Wednesday, April 16, 2008

What now of Taiwan?

Several weeks ago Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT defeated Frank Hsieh of the DPP for Taiwan's presidency in a landslide. With the results of the legislative elections where the KMT gained a three-fourths majority, the KMT has emerged with an absolute victory. As a result Taiwan is likely to pursue far greater integration with China, however until Chen Shui-bian leaves office there are still questions of what will happen.

Since the crippling defeat the DPP has been in a political crisis. Frank Hsieh having been the chairman of the DPP has withdrawn from his post effective upon the appointment of a new chairman on May 18th leading to disputes within the party. In particular there's a battle going on between various factions within the party and a battle of new guard versus old with several going after Chen Shui-bian among others. Even Frank Hsieh has come out to criticize Chen Shui-bian, blaming him for the huge losses and condemning him for hypocrisy on corruption. Hsieh and other voices within the party are calling for a re-evaluation of the party's pro-independence line. If a compromise on all these issues is not agreed to it is likely the party will become deeply divided and may even split completely.

Of particular danger to the DPP is the slew of court cases against senior leaders. Ma Ying-jeou managed to avoid a conviction over corruption charges prior to the election, but the DPP may not be as lucky. Several major officials, among them Vice President Annette Lu and Frank Hsieh, who faces a host of charges. With the party torn by corruption scandals, infighting, and a major electoral defeat they have enough reasons to worry about their future political survival.

For pro-independence forces in the party the overwhelming victory of the KMT is beyond dangerous. During the campaign Chen Shui-bian and Hsieh drew parallels between Taiwan and the recent events in Tibet. They also painted a vote for Ma as akin to a vote for surrender to China and accused Ma, who had held a U.S. green card, of being disloyal to Taiwan. All of this was intended to paint the election as a life or death situation which could lead to the destruction of Taiwan or at least the loss of its independence.

Following the victory of the KMT there was immediate talk of expanded ties with China including daily direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland, the creation of a common market, and, the biggest prize of all, a peace agreement with China. However, the DPP has rejected deepening ties with China as they fear it will only end with the loss of Taiwanese independence.

It is of some note then that recently pro-independence news sites and members of the DPP have begun playing up fears about the incoming KMT administration. Of some note is a recent article which argued an attack by China on Taiwan is likely after Ma Ying-jeou takes office. The argument seems to be that Ma will not have fully organized by then and he won't be strong enough in favor of reunification. As such the author of the article says an attack on Taiwan is likely after Ma takes office. A trip by the Vice President-elect to China also led to criticism as some DPP members said the Chinese government used it as a propaganda tool to promote reunification and treated Taiwan like a province. Another article accused the KMT of scheming together with the U.S. and China to prevent independence and make Taiwan a dependent regime.

Such scaremongering also comes in light of apparent difficulties in the transitional phase between Chen's administration and Ma's. Ma has been playing up the idea of negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus where China and Taiwan agree there is one China but with different interpretations. However, following discussions with the Chen administration it was reported Chen and Ma could not come to an agreement on what the consensus meant or if it even existed. Chen condemned all of Ma's proposed policies declaring China wasn't to be trusted and dealing with the 1992 consensus could lead to Taiwan falling into the "one China" trap.

So what measure could be taken to prevent what Chen and others in the DPP consider a possible trap to end the sovereignty of Taiwan? It's possible Chen has already let slip a possible course of action when in talking about proposals to resolve a dispute of the management of elections he mentioned the possibility of declaring martial law. While he ultimately stepped back from that statement the fact this was proposed to him and he even considered the possibility leads one to wonder if this is how he intends to prevent Taiwan from "falling into the 'one China' trap". Following the election Chen deflected rumors that there was a plan to impose martial law or prevent the entrance of the KMT government insisting he was dedicated to a peaceful transition.
However there have already been accusations and word of hindrances being made to the transition. One potential problem is the planned mass resignation of the government before an agreement can be reached on Ma's administration. Not only that but the shifting of diplomatic personnel indicates Chen is trying to improve the DPP's standing in foreign policy. The end result of the combined efforts would be an obstruction of the incoming KMT administration. What's more having the government under the control of the Cabinet Secretary-General in the interim period could ease the imposition of a martial law situation. If there is still no agreement on how to form the new government and other issues remain outstanding it's possible then a martial law situation will arise.

On this note it might be of interest that Frank Hsieh has called for the formation of a shadow cabinet following his resignation, which would be the first time such a measure has been taking by a losing party since elections started in Taiwan. Hsieh's shadow cabinet is likely to include officials resigning from their posts around the same time and as this would take place before the transition of power there remains the possibility of Chen declaring martial law and having the Cabinet Secretary-General make the shadow cabinet an interim government. One potential justification for a declaration of martial law would be an ongoing investigation into the Taiwan Goal controversy. The controversy involved a private corporation secretly established by Chen's administration to use public funds to make arms purchases for Taiwan. KMT lawmakers have accused the DPP of launching a "green terror" prior to the transfer of power by trying to force journalists to reveal their sources for the story. Taiwan's Defense Minister refused to comment on whether lawmakers could be investigated as well.

Chen himself has a very strong reason to stay on as President as it is widely reported he will immediately be indicted and tried for corruption after he leaves office. It would also not be the first possible action by Chen to preserve himself in power through illegal means. The attempted assassination which is widely believed to have handed him a narrow victory in Taiwan's 2004 elections was suspected of actually being a staged event to keep himself in power. While the official investigation has not verified this claim, if it's true it would not be a stretch for Chen to preserve his place in power by declaring martial law. In fact the corruption charges likely to be made against him and much of the DPP leadership along with what could end as the dissolution of the party provide plenty of reasons for preventing the KMT from taking complete control of the government. Indeed not even the CCP has a three-fourths majority. The disintegration of the DPP could be the onset of a de-facto one-party state under the KMT, blocking such an action might be the ultimate justification for preventing Ma's accession and preserving Chen's position as President.

The incentive for Chen to declare martial law and block the results of the elections is overwhelming as one prosecution official has said, "We will indict Chen after he leaves office unless other factors or barriers intervene first."

In the end such an action, if carried out would only invite the military reaction of China and completely eliminate Chen's Western support. The only way to prevent an attack would be the declaration of a nuclear deterrent. On this it is interesting that several years ago Taiwanese lawmaker accused Chen of developing a nuclear weapon. Reports in Chinese media later speculated that Taiwan had already restarted its nuclear weapons program in secret under President Lee Teng-Hui around 1996 based on comment from several Taiwanese officials.

While questionable these reports should not be automatically dismissed as Taiwan had a long-standing nuclear weapons program and their membership in Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative. Under that program it's believed enough weapons-grade uranium for 1,000 nuclear weapons was sent to 43 countries. The fact Taiwan purchased a reactor from Canada that also had contributed significantly lead to India and Pakistan's successful nuclear weapons program and also unsuccessful programs launched in Argentina and South Korea there is reason to wonder how far Taiwan progressed. It's possible Taiwan already acquired weapons-grade material needed for a bomb and given a case last year of over a dozen pounds of weapons-grade uranium going missing in China it is not inconceivable for Taiwan to attain nuclear material today.

A very recent report which raised concerns was the accidental delivery of four nuclear missile fuses two years ago. Apparently the fuses had only been returned the week prior to the report. Two years could be sufficient time for Taiwan to have studied and been able to copy the technology there and possible incorporate into an unknown nuclear program. One serious question is how could such a mistake happen and some are asserting it was intentional. This is indeed a possibility. The United States military has taken a decisive turn towards positive cooperation with China rather than treating them as an enemy treating them as a partner. It's almost certain this is not supported by all voices in the military, some of whom may wish to see the U.S. more forcefully backing Taiwan. Such sympathies could be played to in order for Taiwan to attain some needed nuclear material.

A declaration of martial law by Chen Shui-bian to prevent unification with China would lead inexorably to a conflict with China and without being able to count on American support. As such Taiwan's only possible counter would be the development of nuclear capabilities to counter-act China's overwhelming military power. However, if such a step is taken it likely means the ultimate demise of the Taiwanese independence movement.

Monday, March 24, 2008

Middle East on Verge of Major War

Mugniyeh's death over a month ago has sparked fears of Hezbollah retaliation and it's being suggested that Monday may be the day when such retaliation comes or may be used to justify an oncoming attack. Hezbollah will hold a rally honoring Mugniyeh and the end of the mourning period of his death. They may use the moment to rally their supporters behind an inevitable war resulting from Hezbollah retaliation. Such a war could engulf all of Lebanon and may even spread to Syria and Gaza.

It should be of no surprise then that Syria has deployed some three divisions of troops on the Lebanese border, likely preparing for or anticipating a massive Israeli attack in Lebanon and maybe even attack against Syria. Other reports are saying the attack by Hezbollah may be done simultaneously with actions by Syria and Iran and may even include attacks by Hamas. The dangers of a war of such scale should not be underestimated.

While Iranian involvement would likely invite American retaliation, especially as it appears military action is again in the works concerning Iran's nuclear plans, it will probably not invite a massive war with Iran. Israel is likely to be incapacitated as it faces off against Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, while the U.S. will likely be facing difficulties in Iraq, and probably will not have sufficient resources deployed to launch a full-scale air and naval attack on Iran.

Such a conflict therefore will primarily involve Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. However, this would likely be an intense and arduous conflict. Of particular notice is the stark advancement in Hezbollah's rocket arsenal. With an estimated 40,000 rockets and missiles Hezbollah would be able to launch a large-scale attacks against Israel well beyond the intensity of the 2006 Lebanon War. More notably is a larger number of these would have a reach of some 200 miles from north of the Litani putting almost all of Israel in Hezbollah's targets. When one considers the massive arsenal built up by Hamas and the inclusion of Syria's arsenal, which itself includes Scuds with far greater range, Israel could face a flurry of missile throughout the country.

During the 2006 Lebanon War Israelis in the North were forced into bomb shelters for weeks. In a renewed conflict the same situation would be repeated throughout all of Israel with Israel likely facing a military attack from Syria to retake the Golan Heights, which could pave way for a full-on invasion to force a concession out of Israel. Syria has armed itself with the latest anti-air and anti-tank weapons from Russia which combined with its military aircraft are sure to wreck havoc on Israel. Syria's push combined with Hezbollah's retaliation and the launch of a massive attack by Hamas might overwhelm Israel incapable of dealing with an endless onslaught of missiles as well as a military attack all designed specifically to strike at Israel's strengths. Faced with its most dire situation since the Yom Kippur War Israel may resort to extreme means including the use of nuclear weapons.

If Israel used nuclear weapons it would most likely be as a result of a crippling unexpected defeat and will probably be directed at the most important target imaginable, Damascus. Being the largest city in Syria and the capital it would be the most psychologically, politically, and militarily effective target. Wiping out the entire area with a dozen or so nuclear weapons would either send Syria into a crisis or force a peace.

While such a strategy could be effective in stopping a defeat it would only heighten Iran's concerns with Israel becoming only the second nation to use nukes in a conflict while the first is allied with them and both nations seeing Iran as the ultimate threat in the region. Iran is likely to seek out a major ally which will likely be Russia and Iran will probably push inexorably towards a nuclear weapon with Russia removing its opposition.

Of course, if Iran gets a nuclear weapon Saudi Arabia will ultimately seek to do the same in order to avoid relying on Israel or the United States. The nuclearization of the Middle East would mean the next Middle Eastern war would be an atomic one.

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Israel preparing for conflict with Syria

The assassination of Imad Muginyeh, which Hezbollah has blamed on Israel, is expected to lead to an attack sometime past March 22, when the mourning period ends. In preparation Israel is beefing up security near Palestine and has put its troops near Lebanon on high alert, as well as advising Jewish and Israeli institutions around the world to increase security. The more frightening aspect of this is Israel's warning that apparently an attack by Hezbollah will lead to an attack on Syria. Their reasoning might be indications from intelligence that Hezbollah is planning revenge attacks alongside Iran and Syria.

It possibly for this reason U.S. ships have been lingering off the Lebanese coast over the past few weeks. A conflict between Israel and Syria is likely to invite Iranian retaliation and escalate into a war between the U.S. and Iran.

It appears Syria is already preparing for a conflict with Israel. Israel has reported that Hezbollah's military preparations have all been made and it is only a matter of time. Israel apparently intends to target the Western Bekaa valley and will likely attack other areas throughout Lebanon.

The most disturbing possibility is that Imad Mugniyeh may not have been killed by Israel, but in fact by Syria. In this case it would be Assef Shawkat the man who is suspected of having killed a Lebanse politician which resulted in the Cedar Revolution. He is reportedly leader of a hawkish faction which wants to go to war with Israel and is pro-Iranian. The implications are clear if he is in fact the attacker.

Shawkat may have killed Muginyeh knowing the response and planning to aggravate it so as to create the pretext for war with Israel. Whether he is doing this with the help of Iran or if its known among the Syrian government can't be certain. However, it seems likely Shawkat will indeed get his war.

Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Fallout from Kosovo looming

On Monday UN and NATO forces clashed with Serbs in Northern Kosovo after seizing a court in Mitrovica. Serbia has been endorsing attempts by Serbs in Kosovo to seize infrastructure in Northern Kosovo and ignore orders from Kosovo's central government. The most eerie comment to exemplify this came from Serbia's Minister for Kosovo who said, "We will protect you just like we protect the Serbs in Serbia," which would suggest this includes military force as the military of Serbia would surely intervene if a foreign country was attacking Serbs within Serbia.

There's no indication Serbia has yet gone to those lengths, but they may be headed in this direction in the future. They may not only be headed for military intervention themselves, but reportedly could end up pushing for Russian intervention. The fact Serbia is consulting with Russia on a joint response to the unrest is a clear example of the post-independent shift towards Russia already taking place. A shift toward the nationalists could be solidified without a nationalist as President and this would be a decisive push towards Russia.

After Kostunica's call for an election the issue of Kosovo will definitely become paramount in Serbia. Indeed his call may have been aimed at shifting the gears through electoral means rather than trying to reach an agreement with Tadic. A major success for nationalists would allow Kostunica to form a new government with Serbian Radicals and others, keeping the democratic parties in the minority. It is likely nationalists will portray the democrats as seeking membership in the EU without Kosovo while their goal is to join the EU with Kosovo. The fact Serbia's Radical party fared so well in the presidential elections should unnerve Tadic heading to parliamentary elections where nationalists have yet failed to net a majority. It seems even less likely for them to lose their majority under the present circumstances. The Western nations would have no room to argue whether Serbia's will is to push towards Europe and leave Kosovo behind it.

Beyond Serbia and Kosovo the implications in the Former Soviet Union are going to become an issue fairly soon. The Duma has announced what its official recommendation is likely to be as it concerns Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a request to initiate a process of recognition. While such a recommendation is sure not to be binding it does not rule out the possibility of its consideration. In particular it would mean Putin and the government most likely going against his party. However, at the same time the Duma gives the government some breathing by offering three scenarios for the breakaway republics:
  • Recognition
  • Transition to the so-called deferred status in bilateral relations with these territories
  • Actively develop more comprehensive cooperation including the opening of Russian missions and the right of tax-free imports of goods produced by enterprises with the share of Russian capital, operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia is making an attempt to paint Kosovo as a precedent already emerging by mentioning the crisis in Macedonia's government and the unrest in Tibet. The former is motivated primarily by Albanians in the Macedonian government who have called for improvements in some areas for Albanians in Macedonia and recognition of Kosovo. Albanians in Macedonia are one prominent groups in the Balkans feared to use Kosovo as a precedent for independence which is believe could also result in a merger with Albania to form a Greater Albania. However, such moves along with clear moves towards partition in Kosovo are likely to open up a larger can of worms with movements for a Greater Serbia and United Macedonia coming into play, even Greater Hungary.

Though, while Greater Serbia and Greater Albania actions are likely to emerge out of Kosovo, it's possible other irredentist ambitions in the region will not result in any real consequences. As it concerns Macedonia the resolutions of the name dispute with Greece, recognition of Kosovo, and induction into NATO could cool any ethnic tensions among Albanians in that country. Induction of Albania could complicate the inclusion of Kosovo into the state, though a partition of Kosovo might quicken it or create an effective union between the two.

At the same time the reverberations from Kosovo will be felt as the precedent gains momentum. At present it does not have the stark implications for the world it has been played up to have, but that is likely to wait on the actions of Russia and Republika Srpska, possible the Albanians in Macedonia. If any of them seek to capitalize on a precedent the push for independence around the world will only be aggravated further. The negotiations on Western Sahara could reach an end this year and Somaliland may also receive recognition. Taiwan's fate seems likely to be decided soon with the presidential elections. Cypriot elections have given renewed consideration to the Cypriot status, though a likely failure could push Northern Cyprus over the edge. Pushes by regions in Georgia could be helped by Georgia receiving a Membership Action Plan for NATO in two weeks, the push for a merging of Srpska with the Bosnia Federation by the EU could push Srpska to a referendum if Kosovo doesn't, though no matter what Kosovo's independence would be linked to it. In every case it seems the answer leads to conflict in the end.

The confluence of so many major events around the world each with broad geopolitical implications one can't help but wonder if this is occurring by design or is simply a bad run of luck.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Russia moves towards recognition of breakaway states

A hearing taking place on today has led to some significant recommendation by the Committee on CIS of the Russian Duma. The recommendations reportedly include:
  • Examining the possibility of opening diplomatic missions in the three regions.
  • Boosting humanitarian and economic assistance for Russian passport holders in the breakaway regions.
  • "Examining the possibility of changing the format" for Russia's relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, which could include recognition.
  • A proposal to abolish customs tariffs on goods imported into Russia from businesses in the three regions that have Russian shareholders.
Beyond this other reports mention the possibility of Russia pushing for their inclusion in international organizations. This hearing did not include Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been left up to Armenia and status negotiations. A Russian paper explained the significance of this fairly well saying, "This is in practice the launch of a procedure of recognition."

The implications of the recommendations should they be adopted and implemented is profound, even if recognition does not follow. Having already removed sanctions on Abkhazia, Russia would also effectively eliminate tariffs. Setting up a consulate alongside this will only further the impression of Russian recognition and, not only that, but annexation. Many in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria are effectively if not actually Russian citizens. With a Russian military detachment present in every last region in one form or another the possibility their moves can be seen as anything short of annexation is unlikely.

Georgia and the U.S. are certainly to see any implementation of these recommendations as effective recognition and annexation. Whether Russia goes even further and officially recognizes the regions, particularly those in Georgia, depends on the actions of NATO with regards to Georgia. Of particular note is the Bucharest Summit being held from April 2 to April 4. This is when Georgia may be inducted into the MAP or Membership Action Plan, a move Russia's ambassador to NATO has already warned could result in the formal secession of the unrecognized republics in Georgia.

To this point German Chancellor Angela Merkel has notably come out saying Georgia can not join NATO due to ongoing conflicts in the country. However, nowhere does she comment on Georgia's possible offer of a MAP, meaning such a decision could be supported by Germany but not a formal invitation to join. If NATO makes the offer and Russia responds by formally completing the process of recognition already being initiated there will unavoidably be a conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Such a conflict will bring the boiling tempers between Russia and the West to their highest point in decades and NATO may then see Georgia less as a liability for membership but a necessary guarantee to prevent Russian expansionism. NATO membership for Georgia will then insure that the next conflict between the two nations will end with a conflict between NATO and Russia.

Sunday, March 2, 2008

Turkey withdraws from Iraq as spring comes

A few days ago Turkey announced its withdrawal from Northern Iraq. The withdrawal ultimately was not the end of Turkish actions as the Turkish Army says similar operations could be carried out at a later time. If anything, the invasion was intended to show the Kurds and PKK that Turkey is serious in its threats and will not hesitate to launch an attack.

The big factor in whether Turkey launches another operation depends on whether the PKK is able to continue attacks against Turkey when the spring comes. If that happens another operation is likely. While official reports might lead one to believe the operation was a major success a crucial issue was brought up by the Turkish military's statement:
The PKK's heartland, the Zap region near the Turkish-Iraqi border, has been targeted in the offensive, the Army statement also said, contrary to earlier media reports that the PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains, located about 150 kilometers away from the border, would be rooted out. The number of the PKK terrorists in Iraqi territories is estimated about 3.000. The PKK is mostly located in Barzani areas and Mesut Barzani group has been giving clear support to the PKK although the PKK is considered as terrorist organization by the United States, Iraq and Turkey.
Those mountain bases may still be inaccessible at this time of the year so this may be the reason bases were not targeted. According to the head of a Turkish think tank, Dr. Sedat Laciner, Turkish troops will be returning in the next few weeks. This likely will be as soon as the snow melts and ultimately lead to an attack on the Kandil Mountains. While the Kurdish government stepped down from conflict, they may not tolerate a second invasion.

Friday, February 22, 2008

Turkey invades Iraq

Turkey has launched a ground operation into Iraq. The operation is being carried out with U.S. and Iraqi approval with Turkey sending in as many as 10,000 soldiers. It seems they've decided to invade before spring in order to prevent the PKK from attacking in the spring.

The reaction of the Kurds in this matters is crucial:

Jabbar Yawar, a spokesman for Iraqi Kurdish security forces, said sporadic bombing was taking place in the border areas, but no casualties were reported.

Fouad Hussein, a spokesman for the semiautonomous Kurdish government in Iraq, said the Kurdish Peshmerga forces had been put on alert.

He said Iraqi Kurdish forces also had tightened security around bases housing Turkish military monitors operating in northern Iraq with permission from local authorities under a 1996 agreement.

"The government of Kurdistan ordered the Peshmerga forces to be on alert in fear of any Turkish incursion on Iraqi territory," he said, claiming that Turkish military monitors had tried to leave their bases in violation of the accord.

"Those troops tried to move out, but the Peshmerga forces forced them to return to their camps within half an hour," he said.

If Turkish troops come into conflict with Kurdish peshmerga it's likely to expand the situation to include a full-on conflict between Turkeys and the Kurdish government. However there are reports saying Barzani has ordered Kurds not to engage Turkish troops. Whether that will stand only time will tell.