Mugniyeh's death over a month ago has sparked fears of Hezbollah retaliation and it's being suggested that Monday may be the day when such retaliation comes or may be used to justify an oncoming attack. Hezbollah will hold a rally honoring Mugniyeh and the end of the mourning period of his death. They may use the moment to rally their supporters behind an inevitable war resulting from Hezbollah retaliation. Such a war could engulf all of Lebanon and may even spread to Syria and Gaza.
It should be of no surprise then that Syria has deployed some three divisions of troops on the Lebanese border, likely preparing for or anticipating a massive Israeli attack in Lebanon and maybe even attack against Syria. Other reports are saying the attack by Hezbollah may be done simultaneously with actions by Syria and Iran and may even include attacks by Hamas. The dangers of a war of such scale should not be underestimated.
While Iranian involvement would likely invite American retaliation, especially as it appears military action is again in the works concerning Iran's nuclear plans, it will probably not invite a massive war with Iran. Israel is likely to be incapacitated as it faces off against Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, while the U.S. will likely be facing difficulties in Iraq, and probably will not have sufficient resources deployed to launch a full-scale air and naval attack on Iran.
Such a conflict therefore will primarily involve Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. However, this would likely be an intense and arduous conflict. Of particular notice is the stark advancement in Hezbollah's rocket arsenal. With an estimated 40,000 rockets and missiles Hezbollah would be able to launch a large-scale attacks against Israel well beyond the intensity of the 2006 Lebanon War. More notably is a larger number of these would have a reach of some 200 miles from north of the Litani putting almost all of Israel in Hezbollah's targets. When one considers the massive arsenal built up by Hamas and the inclusion of Syria's arsenal, which itself includes Scuds with far greater range, Israel could face a flurry of missile throughout the country.
During the 2006 Lebanon War Israelis in the North were forced into bomb shelters for weeks. In a renewed conflict the same situation would be repeated throughout all of Israel with Israel likely facing a military attack from Syria to retake the Golan Heights, which could pave way for a full-on invasion to force a concession out of Israel. Syria has armed itself with the latest anti-air and anti-tank weapons from Russia which combined with its military aircraft are sure to wreck havoc on Israel. Syria's push combined with Hezbollah's retaliation and the launch of a massive attack by Hamas might overwhelm Israel incapable of dealing with an endless onslaught of missiles as well as a military attack all designed specifically to strike at Israel's strengths. Faced with its most dire situation since the Yom Kippur War Israel may resort to extreme means including the use of nuclear weapons.
If Israel used nuclear weapons it would most likely be as a result of a crippling unexpected defeat and will probably be directed at the most important target imaginable, Damascus. Being the largest city in Syria and the capital it would be the most psychologically, politically, and militarily effective target. Wiping out the entire area with a dozen or so nuclear weapons would either send Syria into a crisis or force a peace.
While such a strategy could be effective in stopping a defeat it would only heighten Iran's concerns with Israel becoming only the second nation to use nukes in a conflict while the first is allied with them and both nations seeing Iran as the ultimate threat in the region. Iran is likely to seek out a major ally which will likely be Russia and Iran will probably push inexorably towards a nuclear weapon with Russia removing its opposition.
Of course, if Iran gets a nuclear weapon Saudi Arabia will ultimately seek to do the same in order to avoid relying on Israel or the United States. The nuclearization of the Middle East would mean the next Middle Eastern war would be an atomic one.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Israel preparing for conflict with Syria
The assassination of Imad Muginyeh, which Hezbollah has blamed on Israel, is expected to lead to an attack sometime past March 22, when the mourning period ends. In preparation Israel is beefing up security near Palestine and has put its troops near Lebanon on high alert, as well as advising Jewish and Israeli institutions around the world to increase security. The more frightening aspect of this is Israel's warning that apparently an attack by Hezbollah will lead to an attack on Syria. Their reasoning might be indications from intelligence that Hezbollah is planning revenge attacks alongside Iran and Syria.
It possibly for this reason U.S. ships have been lingering off the Lebanese coast over the past few weeks. A conflict between Israel and Syria is likely to invite Iranian retaliation and escalate into a war between the U.S. and Iran.
It appears Syria is already preparing for a conflict with Israel. Israel has reported that Hezbollah's military preparations have all been made and it is only a matter of time. Israel apparently intends to target the Western Bekaa valley and will likely attack other areas throughout Lebanon.
The most disturbing possibility is that Imad Mugniyeh may not have been killed by Israel, but in fact by Syria. In this case it would be Assef Shawkat the man who is suspected of having killed a Lebanse politician which resulted in the Cedar Revolution. He is reportedly leader of a hawkish faction which wants to go to war with Israel and is pro-Iranian. The implications are clear if he is in fact the attacker.
Shawkat may have killed Muginyeh knowing the response and planning to aggravate it so as to create the pretext for war with Israel. Whether he is doing this with the help of Iran or if its known among the Syrian government can't be certain. However, it seems likely Shawkat will indeed get his war.
It possibly for this reason U.S. ships have been lingering off the Lebanese coast over the past few weeks. A conflict between Israel and Syria is likely to invite Iranian retaliation and escalate into a war between the U.S. and Iran.
It appears Syria is already preparing for a conflict with Israel. Israel has reported that Hezbollah's military preparations have all been made and it is only a matter of time. Israel apparently intends to target the Western Bekaa valley and will likely attack other areas throughout Lebanon.
The most disturbing possibility is that Imad Mugniyeh may not have been killed by Israel, but in fact by Syria. In this case it would be Assef Shawkat the man who is suspected of having killed a Lebanse politician which resulted in the Cedar Revolution. He is reportedly leader of a hawkish faction which wants to go to war with Israel and is pro-Iranian. The implications are clear if he is in fact the attacker.
Shawkat may have killed Muginyeh knowing the response and planning to aggravate it so as to create the pretext for war with Israel. Whether he is doing this with the help of Iran or if its known among the Syrian government can't be certain. However, it seems likely Shawkat will indeed get his war.
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
Fallout from Kosovo looming
On Monday UN and NATO forces clashed with Serbs in Northern Kosovo after seizing a court in Mitrovica. Serbia has been endorsing attempts by Serbs in Kosovo to seize infrastructure in Northern Kosovo and ignore orders from Kosovo's central government. The most eerie comment to exemplify this came from Serbia's Minister for Kosovo who said, "We will protect you just like we protect the Serbs in Serbia," which would suggest this includes military force as the military of Serbia would surely intervene if a foreign country was attacking Serbs within Serbia.
There's no indication Serbia has yet gone to those lengths, but they may be headed in this direction in the future. They may not only be headed for military intervention themselves, but reportedly could end up pushing for Russian intervention. The fact Serbia is consulting with Russia on a joint response to the unrest is a clear example of the post-independent shift towards Russia already taking place. A shift toward the nationalists could be solidified without a nationalist as President and this would be a decisive push towards Russia.
After Kostunica's call for an election the issue of Kosovo will definitely become paramount in Serbia. Indeed his call may have been aimed at shifting the gears through electoral means rather than trying to reach an agreement with Tadic. A major success for nationalists would allow Kostunica to form a new government with Serbian Radicals and others, keeping the democratic parties in the minority. It is likely nationalists will portray the democrats as seeking membership in the EU without Kosovo while their goal is to join the EU with Kosovo. The fact Serbia's Radical party fared so well in the presidential elections should unnerve Tadic heading to parliamentary elections where nationalists have yet failed to net a majority. It seems even less likely for them to lose their majority under the present circumstances. The Western nations would have no room to argue whether Serbia's will is to push towards Europe and leave Kosovo behind it.
Beyond Serbia and Kosovo the implications in the Former Soviet Union are going to become an issue fairly soon. The Duma has announced what its official recommendation is likely to be as it concerns Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a request to initiate a process of recognition. While such a recommendation is sure not to be binding it does not rule out the possibility of its consideration. In particular it would mean Putin and the government most likely going against his party. However, at the same time the Duma gives the government some breathing by offering three scenarios for the breakaway republics:
Though, while Greater Serbia and Greater Albania actions are likely to emerge out of Kosovo, it's possible other irredentist ambitions in the region will not result in any real consequences. As it concerns Macedonia the resolutions of the name dispute with Greece, recognition of Kosovo, and induction into NATO could cool any ethnic tensions among Albanians in that country. Induction of Albania could complicate the inclusion of Kosovo into the state, though a partition of Kosovo might quicken it or create an effective union between the two.
At the same time the reverberations from Kosovo will be felt as the precedent gains momentum. At present it does not have the stark implications for the world it has been played up to have, but that is likely to wait on the actions of Russia and Republika Srpska, possible the Albanians in Macedonia. If any of them seek to capitalize on a precedent the push for independence around the world will only be aggravated further. The negotiations on Western Sahara could reach an end this year and Somaliland may also receive recognition. Taiwan's fate seems likely to be decided soon with the presidential elections. Cypriot elections have given renewed consideration to the Cypriot status, though a likely failure could push Northern Cyprus over the edge. Pushes by regions in Georgia could be helped by Georgia receiving a Membership Action Plan for NATO in two weeks, the push for a merging of Srpska with the Bosnia Federation by the EU could push Srpska to a referendum if Kosovo doesn't, though no matter what Kosovo's independence would be linked to it. In every case it seems the answer leads to conflict in the end.
The confluence of so many major events around the world each with broad geopolitical implications one can't help but wonder if this is occurring by design or is simply a bad run of luck.
There's no indication Serbia has yet gone to those lengths, but they may be headed in this direction in the future. They may not only be headed for military intervention themselves, but reportedly could end up pushing for Russian intervention. The fact Serbia is consulting with Russia on a joint response to the unrest is a clear example of the post-independent shift towards Russia already taking place. A shift toward the nationalists could be solidified without a nationalist as President and this would be a decisive push towards Russia.
After Kostunica's call for an election the issue of Kosovo will definitely become paramount in Serbia. Indeed his call may have been aimed at shifting the gears through electoral means rather than trying to reach an agreement with Tadic. A major success for nationalists would allow Kostunica to form a new government with Serbian Radicals and others, keeping the democratic parties in the minority. It is likely nationalists will portray the democrats as seeking membership in the EU without Kosovo while their goal is to join the EU with Kosovo. The fact Serbia's Radical party fared so well in the presidential elections should unnerve Tadic heading to parliamentary elections where nationalists have yet failed to net a majority. It seems even less likely for them to lose their majority under the present circumstances. The Western nations would have no room to argue whether Serbia's will is to push towards Europe and leave Kosovo behind it.
Beyond Serbia and Kosovo the implications in the Former Soviet Union are going to become an issue fairly soon. The Duma has announced what its official recommendation is likely to be as it concerns Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a request to initiate a process of recognition. While such a recommendation is sure not to be binding it does not rule out the possibility of its consideration. In particular it would mean Putin and the government most likely going against his party. However, at the same time the Duma gives the government some breathing by offering three scenarios for the breakaway republics:
- Recognition
- Transition to the so-called deferred status in bilateral relations with these territories
- Actively develop more comprehensive cooperation including the opening of Russian missions and the right of tax-free imports of goods produced by enterprises with the share of Russian capital, operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Though, while Greater Serbia and Greater Albania actions are likely to emerge out of Kosovo, it's possible other irredentist ambitions in the region will not result in any real consequences. As it concerns Macedonia the resolutions of the name dispute with Greece, recognition of Kosovo, and induction into NATO could cool any ethnic tensions among Albanians in that country. Induction of Albania could complicate the inclusion of Kosovo into the state, though a partition of Kosovo might quicken it or create an effective union between the two.
At the same time the reverberations from Kosovo will be felt as the precedent gains momentum. At present it does not have the stark implications for the world it has been played up to have, but that is likely to wait on the actions of Russia and Republika Srpska, possible the Albanians in Macedonia. If any of them seek to capitalize on a precedent the push for independence around the world will only be aggravated further. The negotiations on Western Sahara could reach an end this year and Somaliland may also receive recognition. Taiwan's fate seems likely to be decided soon with the presidential elections. Cypriot elections have given renewed consideration to the Cypriot status, though a likely failure could push Northern Cyprus over the edge. Pushes by regions in Georgia could be helped by Georgia receiving a Membership Action Plan for NATO in two weeks, the push for a merging of Srpska with the Bosnia Federation by the EU could push Srpska to a referendum if Kosovo doesn't, though no matter what Kosovo's independence would be linked to it. In every case it seems the answer leads to conflict in the end.
The confluence of so many major events around the world each with broad geopolitical implications one can't help but wonder if this is occurring by design or is simply a bad run of luck.
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Russia moves towards recognition of breakaway states
A hearing taking place on today has led to some significant recommendation by the Committee on CIS of the Russian Duma. The recommendations reportedly include:
The implications of the recommendations should they be adopted and implemented is profound, even if recognition does not follow. Having already removed sanctions on Abkhazia, Russia would also effectively eliminate tariffs. Setting up a consulate alongside this will only further the impression of Russian recognition and, not only that, but annexation. Many in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria are effectively if not actually Russian citizens. With a Russian military detachment present in every last region in one form or another the possibility their moves can be seen as anything short of annexation is unlikely.
Georgia and the U.S. are certainly to see any implementation of these recommendations as effective recognition and annexation. Whether Russia goes even further and officially recognizes the regions, particularly those in Georgia, depends on the actions of NATO with regards to Georgia. Of particular note is the Bucharest Summit being held from April 2 to April 4. This is when Georgia may be inducted into the MAP or Membership Action Plan, a move Russia's ambassador to NATO has already warned could result in the formal secession of the unrecognized republics in Georgia.
To this point German Chancellor Angela Merkel has notably come out saying Georgia can not join NATO due to ongoing conflicts in the country. However, nowhere does she comment on Georgia's possible offer of a MAP, meaning such a decision could be supported by Germany but not a formal invitation to join. If NATO makes the offer and Russia responds by formally completing the process of recognition already being initiated there will unavoidably be a conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Such a conflict will bring the boiling tempers between Russia and the West to their highest point in decades and NATO may then see Georgia less as a liability for membership but a necessary guarantee to prevent Russian expansionism. NATO membership for Georgia will then insure that the next conflict between the two nations will end with a conflict between NATO and Russia.
- Examining the possibility of opening diplomatic missions in the three regions.
- Boosting humanitarian and economic assistance for Russian passport holders in the breakaway regions.
- "Examining the possibility of changing the format" for Russia's relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, which could include recognition.
- A proposal to abolish customs tariffs on goods imported into Russia from businesses in the three regions that have Russian shareholders.
The implications of the recommendations should they be adopted and implemented is profound, even if recognition does not follow. Having already removed sanctions on Abkhazia, Russia would also effectively eliminate tariffs. Setting up a consulate alongside this will only further the impression of Russian recognition and, not only that, but annexation. Many in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria are effectively if not actually Russian citizens. With a Russian military detachment present in every last region in one form or another the possibility their moves can be seen as anything short of annexation is unlikely.
Georgia and the U.S. are certainly to see any implementation of these recommendations as effective recognition and annexation. Whether Russia goes even further and officially recognizes the regions, particularly those in Georgia, depends on the actions of NATO with regards to Georgia. Of particular note is the Bucharest Summit being held from April 2 to April 4. This is when Georgia may be inducted into the MAP or Membership Action Plan, a move Russia's ambassador to NATO has already warned could result in the formal secession of the unrecognized republics in Georgia.
To this point German Chancellor Angela Merkel has notably come out saying Georgia can not join NATO due to ongoing conflicts in the country. However, nowhere does she comment on Georgia's possible offer of a MAP, meaning such a decision could be supported by Germany but not a formal invitation to join. If NATO makes the offer and Russia responds by formally completing the process of recognition already being initiated there will unavoidably be a conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Such a conflict will bring the boiling tempers between Russia and the West to their highest point in decades and NATO may then see Georgia less as a liability for membership but a necessary guarantee to prevent Russian expansionism. NATO membership for Georgia will then insure that the next conflict between the two nations will end with a conflict between NATO and Russia.
Sunday, March 2, 2008
Turkey withdraws from Iraq as spring comes
A few days ago Turkey announced its withdrawal from Northern Iraq. The withdrawal ultimately was not the end of Turkish actions as the Turkish Army says similar operations could be carried out at a later time. If anything, the invasion was intended to show the Kurds and PKK that Turkey is serious in its threats and will not hesitate to launch an attack.
The big factor in whether Turkey launches another operation depends on whether the PKK is able to continue attacks against Turkey when the spring comes. If that happens another operation is likely. While official reports might lead one to believe the operation was a major success a crucial issue was brought up by the Turkish military's statement:
The big factor in whether Turkey launches another operation depends on whether the PKK is able to continue attacks against Turkey when the spring comes. If that happens another operation is likely. While official reports might lead one to believe the operation was a major success a crucial issue was brought up by the Turkish military's statement:
The PKK's heartland, the Zap region near the Turkish-Iraqi border, has been targeted in the offensive, the Army statement also said, contrary to earlier media reports that the PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains, located about 150 kilometers away from the border, would be rooted out. The number of the PKK terrorists in Iraqi territories is estimated about 3.000. The PKK is mostly located in Barzani areas and Mesut Barzani group has been giving clear support to the PKK although the PKK is considered as terrorist organization by the United States, Iraq and Turkey.Those mountain bases may still be inaccessible at this time of the year so this may be the reason bases were not targeted. According to the head of a Turkish think tank, Dr. Sedat Laciner, Turkish troops will be returning in the next few weeks. This likely will be as soon as the snow melts and ultimately lead to an attack on the Kandil Mountains. While the Kurdish government stepped down from conflict, they may not tolerate a second invasion.
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