Tomislav Nikolić (Томислав Николић) | Serbian Radical Party (Српска радикална странка) | 1,646,172 | 39.99 |
Boris Tadić (Борис Тадић) | Democratic Party (Демократска странка) | 1,457,030 | 35.39 |
Velimir Ilić (Велимир Илић) | New Serbia (Нова Србија) | 305,828 | 7.43 |
Milutin Mrkonjić (Милутин Мркоњић) | Socialist Party of Serbia (Социјалистичка партија Србије) | 245,889 | 5.97 |
In exchange for his support, according to Belgrade daily Blic, Kostunica said Tadic must oppose the planned EU mission to Kosovo, unless the UN Security Council adopts a new resolution authorising it. In return, Tadic wants the prime minister to back the signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.However, it seems unlikely Tadic will actually follow through on this agreement. Kostunica probably does not want a simple condemnation of the EU force, but hinging the SAA on the refusal of such an agreement:
The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) is calling for a tougher policy regarding the EU -- it does not want the SAA to be signed if the EU deploys that mission to Kosovo, without prior UN approval. The DSS says an EU mission to Kosovo would violate Serbia's sovereignty.These are probably not terms Tadic will agree with. In the event Tadic signs the agreement over the objections of Kostunica, it is possible Kostunica will simply reject Tadic and possibly back Nikolic. Tadic will then be left with little chance of winning the second round of elections, chances already diminished based off the outpouring of nationalist support.
A Nikolic win would set events on the worse possible course. Kostunica's party would likely switch its coalition around to the Serbian Radicals, forming a strongly nationalist government. It is unlikely the EU will waver from its support of Kosovo no matter the outcome since Germany's foreign minister has already declared the international community can not "prevent" independence. Given Kostunica's warnings to the European Union about supporting Kosovo's independence, this probably will mean a shift away from the West and towards Russia.
Potential for instability expanding beyond Kosovo remains strong with the potential for a Greater Albania situation. There are even Albanian political organizations in the Balkans circulating maps showing an Albanian state encompassing Kosovo as well as territories in western Macedonia, parts of Greece and Montenegro. This likely includes areas of Serbia outside of Kosovo with Albanian populations.
Albania's government has been very accommodating for Kosovo, including allowing them passage to their Adriatic port. The possibility of merging an independent Kosovo with Albania has been raised on many occasions, but it's feared such an outcomes will mean rebellions in several Albanian areas seeking to merge with Albania.
To the side is an image of what such a Greater Albania would look like, with Albanian majority areas in purple, though in Greece it is unknown as minorities are not recognized. Despite few areas outside of Kosovo and Albania having a majority Albanian population, essentially every territory considered to be part of historic Albania is meant by Greater Albania. If such territories did merge with Albania ethnic cleansing of non-Albanians could follow either through voluntary abandonment or violent excursion. Such a scenario would be the makings of a new Balkans War.
Alongside this Russia's Foreign Minister is escalating the rhetoric around Kosovo:
It will set a precedent for several territories, not only Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but - according to our figures - for some 200 regions in states around the world. If we allow someone to do something, many others will expect the same treatment.However, this statement was quickly backpedaled on according to news media, but his statements appear less like a denial, and more like spin:
The Russian leadership has never said that after the recognition of independence in Kosovo we would immediately recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.This is true, Vladimir Putin and other leaders have never directly stated they would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and at no time did they say they would do so immediately. He then takes an even more ridiculous spin on the situation:
Lavrov said "there is nothing more untruthful" than the idea that Moscow was waiting to use Kosovan independence as a pretext "to start recognising all and sundry. There could be nothing less true."Of course, this is not denying any plans for recognition, but stating only that Moscow does not want Kosovo's independence because it can be used as a precedent. His comments become much more clear from there on:
The precedent will be created not because we want it but because it will be objectively created...because justice is an understanding that drives people. If someone is allowed to do something, many others will expect similar treatment.In other words, Russia doesn't want Kosovo to get independence and they aren't planning to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a response, but when Kosovo does get its independence the Abkhaz and Ossetians will expect to be recognized and so Russia will have no choice but to comply. Whether Russia does recognize the territories may depend on Georgia refusing to agree to a non-use of force agreement over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia is unlikely to agree as they believe the agreement as Russia proposes it treats South Ossetia and Abkhazia as countries separate from Georgia. It is also unlikely Russia will be willing to change this to imply the territories are part of Georgia.
Russia is not the only nation which is likely to exploit the precedent as Armenian officials often draw similarities between Nagorno-Karabakh and the Kosovo.
Such veiled comments seem to indicate the intentions of Russia and Armenia are ultimately to use Kosovo's independence as a precedent for breakaway regions, which are likely to ultimately merge with them. A merging of Albania and Kosovo may increase irredentist ambitions alongside ambitions for independence. Such a precedent could soon engulf Europe, Africa, and Asia in a tidal wave separatism ending with the possible dissolution of several states like Belgium and Somalia. Borders would be redrawn at a rapid pace resulting in countless conflicts. When the smoke clears, while numerous conflicts will likely be resolved, the path will be laid for a broader and more dangerous conflict. A conflict which could end up engulfing the whole world.
1 comment:
Superb work as usual Tartarus.
Aside from the international implications of the example set by Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence, the regional implications for the Balkans, needless to say, are disturbing for their potential. BBC is reporting today that Serbia has alerted its Reservists, and furthermore that police are registering abandoned housing in Vojvodina - presumably in order to house Serb refugees in the former homes of those Hungarians who have left Serbia over the last 20 years.
Coming as it all does on the heels of Russian gas pipeline deals with Bulgaria (just signed) and Serbia (I'm not sure if it has just been signed or not) - and on very favourable terms to Russia with regards to the Serbian deal, together with rumours of Russian troops possibly being sent to Serbia in support, the potential for real trouble is unsettlingly high. Regardless of who wins the Serbian presidential elections, the pressure to act to protect Serbs in the wake of Kosovo's independence will be very strong, and difficult to handle.
Over the past two decades, it would seem that the Balkans have gone from a problem posed by advocates of a "Greater Serbia" to one potentially posed by advocates of a "Greater Albania".
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