necessitate tougher actions by Israel. This would likely lead to a call-up of the reserves and ultimately the occupation of a large portion of the Strip if not a return to full occupation.According to certain reports Israel has offered to bring Fatah to power in the Strip, though Abbas, the leader of the party, has decided to pursue negotiations with Hamas on reconciliation before any operation. However, Abbas reportedly didn't outright reject the offer and is only pursuing negotiations to avoid appearances that Fatah is put in power by Israeli military action. This would seem to be clear given reports that Fatah-run Palestine and Israel have agreed to some elements of a peace agreement. Bush's expressed hope for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute before the end of his term may come true if these events are any indication, however, it will most likely be as a result of Israeli military action and the usurping of Hamas.
At the same time talk is growing of imminent military action against Iran by the U.S., Israel, or both nations acting in concert. Bush is reportedly on the verge of a decision to strike Iran's nuclear sites and there may also be American plans for a limited strike against Iran's Quds force, specifically sites believed to be involved in training Iraqi insurgents, Hezbollah, and Palestinian groups like Hamas. Additionally there are reports that Israel may be considering a strike against Iran in the near future.
Any action taken against Iran could be in tandem with an invasion of Gaza. The sequence of events could involve a gradual escalation initially with U.S. forces attacking Quds forces believe to be supporting Iraqi insurgents and additionally backing it up as a move supporting Israel's actions against Hamas. The scope of Iran's retaliation would determine the events that follow. If Iran responds in a similarly limited manner it might not expand the conflict, however combined with an Israeli invasion of Gaza Iran could interpret the act as a more general act of war and respond much harder. The U.S. could use an escalation by Iran to justify its own escalation with attacks on Iranian nuclear sites in conjunction with Israel. However, Iran may then use this as a justification for a more concerted action against the U.S. and Israel.
The first possible avenue for expanding the conflict would be Hezbollah in Lebanon. This could involve the usurping of the Lebanese government as a means of preventing its disarmament or, more likely, acting on their promised retaliatory strike against Israel for the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh. On this matter Hezbollah has recently been reported to have fortified its positions in South Lebanon setting up strategic positions throughout the region. Hezbollah could take the opportunity of a strike on Iran or invasion of Gaza to punish Israel for their alleged involvement in the assassination.
In the event of a response by Hezbollah Israel has previously warned Syria it could become a target as a result. To this point Syria has been seeking more advanced technology from Russia to improve its ability to fight the IDF including surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, advanced aircraft like the Mig-29SMT and Yak-130, and even Amur-class submarines, the export version of the Lada. Syria is also reportedly putting its missile forces under the command of an Iranian independent missile command which would include officers from Syria. Combined with the missile and rocket strength of Hezbollah and Hamas the combined force would overwhelm Israeli air defenses and allow for air strikes to be carried out in Israeli territory. Specifically if the force targeted Israeli air bases they could limit air sorties by the IDF which would also improve their chances of launching a ground attack with Syria aiming to regain the Golan Heights and perhaps looking further to force a concession from Israel through an invasion of Israel proper.
Another option for Iran to expand the conflict is in Iraq where it could foment greater violence in Shia communities but also could include another option. This would be an attack jointly with Turkey in the Kurdish north. Among the issues Turkey and Iran worry about one is the Kirkuk issue which, while Kurds have expressed openness to a power-sharing agreement instead of a referendum, they have also threatened to impose a vote in Kirkuk, that would lead to the oil-rich province joining the Kurdistan Region. Upcoming provincial elections have increased the tensions more by dividing Kirkuk into electoral districts, which Kurds claim will lead to partition. Another incident on Thursday added to the dispute over Kirkuk this time concerning its oil fields when Kurdish security forces seized the Khurmala oil field and blocked workers from the field. Oil ministry officials deemed the move irresponsible and brought back the workers with Kurdish forces leaving on Friday.
In the wake of these developments is official acknowledgment from a Turkish general that Turkey and Iran have coordinate strikes on the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan and share intelligence on the organization. At the same time Iranian forces have resumed cross-border attacks against the PKK including a brief incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan. Earlier in the week Turkey sent additional troops to its border with Iraq to fight against the PKK. In Turkey the ruling party received a bad omen for the court case on closure of the AKP with the court's decision to annul its lifting of the ban on wearing headscarves in universities. Seen as an indicator of the result of the closure case it could mean the AKP will be shut down and its members banned from politics. While there's a possibility they will ultimately form a new party the case may lead to a new general election with the AKP suffering from the lack of Erdogan's leadership. The CHP and MHP would likely gain more control in the assembly and may even gain the strength to form a government. Both parties are more anxious about the PKK and have frequently accused the AKP of being soft in Iraq. An invasion would almost be a certainty under a secular-led government, especially if it included the nationalists.
While Kurdish officials have said they're opposed to the PKK's attacks they have also condemned Turkey and Iran for taking action against them, but refrain from doing so in their stead. As a result it's likely both countries consider the Kurdish government's committment to stopping the PKK half-hearted if not a meager ploy. Iran could launch an attack on the PKK base in Mount Qandil with significant Turkish support if not a joint assault. This would be to further complicate U.S. action against Iran as they would be hesitant to act against the Turks, but would not want to tolerate an outright invasion of Iraqi territory by Iran.
The only choice the U.S. would have in the wake of such a decision is to up the ante even more and launch more strikes on Iranian forces. Iran however would also be able to up the ante by expanding its area of action even more. Iran has trained its air force for potential long-range strike missions including night-time aerial refueling over the Mediterranean Sea. While some have suggested this would be in preparation for an attack on Israel if Iranian aircraft were operating from Syrian bases as they have in the past then the more likely is that the goal would be to launch a strike against American bases in Europe. Iran's cooperation with Turkey against the PKK could lead to an accommodation where Iran is able to use Turkish airspace. In addition to operating from Syria Iran would, with aerial refueling, be able to strike American bases in Southeastern Europe including bases in Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. In the past the bases in Romania and Bulgaria have been cited as possible launching points for strikes on Iran.
This all depends on how far Israel is willing to go in Gaza and whether they or the U.S. use it as an opportunity to hit Iran or whether Iran or Hezbollah use it as an opportunity to strike Israel. In that case an invasion of Gaza could be little more than the beginning of a broad regional war which would escalate tensions with Russia and even lead to them siding with Iran. Israel should tread carefully for risk of igniting a conflict beyond their control.
