for social welfare and redistribute land to the indigenous inhabitants of Bolivia, which have both been enshrined in a new constitution, on which Morales has planned a referendum for December. These measures while popular with the majority indigenous population proved controversial in the eastern provinces of the country, rich in natural gas, especially among Bolivians with European ancestry who would see themselves lose considerable economic advantages. They also claim the constitution considerably increases Morales' power.

This schism has led to referendums on autonomy for the eastern provinces and escalating protests to the point of cutting off natural gas exports. Bolivian troops deployed in the provinces came under increasing threat of attack from the opposition governors demanding their withdrawal from the regions. Protests finally resulted in outright conflict between supporters of Morales and his opponents in the province of Pando which is believed to have resulted in 30 deaths including opposition and Morales supporters. Ultimately Morales resorted to launching a state of emergency in Pando and sent troops to take the airport on the outskirts of provincial capital and proceeded to retake the city from the opposition. He also ordered for the provincial governor to be arrest accusing him of committing a massacre.

Morales had initially shown a desire to negotiate on the details of the constitution though he has reiterated his intention to hold the referendum. Talks which have been held with the opposition have shown some progress, though results remain in doubt. Of particular danger is an opposition warning that any more deaths among members of the opposition would result in the cancellation of talks. With the Bolivian military patrolling the capital of Pando and opposition members warning they may resist any moves to formally enter the city the chances for renewed conflict remain. Should such a situation result in the death of opposition members and a breaking of talks, the potential for more violent resistance increases and it is likely Morales will follow through on his threat to extend martial law to the other eastern provinces.

How events unfold from there could depend on the actions of the military and opposition. Should the situation erupt into a full-on civil war the potential for a coup or assassination against Morales greatly increases. Hugo Chavez has threatened in such an event that he would support military operations to restore the government. Chavez also condemned the military for what he believed was a lack of action possibly suggesting the military itself was against Morales. It would be possible for the military to take advantage of a period of civil unrest or civil war to seize power from Morales. Such an event would likely be no more successful than the attempt against Chavez with its chances made considerably worse with the support of Venezuelan armed forces. However, there would be little denying the likely backing of the U.S. government for a Bolivian junta and opposition movements.

Indeed, such support for the opposition governors has already been alleged by Morales, leading to the expulsion of America's ambassador to the country. It is that event which shows the extent to which the U.S. has been shut out of Latin America. In support of Bolivia's action Venezuela followed up by expelling the American ambbassador to his country, also accusing the U.S. of supporting a coup attempt against him. Honduras, which recently joined the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas begun by Chavez, also gave a snub to the U.S. delaying the reception of the American mabbassador. Nicragua's President Daniel Ortega head of the Sandinistas who was also president in the 80's and opposed by a U.S.-backed insurgency at the time also made a show of solidarity by rejecting a meeting with President George W. Bush.

The diplomatic retaliation has increased a crisis with both Bolivia and Venezuela. Before his departure the U.S. ambassador warned of "serious consequences" for Bolivia and accused Morales of underestimating retaliation from Washington. On Venezuela it already seems clear what consequences are in store for it. Quickly after Venezuela's ambassador to the U.S. was expelled the Treasury Department accused two senior Venezuelan intelligence officials of backing the FARC, a leftist terror group in Colombia. One official suggested further economic measures and even designation of Venezuela as a terror sponsor could follow. The accusations against Chavez and his government have their roots in a crisis earlier in the year when Colombia launched a raid into Ecuadorian territory to attack a FARC encampment. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador was another member of Chavez's Bolivarian alliance and both leaders cut ties with Colombia with Venezuela deploying its military to the Colombian border warning any incursion into Venezuela would result in war. Nicaragua also cut diplomatic relations with Colombia following the action. While the situation was later resolved it was likely the first sign of the clashing interests of the United States and its allies with the Bolivarian nations led by Venezuela.

While the backing of Venezuela's Bolivarian allies is to be expected the real sign of the decline of U.S. influence in the region has been the reaction of large nations such as Brazil to the crisis in Bolivia and in March, with Brazil backing the Bolivarian side in both cases. Indeed most of South America has sided with the Bolivarian alliance and it is not just regional support where the U.S. is seeing its interests challenged. Russia has long been an ally of Venezuela and has recently moved long-range bombers to the country for military exercises to be followed by a joint naval exercise with Venezuela. Also while the Bolivarian alliance is divided on its ties with Washington, some more being conciliatory than others, and China, with countries like Nicarague and Honduras still maintaining formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, they all have been supportive of Russia with Nicaragua being the second country to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia following Russia itself.

Brazil also has deepened its Russian ties joining Russia and India in the Su PAK FA fifth generation fighter project. The move shores up the Russian project providing much needed financial backing and also extends Russia's influence in the region. In this light while the internal unrest in Bolivia can be seen as a move by the U.S. to challenge the growing support of Chavez and increasing resistance of South America to U.S. dominance it also could be placed in a global context as a push against Russian penetration into a traditional sphere of influence for the United States.

Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Only a day after the Russian legislature unanimously approved a resolution in support of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has responded by officially recognizing the breakaway states as independent countries. At the same time Russia's Navy is sending a ship near Georgia as Russia digs in around the Georgian port of Poti. This is in expectation of the arrival of an American naval deployment for humanitarian purposes. Whether the port moves into Batumi or attempts to move into Poti could determine how events play out. U.S. is reportedly planning to send aid to Poti though whether that is by ship or land is not clear. The potential for a naval standoff there could have increased as a result of Russia's recognition.

What happens next will be determined by the reactions of other countries. Belarus is one country which could recognize the two breakaway states. Members of Belarus' parliament have already called on the President of Belarus, Lukashenka, to follow Medvedev's lead and recognize the breakaway states. It is possible such recognition could be the next to follow. Armenia is also openly supportive of moves towards self-determination and has good relations with Russia leaving open potential recognition from them, though they may recognize Kosovo as well to protect their relations with the West.

However, it is likely the key event to follow in the coming days will be the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or SCO on August 28 and 29. The countries present will include member Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China. In addition observers to the meeting would include Iran, Pakistan, India, and Mongolia. China has already said the matter could be discussed with the members agreeing to a common position. Altogether ten nations would be present comprising nearly half the world's population. However, the chances of Russia's action receiving universal support are minimal.

While former Soviet republics in the group may support Russia and recognize the republics China, Iran, Pakistan, and India may be more reluctant as all have their own separatist movements to worry about. Mongolia has been developing better relations with the West and so may not wish to harm good relations. At the same time there are possibilities for recognition. Mongolia may decide to recognize the republics and also recognize Kosovo to avoid damaging relations with the West. Iran may attempt to use its recognition to show solidarity with Russia in the hopes that it will lead to increased support from Moscow despite secessionist threats from Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, and in Balochistan. India has very strong relations with Russia well above any other member, but they also have strong relations with the West with that leadership eager to improve relations there and fears of separatism in Kashmir. However, pressure from the parliament is a possibility as many parties are supportive of Russia in general. China has so far showed a very measured response to Russia's action and is probably not interested in sparking reactions in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. At the same time China could consider its relations with Russia of such high priority as to justify recognition. However, the potential for China's recognition is considerably lower. Pakistan is the least likely country to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with their strong Western relations and separatist movements in Balochistan there is little reason for Pakistan to follow Russia's lead, especially if China doesn't.

Outside of that group other nations with the potential to recognize include Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba, which have been very supportive of Russia's actions. Cuba seems particularly likely in light of Raul Castro's statement that South Ossetia was a historical part of Russia. Cuba and Venezuela together could lobby to great effect in South and Central America where they have allies in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Chavez has also shown a remarkable amount of influence with Brazil pioneering together for greater South American integration. Other leftist leaders in South America have maintained good relations with Chavez and have been increasingly resistant to influence from Washington.

In Africa Algeria is a distinct possibility given both its strong ties with Russia and support of Western Sahara's independence. Libya is also a potential supporter given their moves towards Russia. Both nations together with Russia and Iran could exert considerable influence in other parts of Africa. Support from nations like Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is also a possibility considering their favorable relations with Moscow. Malaysia also has good relations with Moscow including having their first astronaut sent up by Russia. Given their position on Kosovo it's possible recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia could be carried out simultaneously.

If Russia is able to successfully gain a considerable number of recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia they could use it to stake legitimacy to both their attack on Georgia and subsequent recognition. However to do so would effectively open Pandora's Box by showing Kosovo was not a unique case.